

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 5, 1957

PART 50

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Roman L. Hruska presiding.

Present: Senator Hruska.

Also present: William Rusher, associate counsel.

Senator HRUSKA. All right. The meeting will come to order.

The Chair would like to make a brief statement before we proceed to swear the witness, and to his interrogation.

The Internal Security Subcommittee has been trying to determine whether the Soviet Union is causing money to come into the United States to serve one or more of its purposes, all of which are calculated to undermine the security of this country and to extend Communist power abroad.

The Board for the Validation of German Bonds in the United States was set up for the purpose of determining which foreign currency bonds of German origin shall be validated and honored as existing obligations of the companies concerned.

When Richard H. Abrey, today's witness, sought to validate \$245,000 worth of bonds of the United Steel Works, the Board held that the bonds were physically located, on January 1, 1945, in the vaults of the Reichsbank in Berlin. This finding of the Validation Board is tantamount to a holding that these particular bonds were acquired by the Soviet Government and subsequently disposed of by it.

Mr. Abrey has been called today because we desire his testimony, in order to learn from him where he obtained the bonds in question.

Mr. Abrey, will you be sworn at this time, please.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ABREY. I do.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Rusher, will you proceed to the interrogation.

**TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HENRICH ABREY, NEW YORK, N. Y.;
ACCOMPANIED BY MINER CRARY, HIS COUNSEL**

Mr. RUSHER. What is your name, please?

Mr. ABREY. Richard Henrich Abrey.

Mr. RUSHER. Senator, I believe counsel for Mr. Abrey would like to make a statement.

Senator HRUSKA. Leave is granted.

Mr. CRARY. My name is Miner Crary. Subsequent to the determination of the Validation Board, Mr. Abrey instituted a proceeding as plaintiff, in the United States district court in New York, in an action to seek a determination that the requirements for the validation of his bonds had been met; that after instituting that proceeding, various motions were made by both parties, and there is now pending a decision by that court on those motions, which has not been decided.

Furthermore, after a particular newspaper article, an action in libel was commenced also by Mr. Abrey in the New York Supreme Court, and that also is still in process of litigation.

Mr. RUSHER. Mr. Abrey, I believe you originally were of Polish nationality; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you give us the Polish form of your name?

Mr. ABREY. Ryszard Henryk Abranowicz.

Mr. RUSHER. In 1939 you were in Poland, were you not, at the time of the outbreak of war?

Mr. ABREY. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you tell us from whom, and when, you acquired the 245 bonds of the value of \$1,000 apiece, of the United Steel Works, which you subsequently, in 1953, registered for validation with the Board for Validation of German Bonds in the United States?

Mr. ABREY. I purchased it through the Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw, Poland, in the early part of the spring of 1940, shortly prior to my departure from Poland for Honduras, in Central America.

Mr. RUSHER. You were, I believe, planning at that time to leave Poland as a result of the dislocations in that country following the German and Russian occupation; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And you say that you bought these bonds from the Bank Dyskontowy?

Mr. ABREY. I bought them at the Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw.

Mr. RUSHER. In Warsaw.

Can you tell us who had suggested the transaction, or how it had come about, directly, how it came to your attention and was consummated?

Mr. ABREY. It was suggested to me by a Mr. Radzinski.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you spell that, please?

Mr. ABREY. R-a-d-z-i-n-s-k-i, Radzinski. He was one of the executives of the Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw. He was known as Director Radzinski, which means one of the members of the board, or managers of the bank. He suggested these bonds as security which, by alterability, permitted by the German occupation authorities to be taken with me abroad at the time when I left Poland.

Mr. RUSHER. Did he indicate who were then the owners of the bonds?

Mr. ABREY. No; he did not.

Mr. RUSHER. Are you aware that the Validation Board, in its opinion denying validation to these particular bonds, stated, and I would quote from the opinion of the Board:

Dr. Laschtowiczka, member of the board of directors of the Bank Dyskontowy, Warsaw, for the period 1935 to May 1940, who served as Deputy Chief of the Polish Banking Supervisory Office after May 1940, testified that the Bank Dyskontowy had no United States Steel works debentures prior to August 31, 1939,

and that, to the best of his knowledge, no such debentures were acquired after that time.

And then it adds in a footnote:

The witness—

meaning Dr. Laschtowiczka—

was on leave from the bank from September 1939 to May 1940 but states he kept in close contact with the head of the bank, a Dr. Mikulecki.

In view of this apparent testimony that the bank did not have such bonds, will you explain how you came to acquire them from the bank?

Mr. ABREY. Well, Dr. Laschtowiczka stated that to his knowledge the bank did not have it, but it does not mean that the bank did not purchase it for specific purpose for me, for selling it to me.

Mr. RUSHER. So that you feel that the bank, although it did not have it, purchased it to sell to you; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct. That is my understanding at this time.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you know Mr. Mikulecki?

Mr. ABREY. Not personally.

Mr. RUSHER. Would he have known of this transaction, if it took place?

Mr. ABREY. Dr. Mikulecki was a German trustee of this bank, and it was rather my understanding that he instigated this transaction.

Mr. RUSHER. And yet Dr. Laschtowiczka, who, according to his testimony before the Validation Board, kept in close contact with him, apparently was not familiar with this transaction; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. It is quite possible, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, after you acquired the bonds, as you say, from the Bank Dyskontowy, what did you do with them? Did you take them with you out of Poland?

Mr. ABREY. I took them with me out of Poland.

Mr. RUSHER. And after a number of months, I believe it was, you came to San Francisco in the United States; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And you were traveling on what kind of a passport?

Mr. ABREY. Diplomatic passport, of the Republic of Honduras.

Mr. RUSHER. And you arrived here in the status of a person in transit; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. That is to say, in transit to Honduras?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you change your status after you came here?

Mr. ABREY. I did.

Mr. RUSHER. To what?

Mr. ABREY. To that of visitor.

Mr. RUSHER. Status of a visitor to the United States?

Mr. ABREY. On the Polish passport.

Mr. RUSHER. On a Polish passport?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, in connection with this change in your status from "in transit" to "visitor," did you execute a form for the Immigration and Naturalization Office in which you declared that you had no foreign securities?

Mr. ABREY. I have no recollection of executing this form. However, if such form was required, I am sure that it was executed.

Mr. RUSHER. Senator, I am informed from the report of the Validation Board, for the year beginning September 1, 1955, and ending August 31, 1956, that the registrant, meaning Mr. Abrey, in acquiring visitor's status, executed the form required by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, declaring that he owned no foreign securities, and that was the basis of my question.

You say you do not recall whether or not you executed such a form?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Subsequently, however, in December 1941, December 16, 1941, did you execute a sworn report of assets to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, as required by Federal regulations?

Mr. ABREY. I did.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you in that report state that you did not have such foreign securities?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct. I did not.

Mr. RUSHER. But at that time you did have them with you?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And you say that you subsequently have them in this country, in your possession?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Where did you keep them, physically?

Mr. ABREY. I had them at home.

Mr. RUSHER. You had them at home?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Until what date, roughly?

Mr. ABREY. Until early August of 1942.

Mr. RUSHER. What did you do with them at that time?

Mr. ABREY. I gave them for safekeeping to Mr. Funes in Honduras consulate. He is the consul general in New York.

Mr. RUSHER. Mr. Abrey, though you now tell us that you kept them at home until August 1942, it is a fact, is it not, that your original statement to the Validation Board at the time of registration in 1953 forward, until late July 1955, was to the effect that these bonds were in a safe deposit box that you maintained in the Chemical Bank, in New York?

Mr. ABREY. Correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And I believe there was evidence, tending to show that they were not in that safe deposit box, presented before the Board; is that right?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. It was subsequent to that, on July 26, 1955, that you submitted a further affidavit to the Board from your wife with respect to what had been the actual disposition of those bonds in that period?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. What was her subsequent explanation; will you tell us the facts as you now understand them to be?

Mr. ABREY. When I was confronted with the statement that these bonds were not in the safe deposit box, I was amazed, as I was all the time under the impression that my wife took it to the bank and placed them in the safe deposit box.

Mr. RUSHER. Had you told her to do this?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, I did; very specifically. However——

Mr. RUSHER. About when was this?

Mr. ABREY. About 1941.

Mr. RUSHER. The particular month, can you give us that?

Mr. ABREY. I can't recall, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Some time in 1941 you had told her to take it to the safe deposit box?

Mr. ABREY. I gave her the package and told her to take it to the safe deposit box which we had at this time, and I never inquired of her whether she did place it in the safe deposit box. I was all the time under the impression that they were there. Apparently my wife decided it was unnecessary, or she had neglected or forgotten. Only recent, within the last couple of years when I learned they were not there, I started to inquire with her why weren't the bonds placed in the safety deposit box, and she said she never bothered to take them over there.

Mr. RUSHER. And you presented her affidavit to the Board?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. When did you claim these bonds from what you then took to be the safe deposit box in the Chemical Bank, but which you now knew was in the personal custody of your wife?

Mr. ABREY. Before joining the Army in August of 1942, I asked my wife to give me the bonds, that I was going to the Honduras consulate to place them for safekeeping in case something happened to me. She then gave me the package and I took them to the consulate, to Mr. Funes.

Mr. RUSHER. You were still under the impression that she got the package from the safe deposit box?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. And under that impression, you made your subsequent statement to the Validation Board?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. I might add at this point, just to keep the record in balance, Senator, that the Validation Board's annual report states—I correct that—it is the opinion of the Board in connection with its decision in the matter that the particular safe deposit box of the Chemical Bank, which they identify as No. A346-970, was not large enough to hold the 245 debentures in question.

Mr. Abrey, when you did recover these from your wife—these bonds—you say you gave them to the representative of Honduras in New York?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Is that the consul general?

Mr. ABREY. The consul general, Mr. Funes.

Mr. RUSHER. F-u-n-e-s is the name?

Mr. ABREY. Correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And Mr. Funes held these for you?

Mr. ABREY. For me, until I called for them in December 1950.

Mr. RUSHER. Did he actually see the bonds, or simply the package?

Mr. ABREY. No. I opened the package, and I was under the impression that he saw these were the bonds.

Mr. RUSHER. You were under the impression that he had seen the bonds?

Mr. ABREY. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Subsequently, however, in his testimony before the Validation Board, it is correct, is it not, he testified simply that he had a package for you, and that it contained a bluish-green paper which he did not otherwise identify, and which he could not specifically identify as containing these bonds?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. So he held them for you until 1950, you say?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And in that year you withdrew them from his custody?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Where did you put them then?

Mr. ABREY. I had them at home, in Great Neck.

Mr. RUSHER. You had them at home, in Great Neck, Long Island?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, Long Island.

Mr. RUSHER. You kept them there until how long?

Mr. ABREY. Until the validation proceeding started to take place.

Mr. RUSHER. When was that?

Mr. ABREY. 1953, I believe.

Mr. RUSHER. Some time in 1953?

Mr. ABREY. Do you have that exact, Mr. Crary?

Mr. CRARY. September 1953.

Mr. RUSHER. September 1953.

Now, at any time after your arrival in this country, and up until, let's say, the time when you registered these bonds for validation in 1953, had you considered selling them for what they would bring?

Mr. ABREY. Well, I was, perhaps, thinking of selling them, but I didn't do any steps toward the sales.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you discuss the possibility of selling them, or the market value of them?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. With whom did you discuss that?

Mr. ABREY. In 1949—in the period covered by your question?

Mr. RUSHER. That's correct; after you arrived in the United States with the bonds.

Mr. ABREY. In 1941, I had two friends here in the United States, both from Poland, both in banking business in Poland, and I spoke to them on this subject.

Mr. RUSHER. Who were they?

Mr. ABREY. Mr. Keh.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you spell that, please?

Mr. ABREY. K-e-h; and Mr. Bagniewski.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you spell that, please?

Mr. ABREY. Bagniewski, B-a-g-n-i-e-w-s-k-i.

Mr. RUSHER. Where are they now?

Mr. ABREY. Both dead.

Mr. RUSHER. They are both dead?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. But you did speak with them, you say, about these bonds in 1941?

Mr. ABREY. In 1941.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you speak to anybody else concerning them?

Mr. ABREY. Not to my recollection—I am sorry; I spoke to Mr. Gross.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you give us his name?

Mr. ABREY. Alexander Gross, G-r-o-s-s.

Mr. RUSHER. And since the war, have you considered selling these bonds?

Mr. ABREY. Well, I was thinking of it.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you discuss it with anybody?

Mr. ABREY. Not to my recollection.

Mr. RUSHER. It is fairly clear in your mind that you have not discussed it with anyone since then?

Mr. ABREY. Fairly clearly, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you know the late Stanley T. Stanley, the first and last names are both S-t-a-n-l-e-y; Stanley T. Stanley, who in Poland, I believe before the war, was known by the name of Ruziewicz?

Mr. ABREY. I met him in Poland before the war, socially, a couple of times, and I knew him under that name. I didn't know that his name in the United States was Stanley.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you hear that he was associated in his business in the United States after the war with the late Serge Rubenstein?

Mr. ABREY. I read to this effect in the newspapers after Rubenstein was killed.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you have any business dealings of any sort with Stanley?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir; never.

Mr. RUSHER. Or with Rubenstein?

Mr. ABREY. Never.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you know a man named Joseph Gruss, who has an office at 30 Broad Street, New York City?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Have you ever had any business dealings with him?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you know a man named Nicholas Deak?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you ever have any business dealings with him?

Mr. ABREY. Never.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you know a man named Peter Kemp?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. When did you arrive in the United States?

Mr. ABREY. In November of 1940.

Mr. RUSHER. November of 1940. Were you well fixed, relatively speaking, financially, or were you in a position where a matter of this size was of some importance to you?

Mr. ABREY. Well, I wasn't well off, if that's what you mean.

Mr. RUSHER. Certainly, this was a matter of large concern; would that be fair to say?

Mr. ABREY. Yes and no, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. It is a subjective question, and I don't want to press it too much.

I wonder, though, whether or not you might not have made some inquiry at the New York Stock Exchange in late 1940 regarding the possible sales value of these bonds.

Mr. ABREY. No, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. You did not?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir. I arrived here in the early part of November 1940, and at this time we did intend to go to Honduras. My wife

took sick immediately upon arrival over here, and she was in bed for several weeks, and I didn't even open my suitcases, which were still sealed at this time, and these bonds were in the suitcases.

Mr. RUSHER. They had come in on your Honduran passport; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you explain—by the way, this is going back a bit—how you came to acquire a Honduran passport?

Mr. ABREY. I was honorary consulate general of Honduras, in Poland, and that is how I came under diplomatic status as a traveler.

Mr. RUSHER. These bonds were in your baggage that you brought with you?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. And were not inspected, therefore?

Mr. ABREY. They were not inspected.

Mr. RUSHER. Were they under diplomatic seal of some kind?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct. And, answering your question, sir, for this reason: Until the very end, or rather the beginning of 1941, being under the impression that I would proceed to Honduras, I did not open the suitcase, I didn't take out these papers and I did not inquire.

Mr. RUSHER. You couldn't inquire without opening the suitcase?

Mr. ABREY. I did not open the suitcases.

Mr. RUSHER. Isn't it a fact that the bonds, series A debentures, were selling on the New York Stock Exchange at a price of from 30½ to 36¼ in November and December of 1940?

Mr. ABREY. I didn't know about that.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you know whether that happens to be the case, from subsequent information?

Mr. ABREY. Only from the statements of the Validation Board.

Mr. RUSHER. That's what I was quoting it from. Mr. Abrey, in your testimony before the Validation Board, I believe you testified that you probably would have sold the debentures for \$50,000 in 1940, as you needed money badly, but that you were not aware that in November and December of 1940 the debentures were sold on the New York Stock Exchange at 30½ to 36¼.

Mr. ABREY. I may have said it, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Would it have been true, if you had said it?

Mr. ABREY. I doubt it.

Mr. RUSHER. You think you might have misstated the fact before the Validation Board?

Mr. ABREY. Perhaps. I was quite confident at the time, when I brought these bonds with me from Poland, that eventually the war would turn against Germany and that the bonds would be redeemed at the full value, and that I would salvage whatever was left from my prewar fortune. I wouldn't attempt to sell them at \$50,000 at this time.

Mr. RUSHER. We have, on two occasions, instances in which, given an opportunity, indeed, required to declare foreign securities, nevertheless you did not do so. When you changed your status from "in transit" to "visitor," a form required by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and again a form required by the Treasury, I believe, of aliens; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Will you please tell us why you violated that requirement?

Mr. ABREY. Well, as I see it today, my way of thinking then was probably that, because I entered this country under diplomatic status and I did not declare these German bonds at the time of entry in San Francisco, it might be in conflict with my status in which I arrived here, later on, to declare these German bonds. And I was probably also afraid they might be confiscated, being German bonds, and my knowledge of the English language, at this time, 1940, 1941, was rather very poor, and I was not too familiar with all the regulations, all the newspaper reports on the status of the foreigners. I was a bit confused, or even more than just a bit confused—I was just simply scared after I went through from Poland where I had seen confiscation without any reason.

Mr. RUSHER. Yet you had competent legal advice throughout, Mr. Abrey?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RUSHER. You had had legal advice in this country about the matter of citizenship as far back as 1938?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct; only about obtaining citizenship.

Mr. RUSHER. You subsequently sought legal advice about the change of your status from "in transit" to "visitor"?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. But, although one of the forms, which was inaccurately filled out, was executed in connection with that change of status, nevertheless you did not seek and did not have legal advice in connection with the filling out of that form; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. Foolishly, I did not.

Mr. RUSHER. How often, altogether, did you visit that safe-deposit box?

Mr. ABREY. Well, I can't recall the exact number of times I was over there. However, Mr. Crary, here, during the period of waiting here, brought to my attention that there are two photostatic copies of the bank's statement that I was twice in the bank; at least, I signed the necessary paper in the bank, in 1941, or, I believe, also 1942.

Mr. RUSHER. This is the paper necessary in order to enter the safe-deposit box; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. Twice in the period of 1941 or early in 1942?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. While the bonds, presumptively, were in the safe-deposit box?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. Were you alarmed not to find them there?

Mr. ABREY. Well, to my recollection, I haven't seen this box. I believe that I went with my wife over there, and I probably signed the papers, but I can't recall entering this box. In all probability, my wife went to the safe-deposit vault and took out the box.

Mr. RUSHER. She must have had, independently, the right to go into the box.

Mr. ABREY. She did; she did. We had rented it in 1938, and each person had independent access.

Mr. RUSHER. So that, as you now visualize it, Mr. Abrey, the records of the bank show that you went there and you signed to enter

the safe-deposit box; you feel that you waited, after having signed, while your wife actually went to the safe-deposit box?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Abrey, does your wife's signature appear on the same occasion, on this photostatic copy?

Mr. ABREY. No; just only mine. I believe only one signature was required to get access to the box, and it was my signature on the photostatic copy which I have seen.

Senator HRUSKA. As a matter of fact, isn't it the practice of all safe-deposit-box companies that all who enter the premises sign, whether their name is required or not?

Mr. ABREY. That I don't know, Senator.

Mr. RUSHER. But the two occasions you were there, were you accompanied by Mrs. Abrey?

Mr. ABREY. I can't recall it, sir. I would presume this was the case, as I can't recall my entering this box.

Senator HRUSKA. On neither of those occasions does Mrs. Abrey's signature appear on that card to which you refer?

Mr. ABREY. On neither one.

Mr. RUSHER. Do you have, Mr. Crary, the photostats of those occasions, and are they available for the inspection of the subcommittee?

Mr. CRARY. Yes, sir; they are. They are exhibits which were introduced by the Validation Board, and I'd be very happy to show you these copies.

Mr. RUSHER. If we could make copies for the record of the subcommittee, would that be agreeable to you?

Mr. CRARY. Certainly. These are public records.

(Copies of the reports of access to the safe-deposit box were marked "Exhibits No. 425 and 425-A" and appear below:)

Exhibit 31

THE CHEMICAL SAFE DEPOSIT COMPANY

~~408~~ BROADWAY

NEW YORK

PERCY H. JOHNSTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
HENRY L. SERVOS
TREASURER
J. LEWIS DALE
VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY
ROBERT JOHNSTON
VICE PRESIDENT, TREASURER
STEPHEN M. LIVINGSTON
VICE PRESIDENT
FRANCIS M. BOGS
ASSISTANT TREASURER

CHEMICAL SAFE DEPOSIT CO.
970 Eighth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

REPORT OF ACCESS TO BOX UNDER
TREASURY DEPARTMENT GENERAL LICENSE NO. 12.

Date of Access: OCT 21 1941

Time: 12:30 P.M.

Box No. A 346

Lessee: Raymond Abramowitz

Property deposited: 1, 012

Property withdrawn: none

Signature of person having access: Raymond Abramowitz

Signature of representative of safe deposit company:

Geo. B. White

THE CHEMICAL SAFE DEPOSIT COMPANY

~~970 Eighth Avenue~~

NEW YORK

PERCY H. JOHNSTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
HENRY L. SERVOS
TREASURER
J. LEWIS DALE
VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY
ROBERT JOHNSTON
VICE PRESIDENT, TREASURER
STEPHEN M. LIVINGSTON
VICE PRESIDENT
FRANCIS M. BOGS
ASSISTANT TREASURER

Sent
1/21/42

REPORT OF ACCESS TO BOX UNDER
TREASURY DEPARTMENT GENERAL LICENSE NO. 12.

Date of Access: January 21st 1942 Time: 9:30 AM

Box No. A 346

Lessee: Raymond Abramowitz

Property deposited:

Property withdrawn: 1 Gold ring 1 Gold Rocker 1 silver Vanity Case

Signature of person having access:

Raymond Abramowitz

Signature of representative of safe deposit company:

Leo L. Lander

Senator HRUSKA. If they are available for that purpose, they will be returned to you immediately upon being reproduced.

Mr. RUSHER. I might explain, Senator, that the decision of the Board in the matter of Mr. Abrey's bonds is already in the public record of the subcommittee, and has been, I believe, since the testimony of Mr. Reinstein in 1956.

I will, however, if I may, submit the report of the Validation Board in the German dollar bonds for the year beginning September 1, 1955, insofar as it pertains to the matter of these challenged, so-called challenged, registrations.

Senator HRUSKA. The report will be received for the record.

(The section of the report above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 426" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 426

VII. THE CHALLENGED REGISTRATIONS

A. GENERAL

Of the total of \$142,459,600 principal amount of German dollar bonds registered with the Board under 40,620 separate registrations, 54 registrations have been challenged. These challenged cases represent bonds having a principal value of \$1,319,000. In all of these cases objections have been filed with the Board by the issuers and examining agencies. Such objections are accompanied by evidence tending to show that the bonds were, in fact, within Germany on January 1, 1945, and that they were unlawfully removed from the vaults in which they were deposited.

In 6 of these cases representing a total principal value of \$274,000, the Board has rendered formal decisions denying validation.

In 12 of these cases involving bonds totaling \$329,000 principal value, the registrants, after receiving the Board's letter outlining the facts and evidence against the validation, have withdrawn their registrations.

There are still pending before the Board 36 cases involving \$716,000 principal value. The registrants in these cases have been or will be notified that objections to validation have been filed with the Board by the issuers and examining agencies and invited to rebut the objections and to supplement the evidence submitted with their registrations in support of their claims that the bonds were, in fact, outside of Germany on January 1, 1945.

In 14 of these cases the Board has given formal notice of its intention to deny validation, informing the registrant that unless further evidence supporting the registrant's case is received within 90 days, the Board would proceed to render its decision denying validation.

Although a public hearing has been held in only one of the challenged cases, the Board has been ready at all times to meet and discuss evidence with any of its registrants or their representatives, either privately or in public hearing. Every possible assistance has been offered to its registrants in suggesting sources of documentary evidence or granting additional time within which to find evidence.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RUSHER. Mr. Abrey, when you first purchased these bonds, as you say, in Poland in 1940, was it early 1940?

Mr. ABREY. 1940.

Mr. RUSHER. Whom did you deal with in the Bank Dyskontowy?

Mr. ABREY. Mr. Radzinski.

Mr. RUSHER. Would you spell that for the record, please?

Mr. ABREY. Radzinski, R-a-d-z-i-n-s-k-i.

Mr. RUSHER. Did you deal with anybody else?

Mr. ABREY. No, sir; only with him.

Mr. RUSHER. He was the only bank official that you had any dealings with?

Mr. ABREY. Yes.

Mr. RUSHER. And he carried through the transaction?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. How did you pay for these bonds?

Mr. ABREY. By check, in Polish currency, drawn against my account in the Bank Dyskontowy.

Mr. RUSHER. To whom did you pay in the bank?

Mr. ABREY. Bank Dyskontowy.

Mr. RUSHER. To whom, specifically; a clerical employee?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Can you tell us a little bit about the physical situation of the transaction; did you go to the bank?

Mr. ABREY. Yes; I went to the bank personally, at which time I was told that export permit was granted to me; and at this time only I authorized the bank to obtain the title to these bonds.

Mr. RUSHER. Now, you say an export permit was granted to you. Was that necessary at that time?

Mr. ABREY. This was the main purpose of purchasing these bonds, or anything else; whatever was available of any value to me.

Mr. RUSHER. These particular bonds were of a type for which the German authorities would grant an export permit?

Mr. ABREY. They granted me a permit for these particular securities.

Mr. RUSHER. Were you aware that the decision of the Validation Board, in denying validation to your bonds, states, and I quote:

Erich Tetzner, former head of the German office in Poland, charged with control of foreign currency assets, testified that under the regulations in effect during the German occupation of Poland he personally would have had to approve a transaction involving the purchase, sale, or export of \$245,000 in face value of United Steel Works debentures, and that no application was ever filed with his office.

Mr. ABREY. I understand that that is what the Validation Board stated.

Mr. RUSHER. Is that your own understanding, that he would have had to approve such a transaction?

Mr. ABREY. I wouldn't know, sir. I never went to his office, I never applied for permit to him personally.

Mr. RUSHER. Yet you say that the bank told you that a permit had been granted?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct; and I have seen this permit myself. I had it in my hands.

Mr. RUSHER. Where is it now?

Mr. ABREY. Well, I don't have it.

The German authorities, when inspecting my luggage at the time it was packed and sealed, they took it with them.

Mr. RUSHER. In Poland?

Mr. ABREY. In Poland; in Warsaw.

Mr. RUSHER. But they left the bonds?

Mr. ABREY. But they left the bonds in my suitcases.

Mr. RUSHER. So this one man in the bank that you referred to is the only man who had knowledge of the transaction?

Mr. ABREY. Of the officials of the bank.

Mr. RUSHER. Where is he now?

Mr. ABREY. He is dead, as I understand from the report of the Validation Board.

Mr. RUSHER. I see.

Let me ask you: You had seen the safe deposit box, yourself, had you not, prior to these two occasions on which you say your wife actually went into it?

Mr. ABREY. At the time I rented the box in 1938, 1939, I had seen the box. I——

Mr. RUSHER. Go ahead.

Mr. ABREY. I placed whatever we left there in 1939, prior to returning to Poland; I placed that myself personally.

Mr. RUSHER. What kind of things were those?

Mr. ABREY. They were personal jewelry of my wife, some United States Government savings bonds, and some cash.

Mr. RUSHER. You put this physically in the box yourself?

Mr. ABREY. In the box, myself.

Mr. RUSHER. You had a clear physical impression of it; you knew roughly what it was, and its size; is that correct?

Mr. ABREY. Well, I don't have the impression now, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. You do remember having gone to it and put these things in it?

Mr. ABREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUSHER. Is it your impression that the 245 bonds of the United Steel Works would fit into that box?

Mr. ABREY. My impression at that moment?

Mr. RUSHER. At that time.

Mr. ABREY. I can't recall; it was about 19 years ago.

Mr. RUSHER. And it is your recollection that you told your wife, nevertheless, to put them in?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Mr. RUSHER. And you are now familiar with the testimony before the Board to the effect that it would not have fitted?

Mr. ABREY. That is correct.

Senator HRUSKA. Will that be all, Mr. Rusher?

Mr. RUSHER. I have no further questions, Senator.

Senator HRUSKA. Very well.

The subcommittee will continue its hearings at a time and date to be fixed by the Chairman.

We will continue our efforts to find out as to some of the aspects of the testimony, both of the Validation Board and that which you have given, Mr. Abrey.

There do seem to be some conflicts, and it will be the subcommittee's desire to resolve those conflicts, if possible, and to see if they can be reconciled.

Mr. CARY. May I say for the record, Senator, that if there is any further help Mr. Abrey can give, I believe I speak for him in saying that we will be glad to do so.

Senator HRUSKA. I appreciate that.

Anything further?

Mr. RUSHER. Not at this time, Senator.

Senator HRUSKA. The meeting is adjourned, and the witness is excused for the time being.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 14 AND 15, 1957

PART 51

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:05 a. m., in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan presiding.

Present: Senator McClellan.

Also present: Robert Morris, Chief counsel; J. G. Sourvine, associate counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert McManus, investigations analyst.

Senator McCLELLAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Counsel, will you make a brief statement of the hearing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness this morning is a former official of the Soviet Secret Police, economic adviser to the NKVD, who is prepared to testify on Soviet espionage relating to the United States, as well as Soviet manipulation of money, I believe.

Senator McCLELLAN. Has his testimony been taken in executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. It has.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Sir, you may stand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ORLOV. I do.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right, Mr. Counsel, proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER ORLOV

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born, Mr. Orlov?

Mr. ORLOV. In Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mr. ORLOV. 1895.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could sketch for us some of your more important assignments with the Soviet Government?

Mr. ORLOV. Well, during the civil war in Russia I was commander of the guerrilla detachments on the southwestern front, the Twelfth Red Army, to be exact.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in charge of operations on the Spanish front?

Mr. ORLOV. No; in Russia, during the civil war.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry.

Mr. ORLOV. Then, I was chief of counterintelligence of the Army. In 1921, I was commander of the frontier troops of the northern region of Russia, and also of the local troops there, based at Archangel.

In 1921, I was sent to the supreme court of the Soviet Union, which at that time was not called the Soviet Union but just the Federal Republic.

From 1922 to 1924 I was assistant prosecutor of the supreme court of the whole country.

In 1924 I was sent to the OGPU, which is the same as the NKVD, as deputy chief of the economic department, which had to supervise industry and trade.

Mr. MORRIS. You were the deputy chief?

Mr. ORLOV. Deputy chief of the economic department of the OGPU, or the NKVD.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was the Soviet secret police?

Mr. ORLOV. You may call it that way. It was the Ministry of the Interior.

Mr. MORRIS. As opposed to the military intelligence operations?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

Then, in 1925, I was sent to the Caucasus as commander of the frontier troops, which guarded the borders of the Soviet Union with Persia and Turkey.

In 1926 I was named chief of the economic department of the NKVD for the supervision of foreign trade.

At the beginning of 1936 or the end of 1935, I was named acting chief of the department of NKVD for railways and sea transport.

In 1936, when civil war started in Spain, I was sent as a Soviet diplomat to Madrid and adviser to the Republican Government of Spain on matters pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. I directed the guerrilla warfare there, and it is a matter of record in the newspapers that we succeeded in organizing two rebel groups, one in the region of La Roche and the other, Rio Tinto, among the miners, which was very successful and which forced General Franco to issue an order to divert two divisions from his active forces at the front, in order to combat the guerrilla forces.

I arrived in Spain in 1936, the beginning of September, and I left Spain on July 12, 1938, when I broke with the Soviet Government and made my way through Canada to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, have you since been living in the United States?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes. I have been all that time in the United States, in complete hiding, for 15 years, until 1953, when I published my book, the Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, and a series of articles in Life magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. You had never testified before a congressional committee or tribunal of the Government of the United States?

Mr. ORLOV. I testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee in executive session, in September.

Mr. MORRIS. On September 28, 1955?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Other than that, you have not testified anywhere?

Mr. ORLOV. No, I have not.

Mr. MORRIS. And you are not known in the United States as Alexander Orlov?

Mr. ORLOV. No, not generally. I lived in complete hiding because I had to dodge assassins which would be sent, or which had been sent out, I am quite sure, by the Soviet NKVD on orders of Stalin.

When I broke with the Soviet Government, I had to think about my mother and the mother of my wife, who remained in Russia, and I surely was aware that attempts would be made on my life.

So, I wrote a letter to Stalin, with one copy to Yezhov, who was then the right-hand man of Stalin, warning them that if anything happened to our mothers or if I were killed, my memoirs would be published and the secrets known to me about Stalin's crimes exposed. To show forcefully enough to Stalin that I meant business, I, in spite of the protests of my wife, attached to that letter a whole list of Stalin's crimes, with some of the expressions which he himself had used in secret conferences with the NKVD chiefs, when he was forging, fabricating the evidence against the leaders of the revolution during the Moscow trials.

That probably had a certain effect, and I knew that they would not kill me outright in the street, but would try to kidnap me to some remote place and force me to yield all my notes and memoirs, and things like that.

In 1953 I came to the conclusion that our mothers could no longer be alive, because so many years have passed, and I decided to take the chance, and I submitted my manuscript, while Stalin was still alive, to the editors of Life magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Orlov—

I might say, Senator McClellan, when we learned in 1955 that this particular witness knew a man who was at that time operating under a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation and was working in the Veterans' Administration in the Bronx, in New York, we knew that Mr. Orlov, through his own experiences in the Soviet organization, knew that that man was a Soviet agent, we called Mr. Orlov to testify on that particular subject.

I wonder if you could tell us now—it was only in executive session, then, so this testimony has not become known—did you know Mark Zborowsky, or know of him?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes, I did.

If you wish, I may tell you in short the story about that.

Mr. MORRIS. He is an anthropologist, operating under a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation, in the Veterans' Administration, and he is in the Bronx.

Mr. ORLOV. Before I left Russia in 1936, I learned that the NKVD had succeeded in planting a spy in the entourage of Trotsky and his son, Leon Sedov, and that Stalin himself knew about that agent and used to read his reports about Trotsky and Trotsky's son. I understood very well what that meant. I understood that Stalin was doing his best in order to corner Trotsky and assassinate him, and I understood that through this man Stalin might introduce, under the guise of a guard or secretary, an assassin into Trotsky's household.

When I heard about that, I understood that only a very few chosen people knew about that agent. And I was afraid to ask for his name because, after he had been exposed, after he would have been exposed by me, there would be an investigation as to who had exposed him.

So, without asking that name, I left for Spain. I knew that that agent was working in Paris where Trotsky's son lived and edited the Bulletin of the Opposition.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Trotsky's son's name? How was he known?

Mr. ORLOV. He was known as Leon Sedov.

While working in Spain during the civil war, I used to come on business to France, and there I did my best to find out the identity of this agent from the chief of the NKVD in Paris, in France.

I found out that this agent had become the closest friend of Trotsky's son, Leon Sedov, and that he was in correspondence with Trotsky himself.

Again, I did not ask for his name, but I found out that his first name was Mark.

Mr. MORRIS. The agent's first name was Mark?

Mr. ORLOV. The agent's first name was Mark.

I did not know at that time that his name was Zborowsky. Then I learned that he used to sign his articles in the Trotsky Bulletin of the Opposition, under the pen name of Etienne. I found out also that he was married, about his age, and that he had a baby, a little child about a year old, and I have also found out that that agent worked at the Research Institute, which belonged to an old, well-known Socialist, Boris Nikolayevsky.

So I had something to go on in order to expose that man.

Soon after that, I broke with the Soviet Government and came to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you decided to expose that man?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes, I decided to expose that man, and to warn Trotsky that he might expect an assassin, from that man.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you had already fallen out with the ideals of the Soviets?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

And as soon as I came to the United States and arranged my personal affairs, I wrote two letters, one to Trotsky in Mexico, and the other, a copy to his wife, also in Mexico, warning them about that agent provocateur who was planted in their midst, and warning Trotsky to be on guard against that man.

I have a copy of that letter, which I have given in executive session to the Internal Security Subcommittee. This is the photostat of my carbon copy, and here is a translation of the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the one you sent many years ago to Trotsky himself?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes. I sent it on December 27, 1938.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you wish to have the letter read into the record at this point?

Mr. MORRIS. I think it would be helpful, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. If you will, just read the letter into the record.

Mr. ORLOV. Because the letter is long, I would ask permission to give only these quotations from it.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, the whole letter—

Mr. MORRIS. I suggest, maybe we put the whole letter in the record, and ask the witness to read the pertinent sections.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. The letter will be printed in the record at this point.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 426." A translation reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 426

[Transcribed copy]

DECEMBER 27, 1938.

DEAR LEV DAVIDOVICH, I am a Jew who came from Russia. In my youth I was close to the revolutionary movement (the Bund Party). Later I emigrated to America where I have been living for many years.

I have close relatives in Russia. Among them there was one by the name of *Lushkov*, Henry Samoilovich, a prominent Bolshevik and chief of the Cheka. It is the same *Lushkov*, who, being afraid for his life, fled 8 months ago from Khabarovsk (Russia) to Japan. That story was printed in all newspapers. From there (Japan) he wrote to me in America, asking me to come to Japan and help him. I went there and helped him as much as I could. I found for him a lawyer to make sure that he is not extradited to the Soviets and gave him a little money.

Why am I writing all this to you?—Because I have learned from *Lushkov* that there is within your organization a dangerous *agent provocateur*. I am no longer a revolutionary, but I am an honest man. And an honest man has a definite attitude toward agent provocateurs. *Here is what I learned from Lushkov:*

All the work against the old Bolsheviks in Russia was concentrated in the hands of *Molchanov*, chief of the secret department. He was in charge of the preparation of the Moscow trial against *Zinoviev*. *Lushkov* was *Molchanov's* assistant. After the arrest of *Yagoda*, *Lushkov* was transferred to Khabarovsk and appointed chief of the political police and assistant to General *Blukher*. Meantime, *Molchanov* and all other leading police officers, who had served under *Yagoda* were executed on *Stalin's* orders. *Lushkov* understood that his turn was near and escaped to Japan.

From my conversation with *Lushkov* it has become clear to me that he himself had also taken part in the persecution of revolutionaries and the preparation of the trial against *Zinoviev*. *Lushkov* is now an enemy of *Stalin*, but he declined my suggestion that he take action to vindicate the revolutionaries imprisoned in Russia, because he is afraid that if he did so the Russian Government would insist on his extradition and might come to terms with Japan on that score.

But I think that that's not the point, and that the real reason for *Lushkov's* reluctance lies in the fact that he himself, spurred on by promotions and love of power, took an active part in the crimes committed against the revolutionaries.

When I returned to the United States I acquainted myself more closely with the tragedy of the Russian revolutionaries and read the books *Not Guilty* and *The Case of Leon Trotsky*.

Dear L. D., these books arouse indignation at the cruelties which are being inflicted in Russia on people who gave their whole lives to the revolution. Under the influence of these books I decided (a little late to my regret) to write to you about the most important thing which I learned from *Lushkov*: *about one important and dangerous agent provocateur*, who had been for a long time assistant to your son, *Sedov*, in Paris.

Lushkov is categorically against publishing the things which are known to him and does not intend to make any public revelations himself, but he does not object to letting you know who the principal agent provocateur or the *Stalin Cheka* in your party is.

Lushkov gave me detailed information about this agent provocateur with the understanding that no one, even you yourself, should know that this information came from him. In spite of the fact that *Lushkov* forgot the last name of the provocateur, he supplied enough details to enable you to establish without any error who that man is. This agent provocateur had for a long time assisted your son *L. Sedov* in editing your Russian "Bulleting of Opposition," in Paris, and collaborated with him until the very death of *Sedov*.

Lushkov is almost sure that the provocateur's name is "Mark." He was literally the shadow of *L. Sedov*; he informed the Cheka about every step of *Sedov*, about his activities and personal correspondence with you which the provocateur read with the knowledge of *L. Sedov*. This provocateur wormed himself into the complete confidence of your son and knew as much about the activities of

your organization as Sedov himself. Thanks to this provocateur several officers of the Cheka have received decorations.

This provocateur worked till 1938 at the Archive or Institute of the well-known Menshevik, Nikolayevsky, in Paris and, may be, still works there. It was this Mark who stole a part of your archive (documents) from Nikolayevsky's establishment (he did it twice if I am not mistaken). These documents were delivered to Lushkov in Moscow and he read them.

This agent provocateur is about 32-35 years old. He is a Jew, originates from the Russian part of Poland, writes well in Russian. Lushkov had seen his photograph. This provocateur wears glasses. He is married and has a baby.

What surprises me more than anything else is the gullibility of your comrades. This man had no revolutionary past whatsoever. In spite of the fact that he is a Jew, he was about 4 years ago a member of the Society for Repatriation to Russia (this is a society of former czarist officers, in Paris). According to Lushkov, this was well known in Paris even to members of your organization. In that society he acted already as a Bolshevik agent provocateur. After that the Cheka assigned him to your organization, where for some reason, he was trusted. This provocateur represented himself as a former Polish Communist, but it is very unlikely that this was true.

Lushkov said that after the theft of your archive from Nikolayevsky's Institute, they were almost sure in Moscow that you would discover who the provocateur was, because only a few persons worked at the institute and all of them with the exception of the provocateur Mark, had some revolutionary past. When I asked Lushkov whether this provocateur was in any way responsible for the death of your son L. Sedov, he answered that this was not known to him, but that the archive was definitely stolen by Mark.

Lushkov expressed apprehension that now *the assassination of Trotsky was on the agenda and that Moscow would try to plant assassins with the help of this agent provocateur or through agent provocateurs from Spain under the guise of Spanish Trotskyites.*

Lushkov said that you knew this provocateur well from letters of L. Sedov, but that you had never met him personally. Lushkov told me that the provocateur has regular meetings with officers from the Soviet embassy in Paris and Lushkov expressed surprise why your comrades have not discovered this, *especially after your documents had been stolen from Nikolayevsky's Institute.*

Dear L. D., this is all that I can tell you now. I hope that in the future I will succeed in learning from him a lot of things, which might be important for the purpose of exposing the frameups of the Moscow political police and proving that the executed revolutionaries were innocent.

I ask you not to tell anybody about my letter and, especially, that this letter came from the United States. The Russian Cheka, no doubt, knows that I made the trip to Lushkov, and if they learn in some way about this letter they will understand that Lushkov supplied the information through me. And I have close relatives in Russia to whom I send food parcels and they might be arrested as a reprisal for this letter.

Do not tell also that you obtained this information from Lushkov. The best thing, don't tell anybody about this letter. Ask your trusted comrades in Paris to find out whether Mark belonged to the Union of Repatriation to the Homeland, to check on his past and to see whom he meets. There is no doubt, that before long your comrades will see him meet officers from the Soviet Embassy.

You have all the right in the world to check on members of your organization, even when you have no information that they are traitors. And besides, you are not obliged to believe me.

The main thing: be on your guard. Do not trust any person, man or woman, who may come to you with recommendations from this provocateur.

I am not signing this letter and I am not giving my address, because I am afraid that the Stalinists might intercept and read this letter at the post office in Mexico. They might even confiscate the letter.

In order that I may know that you have received this letter I should like you to publish a notice in the newspaper Socialist Appeal in New York that the editorial office has received the letter from Stein; please, have the notice appear in the newspaper for January and February.

To make it safer, I am sending 2 identical letters: one addressed to you and the other to your wife, N. Sedov. I have learned your address from the book *The Case of L. T.*

Respectfully, your friend,

Senator McCLELLAN. Now you may comment upon certain quotes from it.

Mr. ORLOV. Yes. Here are the quotations, but before quoting this, I would like to say that, while I was sending that letter, I was aware that Trotsky's correspondence was being intercepted by agents of the Russian police at the Mexican Post Office, and I knew they would read my letter, and thus find out where I was hiding in the United States, and that would facilitate my assassination.

So I had to find some way of transmitting the true message to Trotsky and, at the same time, disguise my identity. I was successful in doing that, thanks to one incident that occurred a few months earlier.

Senator McCLELLAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. ORLOV. There was another person abroad who knew about the identity of that Soviet agent among the Trotskyites. That man was General Lushkov, who had been, before that, Deputy to Marshal Blucher. Blucher was in the far eastern maritime provinces of Russia.

It happened that General Lushkov, who was one of Stalin's right-hand men in the preparation of the trials against the old Bolsheviks, became afraid for his own life and fled to Japan some time in June 1938.

So I decided to send that message to Trotsky in such a way that he should think that that information came from General Lushkov, and I knew pretty well that the Russians would read that letter and would then think that Lushkov, who made revelations in Japan before newspapermen, was the man who exposed Mark Zborowsky.

So I devised a legend and wrote to Trotsky that I was an old immigrant, a Russian immigrant in America, that my "nephew," General Lushkov, fled to Japan, that I had received a letter from him saying he needed help, and was afraid he would be extradited to Russia. So I went to him and helped him with whatever I could, and found a lawyer for him. This is what I learned from Lushkov, I wrote in my letter to Trotsky that Lushkov was one of the organizers of the famous trials for Stalin, one of the men who falsified the testimony in those trials and who became afraid for his life because Stalin got into a habit of killing everybody who knew his secrets and his crimes.

So, I wrote, I learned from Lushkov about the dangerous agent provocateur in their midst, who is close to Trotsky's son, and who might become instrumental in the assassination of Trotsky.

And here are some of the extracts from that letter. I wrote the letter as a Russian immigrant would write it. I tried that my language should not be very good, not in very good Russian:

I decided to write to you that I learned about an important and dangerous agent provocateur who had been a long time the assistant of your son, Sedov, in Paris. The name of this provocateur is Mark. He was literally the shadow of Leon Sedov.

Those are little pieces, quotations from the letter.

This provocateur worked until 1938 for the archives of Nikolayevsky in Paris and maybe works there now. It was this Mark who stole a part of your archives from the Nikolayevsky Institute in Paris.

This agent provocateur is about 32 to 35 years old. He is a Jew, originates from the Russian part of Poland, speaks good Russian. He wears glasses. He is married and has one child, a baby.

This provocateur has no revolutionary past whatsoever. In spite of the fact that he is a Jew, he was about 4 years ago a member of the Society for the Repatriation to Russia. (This is a society of former Czarist officers.) He was already a Bolshevik provocateur then.

Now the assassination of Trotsky is on the agenda and they will try to plant assassins through this agent provocateur or through provocateurs from Spain under the guise of Spanish Trotskyites.

This provocateur meets a Soviet agent from the Soviet Embassy regularly. The main thing, be on your guard. Don't trust any person, man or woman, who may come to you with recommendations from this provocateur. Ask your trusted men to check on this man and find out whom he meets. There is no doubt that before long they will see him with an officer from the Soviet Embassy.

Being afraid that that letter might be stolen altogether from the post office, and I would never know whether Trotsky had received the letter, I asked Trotsky to place an ad in his own newspaper in New York, which was called Socialist Appeal, and address it to Stein. This is the name with which I signed the letter, but I wrote in the letter that that was not my real name.

Soon enough, a month later, I received his frantic ad:

I insist, Mr. Stein, I insist that you go immediately to the editorial offices of the Socialist Appeal and talk to Comrade Martin.

I went there without disclosing my identity. I took just a side look at that Martin, and he did not inspire too much confidence in me, so that was all.

MR. MORRIS. You say he did not inspire any confidence?

MR. ORLOV. Yes.

After that I tried to call up Trotsky by phone. His secretary talked to me. Trotsky did not want to come to the phone. He was afraid I was a journalist who just wanted to exploit him, for my own purposes. So that was all about it.

Now, I have been in hiding for 15 years, in complete hiding. In 1953, when I published my life articles, and came out, if not into the open, at least into semihiding. I met some of the Old Russian Socialists who had lived in exile in France for many years and are now in the United States. I asked them whether they knew such a man, because I was interested in preventing his treacherous work, which he might have been continuing somewhere else, betraying Socialists, deviationists, and other people.

Within 6 months I have found out—which was a big surprise to me—that that man was here in the United States since 1941, that he became an American citizen, that he enjoyed Government and social grants, quite substantial ones.

I immediately suspected that he had been sent by the Russians to America to conduct espionage and to betray people. I learned this on Christmas night, 1954, and, as soon as the holiday was over, I went to the assistant United States attorney, B. Atterbury, in New York, and told him the story. He called in two FBI men, and I repeated the story before them.

As a result—only then have I learned that his real name here was Zborowsky, because, if you may have noticed, I have never asked what his last name was—this Zborowsky was called before the Internal Security Subcommittee where he confirmed everything, in the minutest detail, of what I had said about him.

I gave my information about him—about his activity until 1938—because I did not have any way of knowing what he did afterward.

But he confessed that he maintained connections with the Soviet intelligence service, through the Soviet Embassy here, until 1945.

I got then a suspicion that he decided to limit his activities by 1945, because then he would have enjoyed here the statute of limitation. But I don't know, probably the investigative agencies of the Government are talking or have been talking to him, and I think that he might have told them much more than we have heard about him here in his testimony in the Internal Security Subcommittee.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator McClellan, when Mr. Zborowsky testified here on February 29, 1956, he acknowledged that, when the FBI first went to him after this disclosure by Mr. Orlov, he had first denied that he had been working for the secret police, but then afterward, in subsequent sessions, he did make confessions that he had indeed been doing these things. Now——

Senator McCLELLAN. Where is he now?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, we last heard, when he testified at that time, that he was operating under this grant in the Veterans' Administration hospitals in New York. He was working among the patients, at the veterans' hospitals, studying pain and the reaction of pain on the part of the wounded soldiers, wounded service people.

I could not tell you whether he is still there now or not. We have not pursued Zborowsky now, the subject of Zborowsky, now for some time.

Now, is there anything more you would like to know about that particular man, Senator, that Zaborowsky?

Senator McCLELLAN. I think we would all like to know where he is and what he is doing now.

Mr. MORRIS. We will find out whether he is still up there now.

Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you would tell us about your role in Spain. You had to handle—you were in charge of the rather substantial gold transfer from the Spanish Government to Moscow, were you not?

Mr. ORLOV. Well, that was just an exceptional operation——

Mr. MORRIS. An exceptional operation.

Mr. ORLOV (continuing). Because my basic work in Spain was organizing for the Spanish Republican Government the counter-intelligence and intelligence against Hitlerite Germany and against General Franco's forces.

My second task was to organize guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines.

But the gold operation was just a unique operation which had been entrusted to me by Stalin personally.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were personally in charge of this transfer of gold, and you were personally deputized by Stalin to arrange that; is that right?

Mr. ORLOV. That is true.

I wish to say that the secret of the shipment of the Spanish reserves of gold to Russia had been known to a very few selected persons. After Prime Minister of Spain Largo Caballero died, after the President of Spain, Azana, died, there remain now in the Western World only 3 persons who know about that operation of gold, and after the death of the Prime Minister Negrin, only 3 persons. One is Indalecio Prieto, one of the biggest statesmen of Republican Spain, the former Minister of Defense. The second person who knew about the opera-

tion was the Chief of the Spanish Treasury, Senor Mendez Aspe, who later became Finance Minister of Spain, and the third person is me.

Mr. Prieto is a very old man. We don't know how long he will last. So, actually, 2 persons might still remain as witnesses, 1, this Aspe, who is somewhere in Mexico, and me, Alexander Orlov, who is now in the United States.

Until approximately November of last year, there was no proof of any kind that that gold had been shipped to Russia, because the receipt which had been issued in Moscow after the gold had been counted, was in safekeeping of the former Prime Minister Negrin, who did not want the gold to go to Franco.

As I read in the newspapers, Franco's men succeeded in stealing or otherwise obtaining, maybe with the consent of Negrin himself, of that receipt, and that the receipt is now in the hands of the Franco government. There is some suspicion that Negrin himself, feeling that his end was approaching, decided that, after all, that huge hoard of gold belongs to the Spanish people. Regimes come and go. The Spanish people remain, and the Spanish nation is entitled to the gold and there were expressed suspicions or conjectures that he, Negrin, instructed his own son to turn over that receipt to the present Spanish Government.

The story about the Spanish gold developed as follows——

Mr. MORRIS. Are you going to relate your own role in that particular operation?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

On the 20th of October, when I was in Madrid, the situation at the front was desperate. The enemy came to within 20 miles of Madrid. People were leaving the city, and the opinion of the Government was that Madrid could not be held and the Government was getting ready to abandon Madrid.

At that time, 1 day my code clerk came into my office with a code book under his arm, and with a telegram which he started to decipher. He deciphered only a few words, after which there was an order that I should myself decipher the rest of the telegram.

The telegram read:

I transmit to you the personal order of the boss——

Yezhov.

And there followed the telegram of Stalin:

Together with Ambassador Rosenberg, arrange with the head of the Spanish Government, Caballero, for the shipment of the gold reserves of Spain to the Soviet Union. Use for that purpose a Soviet steamer. This operation must be carried out with the utmost secrecy.

If the Spaniards demand from you a receipt for the cargo, refuse. I repeat, refuse to sign anything, and say that a formal receipt will be issued in Moscow by the State Bank.

I hold you personally responsible for this operation. Rosenberg has been instructed accordingly.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, this is the secret instruction sent to you by Yezhov. What was his title at that time?

Mr. ORLOV. He was at that time Minister of the Interior, the head of all the Soviet Intelligence Service, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and, above all, the righthand man of Stalin.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were being given instructions from Stalin that you were to act with respect to the Spanish gold?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Who was Rosenberg?

Mr. ORLOV. He was the Soviet Ambassador.

Senator McCLELLAN. In Spain?

Mr. ORLOV. In Spain; in Madrid.

I immediately went with that telegram to Soviet Ambassador Rosenberg and found him deciphering a similar telegram, with his code clerk waiting in a remote corner, waiting because maybe his help would be needed. Probably the Ambassador had instructions also that he should decipher that telegram himself.

The next day, or the day after, I had a conference with our Ambassador Rosenberg and with the Spanish Finance Minister Negrin, who eventually became Prime Minister. Negrin asked me how many men I would need in order to carry out that operation. I told him that I would carry out the operation with my own men, and I had in mind our tank soldiers who had recently arrived in Spain.

Mr. MORRIS. Soviet soldiers?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes; Soviet soldiers.

From there we went to the Spanish—from our Embassy we went to the Spanish Ministry of Finance, where Negrin, the Finance Minister, introduced me to the Chief of the Spanish Treasury, Senor Mendez Aspe.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did Negrin understand what was going on here?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes, Negrin understood, and only three men of the Government knew about the operation. No one else of the Cabinet knew it. Those were Prime Minister Caballero, Finance Minister Negrin, and the President of the Republic, Azana.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in there, Mr. Orlov?

Knowing from the Soviet outlook, was this gold being taken from the Spanish Government for safekeeping or simply being taken away?

Mr. ORLOV. It was being sent for safekeeping.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the Soviet intention at that time?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes, that was the Soviet intention at that time, and I must say that Ambassador Rosenberg and myself were flabbergasted when we were told that the Spanish Government was willing to trust Stalin with all the savings of the Spanish nation—Stalin, who had been already known to the world for what he was, a man who did not actually deserve any confidence at all.

Senator McCLELLAN. What was the value of the gold?

Mr. ORLOV. It is difficult to say. I think about—it was estimated between \$600 million and \$700 million. I think it was about 600 tons.

I wish to stress that, at that time, the Spanish Government, which was a coalition government that consisted of leaders of various parties, was not in full control because there were many parties, many armies, uncontrollables. Anarchists had their own army. I frankly told Finance Minister Negrin that if somebody got wind of it, if the anarchists intercepted my men, Russians, with truckloads of Spanish gold, they would kill my men, and it would be a tremendous political scandal all over the world, and it might even create an internal revolution.

So my suggestion was, I asked him whether the Spanish Government could issue to me credentials under some fictitious name, naming me there, representing me there as a representative of the Bank of England or of the Bank of America, because then, figuring as a repre-

sentative of the Bank of England or of America, I would be able to say that the gold was being taken for safekeeping to America, but it would be dangerous to say that I was taking it to Russia because that would really create a revolution.

Negrin did not object. He thought it was a fine idea. I spoke more or less decent English, and I could pass for a foreigner.

So he issued to me credentials in the name of Blackstone, and I became the representative of the Bank of America.

Mr. MORRIS. You had the credentials of a man named Blackstone, of the Bank of America?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes. Blackstone.

The order was that I should put that gold on a Russian steamer, but I decided to spread the risk and to load it on as many ships as I could lay my hands on. I commandeered four Soviet steamers who were then in Spanish ports.

Senator McCLELLAN. Four what?

Mr. ORLOV. Four Soviet steamers who had been there then, in Spanish ports, after they had unloaded armaments and food. And I left for Cartagena, the Spanish port where the gold was stored in a huge cave, hewn out of a mountain.

I asked the Government to give me 60 Spanish sailors to do the loading of the gold. The Spanish sailors were kept for 3 nights and 3 days in that cave. They understood pretty well what was in those boxes, because there were huge sacks, plain sacks, filled with silver coins, and they knew that that was their treasury. But they did not know where the gold was being taken, maybe to another Spanish city.

For 3 nights the loading of the gold was done during the night, and transported during the night in complete blackout, to the pier, where it was loaded on Soviet ships. During the day the Spanish sailors slept on those sacks of silver.

On the second or third day there was a tremendous bombardment, and somebody mentioned that, if a bomb hit the neighboring cave where thousands of pounds of dynamite were stored, we would be blown up into bits. The health of Mendez Aspe was a very serious thing. He was a nervous man. He told us we must discontinue loading or we will perish. I told him we could not do it, because the Germans would continue to bombard the harbor and the ships will be sunk, that we must go on with it.

So he fled and left just one assistant, a very nice Spanish fellow, who did the counting of the gold for them.

The first day I saw that our count of the gold coincided, but after Mendez Aspe fled and that lone officer did the counting, the figures began to diverge.

When the loading was finished, the Chief of the Treasury, Mendez Aspe, wished to compare the figures with mine. My figures were 7,900 crates. His figures were 7,800. The error was by 2 truckloads because each truckload, according to my instruction, contained 50 boxes, to facilitate the count. Each box weighed about 125 pounds.

I was afraid to tell him my real count because if I told him that we had 100 boxes of gold more than he thought we did and later his count would prove to be correct, then I would have to be responsible for 100 boxes of gold. So I did not tell him anything, but I telegraphed to Moscow and told them later about that difference.

Before the gold was loaded, I decided to ask the Spanish Government for an order to spread Spanish warships along the route, the Mediterranean, at certain intervals, with instructions to the skippers of the ships that if they received a special S O S with a special signal, which would mean that the Soviet steamer had been attacked or was being abducted, then the ships should hurry immediately to the rescue of that Soviet steamer.

That order was issued to the skippers of Spanish warships in sealed envelopes; they did not know anything, they did not know anything before that. But the instructions were that as soon as an S O S, with a certain special signal, is intercepted, then the skippers were supposed to tear the envelopes, to read the instructions, and the instruction was a Soviet steamer with very valuable cargo is being attacked; hurry to rescue and engage in battle.

I knew that such an order could not be issued without Prieto, the Minister of Defense—at that time he was the Minister of the Navy—who did not know anything about the whole plan of the gold operation.

So, I called up the Soviet Ambassador in Madrid, Rosenberg, and asked him to take it up with Prime Minister Caballero and arrange that the Navy Minister, Prieto, should issue orders to the Spanish warships, to the skippers.

In a few days, the Spanish Finance Minister, Negrin, and the Defense Minister, Prieto, came to Cartagena. The orders were issued. After that, I was waiting for about 7 or 8 days on tenterhooks, waiting and wondering whether the ships will pass safely through the dangerous stretches of the Mediterranean, not far from Italy.

In about 8 days, when I saw that the ships had already passed, I sent a cable to Yezhov saying that, according to my count, there were 7,900 crates, according to the Spanish count, 7,800 crates, and I should like them to check on it.

Well, this is a mystery. When I see now in the newspapers that the receipt issued by the Soviet State Bank was for 7,800 boxes, not for 7,900, I think that probably Stalin decided that he could use 100 boxes of gold, maybe for some Comintern work or for something else.

Several months after the shipment of the gold, when I was lying in a surgical clinic of Professor Bergere, in Paris, the Chief of the Soviet NKVD himself, Sloutsky, came to see me and he told me about the gold, what a great event it was when it arrived in Moscow, and he told me on good authority that that gold, according to Stalin, would never be returned to Spain.

A few months later, there came to see me a close friend of mine who was in Spain at that time with me, whom I considered liquidated until now, but it has been established now through the Soviet press that about a month ago he had been rehabilitated and his books are being reprinted now in Russia—so I would not name his name, not to embarrass him. He was a very close friend of Yezhov, a man who used to report to Stalin personally. He came from Moscow, where he spent about a month, to Spain and told me about the great event of the gold when it arrived in Russia, and he asked me why didn't you tell me about that gold?

But the most interesting thing he told me was that Stalin said at a banquet, at which members of the Politburo were present, and at which the arrival of the gold was celebrated, that—here are Stalin's words:

"The Spaniards will never see their gold again, as they don't see their own ears." This is a Russian proverb.

Now, since then, so many years have passed, the gold is still locked up in the underground vaults of the Kremlin, and if nothing is done about it, it probably will never be returned. That gold belongs to the Spanish nation. Regimes come and go, but the gold belongs to the people, and the Spanish nation has a right to it, and I think it would be a good idea if the leaders of the Spanish political parties, irrespective of their political affiliations and ideas, would combine together and demand that the gold should be returned or transferred to the United Nations or to the World Bank, in safekeeping for the Spanish nation.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator McClellan, I suggest that inasmuch as this is direct testimony here today and, therefore, evidence that this \$600 million worth of gold actually belongs to the Spanish people, that we transmit a copy of this testimony, through our Ambassador at the United Nations, to the United Nations, so that they perhaps may consider some steps in order to effectuate justice in this matter.

Senator McCLELLAN. This is a public hearing. Of course, the information will be news, will be in the press. They will get the information.

I think, possibly to take official action of the committee to carry out your suggestions, the Chair would not want to order it. The Acting Chair would not want to order it. I think it is a matter that addresses itself to the committee as a whole, and I assume that can be arranged simply by sending around a notice or request and let the majority of the members sign it.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be done, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

(Certain newspaper articles bearing on the Spanish gold shipment were ordered into the record by Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding, at a hearing February 20, 1957, and appear below:)

[The New York Times, January 6, 1957]

SOVIET GOLD ISSUE STIRS SPAIN ANEW

MADRID REPORTS RECOVERY OF RECEIPT FOR RESERVES SENT TO MOSCOW TO FOIL FRANCO

By Benjamin Welles—Special to The New York Times

MADRID, January 5.—A tale of several hundred tons of Spanish gold turned over to the Soviet Union in 1936 has become headline news here.

A brief, cautiously worded announcement by the Foreign Ministry, December 29 has led to widespread comment in the controlled press and in official and diplomatic circles.

The Ministry asserted that exhaustive efforts carried out abroad over the last year had resulted in the recovery of the official Soviet receipt for the nation's gold reserves. These were shipped secretly to Moscow in September 1936, at the start of the Spanish Civil War.

The Ministry paid tribute to the family and friends of the late Dr. Juan Negrin, Republican Premier during most of the civil war, for the reported recovery of this important document. The paper gives Spain a legal basis for demanding the return of her treasure, the statement said.

The announcement is the latest—and perhaps the most important—step in the Franco government's 20-year effort to recover the gold shipment.

7,800 CRATES OF GOLD

Officials here prefer not to estimate the quantity of gold. One highly placed source has set it privately at "between 600 and 700 tons." Others, quoting Spaniards in exile, say that on November 6, 1936, 510 tons of gold bars and gold pesetas totaling 1,734 million gold pesetas reached Moscow in 7,800 crates.

Unofficially the value of such gold today is believed to be considerably more than \$500 million.

[Present gold reserves in the Bank of Spain have been reported authoritatively at \$200 million.]

It has been disclosed that the Soviet receipt for the gold shipment was preserved in the personal archives of Dr. Negrin, who lived in exile in Paris and London until his death in the French capital on November 14. During the last year officials of the Franco government began negotiating secretly with Dr. Negrin for the return of the receipt. On his death it was handed to Spanish officials by one of his sons.

The shipment was carried out in extraordinary secrecy when the Republican government began seriously to fear that the gold might be captured by the rebels under Gen. Francisco Franco.

DUAL PURPOSE OF MOVE

As pieced together from various accounts by Spanish and Communist sources, the shipment was ordered by Dr. Negrin, then Minister of Finance, on September 13, 1936. It had a dual purpose: to safeguard the gold from the Franco forces and to serve as security for Soviet arms shipments to the Republican government.

Under the personal direction of Francisco Mendez Aspe, Director General of the Treasury, the bars and coins were loaded into trucks. On September 15, a special train left for Cartagena, on the Mediterranean coast. At Cartagena the treasure was transferred to three Soviet vessels, which were guarded by Spanish Navy units. The ships sailed to Odessa, and on arriving there the docks were guarded by special Soviet security units while officials from Moscow helped load the gold into a special train.

At this point the trail becomes obscure.

What steps the Spanish Government will now take to recover the gold from the Soviet Union are not being officially disclosed here. It is pointed out that on January 7, 1955, the Government warned many countries that Moscow might seek to make gold payments out of the Spanish national treasure.

It is generally believed Spain will take up the case at the International Court in The Hague and in the United Nations.

ONE SON ISSUES DENIAL

(Special to the New York Times)

PARIS, January 5.—Romulo Negrin, 1 of the 3 sons of the late Dr. Juan Negrin, denied today that he had handed over the receipt to the Franco regime on his father's instructions.

Romulo Negrin, who lives in Mexico City and is in Paris on a visit, said he had no knowledge of such a receipt.

ANOTHER DENIAL ISSUED

A similar denial was made by Miguel Negrin, who said the only 1 of the 3 brothers in Paris when his father died was Romulo. Senor Miguel Negrin, reached by telephone at his home at Sands Point, Long Island, said that whatever was to be said on the subject was to be said by Romulo Negrin. It was conceded, however, that the late Dr. Juan Negrin might have handed over the paper at some time other than at his deathbed, but Miguel Negrin cautioned that "this would be speculation."

The third brother, Dr. Juan Negrin, was reported out of town and could not be reached.

[The New York Times, January 10, 1957]

TWO SPANISH ENVOYS ARRIVE IN SOVIET

TRIP LINKED TO EXILES' RETURN AND TO BIG GOLD RESERVE CLAIMED BY MADRID

By Benjamin Welles—Special to the New York Times

MADRID, January 9.—Two Spanish envoys were reported today to have arrived in Moscow.

They are Dr. Luis de la Serna, a high official of the Spanish Red Cross, and Salvador Vallina, a reporter of *Arriba*, newspaper of the *Falange*.

Officially it is explained that Dr. De la Serna is visiting the Soviet capital in connection with the repatriation of Spaniards in exile. About 1,500 have returned so far, there may be 3,000 more in the Soviet Union. About 300 are due to sail from Odessa for Spain in a few days.

Observers have noted that the visit coincides with the wide publicity given in the Spanish press to the Spanish gold reserves. These were shipped to the Soviet Union by the Spanish Republican Government at the start of the 1936 civil war.

SOVIET OFFER REPORTED

According to informed sources, the Soviet Government suggested late in 1955 that there be Spanish-Soviet discussions covering the repatriation of Spaniards, the renewal of diplomatic relations, and, inferentially, the return of the gold.

Talks were accordingly held between Soviet and Spanish diplomats, first in Paris and later in Hamburg, although no final agreements were reached.

The treasure thought to be in Moscow is estimated at 510 metric tons of gold (16 million troy ounces). This is worth \$560 million at the United States Government price of gold, which is \$35 a troy ounce.

Details of the shipment of Spanish monetary reserves are given in documents that have recently come into the possession of the Spanish Government.

DOCUMENTS ARE LISTED

These documents include the following:

A Spanish Republican decree of September 13, 1936, which authorized the late Juan Negrin, then Finance Minister, to export the monetary treasure "wherever he considers safest." The decree is signed by Manuel Azana, President of the Republic, and by Largo Caballero, Premier.

An eight-page document in French in four parts, which tabulates the gold coin, ingot bars and nugget gold received in Moscow by Gokhran, the state depot of precious metals in the Finance Commissariat. This document was signed February 5, 1937, by Marcelino Pascua, Spanish Republican Ambassador to Moscow, and by G. F. Grinko, People's Commissar for Finance, and N. N. Krestinski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. It provides in paragraph 2, section 4, that the Spanish Republican Government may reexport or otherwise dispose of its deposits freely.

The documents here were obtained after a year's confidential negotiations in Paris with Señor Negrin, who died there November 14, 1956. He had agreed before his death to return them to the Spanish state, officials here say.

The documents had been held for many years in safekeeping in the United States, but not in Paris or London as was originally reported. The death of Señor Negrin before the transaction was completed caused serious concern in Government circles here.

These circles feared that the important papers, which formed the Spanish nation's legal basis for renewed international efforts to get the treasure back from Moscow, might be destroyed or might pass otherwise into Soviet possession and so disappear.

RETRIEVED FROM UNITED STATES

Through the cooperation of one of Señor Negrin's sons, whom officials choose not to identify, and of other members of his entourage, including his housekeeper, the papers were retrieved from the United States and are now in the Madrid government's hands.

These documents give the Spanish Government what it considers watertight legal proof that the Soviet Government received the Spanish national gold reserves. Hitherto, this claim has rested solely on the Spanish Government's word. With the documentary proof available, Madrid is expected to submit its

claim for the return of this treasure both in the International Court of Justice in The Hague and in the United Nations and through diplomatic channels.

The documents have been carefully perused. They show among other things that the total gold shipment, which reached Odessa in 3 Russian vessels, weighed precisely 510,079,524.3 grams, or about 510 metric tons.

New York Times, International Edition, January 21, 1957]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE HIDALGO AND THE COMMISSAR WARM THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND MADRID

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

PARIS, January 20.—The most interesting diplomatic colloquy now being carried on in Paris is between a Spanish grandee and a Communist professor of history. The ultimate purpose of their drawn-out talks is to decide whether formal relationships shall be established between the antipathetic regimes of Franco Spain and Bolshevik Russia.

Each dialogist serves his Government as Ambassador to France, which has been chosen as the arena for this curious engagement. José Rojas y Moreno, count of Casa Rojas, representing Madrid, is a well-dressed Valencian gentleman with pale face, white hair, and cultivated, conservative manner. Sergei Alexandrovitch Vinogradov, representing Moscow, is a heavy-set, muscular Russian with metallic smile and considerable suavity of expression. He was once on the faculty of Leningrad University.

Casa Rojas and Vinogradov were acutely aware of each other's existence during World War II when they served simultaneously in Ankara. They did not speak to each other at the awkward diplomatic receptions staged by neutral Turkey. But, from a distance, they observed the maneuverings and activities of their mutually hostile embassies.

When Casa Rojas and Vinogradov found themselves again together in Paris, they maintained this atmosphere of frigidity. This continued until the autumn of 1954.

That November President Coty, as is his custom, invited all ambassadors to the annual bird shoot at Rambouillet where thousands of plump and not very agile pheasants are driven into the diplomatic guns. Casa Rojas and Vinogradov were there. And, to the surprise of the hidalgo, the Bolshevik professor was effusively agreeable. He joked. When a Soviet ambassador jokes it is not without instruction.

SIGNS OF A THAW

Soon the peculiarly tense situation existing between Madrid and Moscow began to ease. Russian representatives attended various nongovernmental international conferences in Spain. Informal conversations began at several neutral points concerning Madrid's desire to repatriate Spanish émigrés from the U. S. S. R.

Approximately 2,000 of these had asked Moscow for permission to go home. They included prisoners of war from the blue division that fought with Hitler on the eastern front and grown up children of Loyalists who had been evacuated to Russia during the civil war.

The U. S. S. R. permitted the departure of 286 veterans. By autumn it also granted exit permits to more than 1,300 refugees. The first Soviet ship to touch at a Spanish port since 1938 arrived in Valencia last September. Another is now en route.

By October, Spaniards were even contemplating the approach of diplomatic recognition. The U. S. S. R. refrained from vetoing Spain's entry to the U. N. Madrid saw this as tantamount to de facto acceptance of the Franco government.

At this point, when Vinogradov began direct conversations with Casa Rojas, the latter was instructed to raise the subject of Spanish gold. Ten years ago Juan Negrin, then Finance Minister of the Republican government, arranged to export the national reserve to Moscow in order to protect it from seizure by Franco.

SEEKS SPANISH GOLD

The treasure, amounting to 510 metric tons, is worth considerably more than half a billion dollars. But when Franco sought to press its claim, Moscow argued that he had no legal proof of ownership.

Last November 14 Negrin, an embittered émigré, died in Paris. On his deathbed the old Loyalist leader asked one of his sons to collect from their hiding place the official receipts for the gold and to present them to Franco. These were photostated. Seventeen days ago Casa Rojas called on Vinogradov and gave him copies of these documents. He officially requested that the bullion be returned. If Moscow does not now oblige, Madrid will push its claims in the Hague World Court.

While Negrin lay dying, however, a new element was intruded into the situation. The revolt of the largely Catholic Hungarian people—and its brutal repression—made it politically still more difficult for a devoutly religious Spanish regime to recognize Communist Russia.

Moscow desires to exchange embassies with Madrid for highly pragmatic reasons. A diplomatic mission in Spain could help coordinate clandestine propaganda and direction of espionage against American military bases. It could also promote expansion of hitherto indirect commercial relationships. The Soviets wish access to Spanish mineral wealth.

Madrid certainly covets its treasure. The national finances are in desperate condition. A half a billion dollars would aid immensely in putting the country on its feet. The question therefore resolves itself quite simply. Does Spain want the gold enough to give recognition? Does Russia want recognition enough to give up gold?

There is no prospect of any swift resolution of this problem. But both countries involved in the discussion are noted for their qualities of patience and endurance. The word "tomorrow" and the words "soon it will be done" have equivalent significance in Spanish and in Russian.

[Washington Post, April 6, 1957]

GOLD OF SPANISH WAR SPENT, SOVIETS REPORT

LONDON, April 5 (UP).—Radio Moscow reported today that \$420 million worth of Spanish gold smuggled to Russia 20 years ago had been sent "to finance the (Spanish) Republican cause."

The broadcast also said the Spanish Republicans never did repay \$50 million of \$85 million lent them by Russia during their brief period in power.

[Informed sources in Madrid said Spain will continue to press for the return of gold.]

The gold, taken from the Spanish treasury, was smuggled out of the country by the Communist-supported Republican government. Spain has been trying ever since to get it back.

Today's broadcast, quoting what it said was an editorial in the Communist organ Pravda, said there was no gold left.

"Some foreign newspapers carry articles concerning the deposit of Spanish gold in the U. S. S. R. 20 years ago, completely ignoring the expenditure incurred by the Spanish Republican government * * *," it said.

"After the Spanish Republican government had deposited the money in Moscow, it frequently asked the Soviet Central State Bank to make payments abroad from it. The payments became so frequent that the money soon was all gone."

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more about that one particular episode that you would like to know, Senator?

Senator McCLELLAN. No, I don't think so.

Is there anything further that you think of that you would like—

Mr. ORLOV. No. I have no more suggestions.

Senator McCLELLAN. In connection with that.

All right; proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know, Mr. Orlov, about Stalin personally undertaking to counterfeit United States currency?

Mr. ORLOV. Oh, yes. That was a well-known affair in the circles of the NKVD chiefs. It is a bizarre affair for a huge country to start counterfeiting American dollars with the purpose of passing it in the West.

It is true that at the time when it had been prepared and done, it was 1929, and Stalin was in need of money for financing the industrial-

zation of the country. But everyone, and he himself, probably understood that, no matter how good the forgeries, you cannot pass more than \$1 million because it will become known to the banks. The banks would be warned about the serial numbers, and that would be the end of it.

But in spite of that, Stalin did it. And how could we explain that? My explanation is—and I am quite sure I am right—it stems from the character of Stalin, who was 90 percent a criminal and 10 percent a politician.

Senator McCLELLAN. From whom?

Mr. ORLOV. From Stalin; from Stalin himself.

In this respect, I should like to have your permission to quote a well-known Russian Socialist revolutionary, who spent 6 months with Stalin in prison in 1908, under the Czar. The name of this man is Simon Vereshchak. As a matter of fact, Stalin himself confirmed that he knew Vereshchak, and, in 1927, Pravda published an article concerning the memoirs of that man. Stalin liked something of what Vereshchak said about him while they were both in prison, and that is why a special article was published in Pravda.

But here is what Vereshchak, that Socialist revolutionary, wrote in his memoirs:

While the politicals—

that means the political prisoners—

tried not to mix with ordinary criminals and especially warned their younger members against doing so, Koba—

this is the revolutionary pseudonym of Stalin—

was always to be seen in the company of the murderers, blackmailers and robbers. He was always impressed by men who had brought off an affair. He shared a cell with two forgers of 500-ruble notes, Sakvarelidze, and his brother Niko.

That was written about events when they were both in prison in 1908.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate at this time if we excuse this witness from testifying for just a few minutes. We have a Treasury representative who has a sample of some of these counterfeit bills that Mr. Orlov has just referred to, and I think if he will testify for the record, Senator, we would know in a concrete form what was involved in this particular testimony.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Will the witness come around here?

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GRUBE. I do.

Senator McCLELLAN. Counsel, you may interrogate.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT F. GRUBE, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. GRUBE. Robert F. Grube.

Mr. MORRIS. And for whom do you work?

Mr. GRUBE. United States Secret Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I might say, Mr. Grube, that there are no photographers here, so you will have no problem about photographs being taken of existing Government obligations.

Have you brought samples of certain counterfeit money here with you today?

Mr. GRUBE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you offer them to the chairman?

Mr. GRUBE. Mr. Chairman, those are counterfeit \$100 Federal Reserve notes of the old issue, and they originally appeared in the United States, in Texas in 1928, and \$100,000 worth of those notes were involved in an operation in Chicago, and also we had information relative to the circulation of those notes more extensively in foreign countries.

Mr. McCLELLAN. How many millions of dollars were circulated?

Mr. GRUBE. That would be hard to say, because we did not have the complete information from all the foreign countries. As far as the United States was concerned, we only had the 1 case involving the \$100,000 in Chicago but, in addition to that, we received many, what we called floaters, in other words, brought in from foreign sources in small amounts either by tourists or people who brought them in intentionally.

Senator McCLELLAN. What is the total amount that has been recovered?

Mr. GRUBE. The total amount by this country was the \$100,000, plus those passed in Chicago.

Now, the amount involved in Chicago, the \$100,000, they were only able to place \$25,000 of that money in circulation. We recovered the \$75,000 before they had an opportunity to put them in.

Senator McCLELLAN. Before circulation?

Mr. GRUBE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Counsel, do you want these made an exhibit to the testimony?

Mr. MORRIS. I think not. Just let the records show we can't reduplicate them.

Senator McCLELLAN. Take the numbers that you present here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I respectfully call attention to the fact that the important thing about these is the difference in serial numbers and Reserve banks, and other indicia on the notes. It is not just a single note as a run-of-the-mine counterfeiter might make. This is a mass-production operation, with many changes in the plates.

Mr. GRUBE. That is right.

Each one of these notes has different characteristics, as far as their identifying features. Either a different Federal Reserve bank, a different check letter, a different face plate number, or a different back plate number, and normally, on a counterfeiting operation, we will get one note which will represent the entire lot turned out by that counterfeiter.

In other words, they will stick to the same Federal Reserve bank, the same check letter, the same face plate number and back plate number, but in this particular instance here are two, what we consider, variations from the same plant.

Mr. MORRIS. From a technical point of view, they are good duplications of our existing operation, are they not?

Mr. GRUBE. These are extremely deceptive. They are perhaps the most deceptive counterfeit samples of the old issue that have ever been brought to our attention of the \$100 issue.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you able to trace these to any Soviet source?

Mr. GRUBE. No, sir, we were not.

Mr. MORRIS. There was one man arrested, was there not?

Mr. GRUBE. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his name?

Mr. GRUBE. Dr. Valentine Burtan.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of this witness.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. Thank you very much.

Now you may resume.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER ORLOV—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Orlov, tell us what you know about this particular operation.

Mr. ORLOV. I learned about this operation of counterfeiting \$100 bills in 1930, and I have learned that that operation had been directed by Stalin personally and was supervised by 2 men. The name of one of them is Boki.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Boki?

Mr. ORLOV. Mr. Boki was an old Bolshevik, the chief of the special department of the NKVD, a man who became famous in the party because he was the secretary who transcribed the so-called April decision taken by Lenin and his associates in April 1917, to start, to prepare for the revolution which occurred later, in October.

The other man was Berzin, the head of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service.

I also learned that, in preparing for the passing of the money on orders of Stalin, a bank, a German bank, had been acquired, bought, in order to facilitate the distribution of the money.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean, the Soviets even bought a German bank?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

The Soviets bought a German bank, or a financial house in Berlin, which was called Martini, and another word, Sacks or Sass. Maybe Mr. Mandel will correct me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that?

Mr. MANDEL. S-a-a-s—M-a-r-t-i-n-i.

Mr. ORLOV. That bank had been acquired by some Canadian people, also under Communist direction, and finally was resold to a German Communist by the name of Paul Roth.

Mr. MORRIS. Paul Roth?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He was also a Communist?

Mr. ORLOV. He was also a Communist, and the main distributor of that money. The man who became the chief customer of the bank was a man by the name of Franz Fischer.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you some photographs. Will you tell us if that is the man you refer to?

Mr. ORLOV. I have never seen Fischer, so I cannot recognize it.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify those, the picture of Franz Fischer, or can Mr. McManus do that?

Mr. McManus, I wonder if you could identify those photographs which I just offered to Mr. Orlov, of Franz Fischer.

Senator McCLELLAN. Is he a witness or a member of the staff?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. McManus is a member of the staff.

Senator McCLELLAN. He can make the statement.

Mr. ORLOV. Will you permit me to add that that money was well fabricated, because it was made in the Russian Engraving and Printing Offices, in the Government Offices which make Russian money, and which have the greatest experts in the world, who were able to produce the so-called Czarist, you know, bills, which were the most complicated in all the world. So that it is no wonder that that money is undistinguishable from American \$100 bills.

But it was a bizarre, foolish operation, because, after all, nobody, could distribute more than \$1 million.

Mr. MORRIS. How much was involved here, do you know?

Mr. ORLOV. The plan was for \$10 million first. That is all I know.

Senator McCLELLAN. How much did they actually—how much were they actually able to place in circulation?

Mr. ORLOV. I don't know. But one thing I know: In 1931 I met in Berlin a man. I became curious to see this man, and it might also be interesting for you to know that this operation was tied up with the common underworld, with criminals.

When I was in Berlin, in 1931, I was told that a noted criminal, a common criminal, arrived from Shanghai, China, that he had been arrested there and extricated himself in spite of the fact that \$100 bills had been found in his possession. He probably bribed the police.

So I wanted to see that man, to learn more about it.

I met him. I don't remember the name of that man. And he told me how a number of his men were arrested and how he saved himself, and that he got 50-50 from that operation, from all the money.

I was just curious to see a real common criminal for the first time in my life.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. McManus, will you tell us where you obtained those photographs?

Mr. McMANUS. These are photographs that were made available to me by the Secret Service, from the files on Valentine Burton. There were a number of pictures.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, these photographs were taken from the files concerning the testimony regarding these \$100 bills which have been identified, and there is in that file a picture of Franz Fischer?

Mr. McMANUS. These are from the file containing pictures which bore on their face the name of Franz Fischer.

Mr. MORRIS. This witness has testified that from his knowledge, Franz Fischer was the Communist agent that was taking part in this operation. I mention that by way of identifying those two things.

Mr. Mandel has prepared some contemporaneous news clippings, which do tell us some more about this particular counterfeiting operation.

Mr. MANDEL. In the New York Times of February 24, 1933, on page 1, is an article I would like to place in the record, which is headed as follows: "Flood of fake bills is traced to Russia; agents investigate report Dr. Burton, held as one of ring, was a Soviet agent."

And secondly—

Senator McCLELLAN. That article may be printed in the record.
(The newspaper article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 427" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 427

[The New York Times, New York, February 24, 1933]

FLOOD OF FAKE BILLS IS TRACED TO RUSSIA

AGENTS INVESTIGATE REPORT DR. BURTAN, HELD AS ONE OF RING, WAS A SOVIET AGENT—HE LOSES REMOVAL FIGHT—COMMISSIONER ADVISES HE BE SENT TO CHICAGO FOR TRIAL IN \$100,000 CONSPIRACY

The origin of \$100,000 in counterfeit \$100 notes, many of which were successfully passed last month in Chicago, has been traced by Federal agents to Soviet Russia, it was disclosed yesterday at the Federal Building.

The notes, which have turned up as far away as China, have been pronounced by experts of the Treasury Department to be the most genuine-appearing counterfeits ever uncovered. They are said to have been made 6 years ago.

The Government, it was disclosed, is investigating a report that Dr. V. Gregory Burtan, New York physician, who was arrested on January 4 as the American principal in the alleged international counterfeiting plot, is, or was, an agent of the Soviet Government.

It is believed that foreign governments have been notified of the facts of the conspiracy as they have been revealed in New York and Chicago, and that an international effort is being made to learn the identity of those higher in the scheme than Burtan is alleged to be.

REMOVAL TO CHICAGO URGED

While the inquiry was being carried on with secrecy on orders from Washington, Francis A. O'Neill, United States Commissioner, handed down an opinion recommending the removal of Dr. Burtan to Chicago, where he and "Count" Enrique Dechow von Buelow, German aviator, have been indicted on a charge of possessing and passing the notes.

Alvin McK. Sylvester, assistant United States attorney,, immediately arranged to present the opinion to Federal Judge Alfred C. Coxe, who, it is expected, will sign a removal order today and order Dr. Burtan, formerly an assistant physician of the staff of Polyclinic Hospital, to surrender. Dr. Burtan is free in bail of \$15,000.

Von Buelow, who is said to have made a full confession of the part he played in attempting to dispose of the counterfeits, is in Chicago awaiting trial.

Dr. Burtan has insisted ever since his arrest that he was connected in no way with any counterfeiting plot. During the removal proceedings Frank H. Smiley, a private detective of Chicago, testified that Von Buelow had introduced him to Burtan. Smiley and two of his friends arranged to dispose of \$100,000 in counterfeit notes in the innocent belief, he said, that they were genuine bills which bootleggers sought to dispose of because they feared income tax investigation if they themselves attempted to pass them.

BANK TELLERS DECEIVED

Louis Mead Treadwell, assistant United States attorney, said that Smiley took some of the notes to banks in Chicago, suspecting that they might be counterfeits, but tellers in five banks said they were genuine, and the detective accepted Von Buelow's story as true.

Smiley told Commissioner O'Neill that the actual passers had been promised 30 percent of all profits in the scheme. Twenty percent was to be divided among himself, Burtan, Von Buelow and two of Smiley's associates, while 50 percent was to go to the "bootleggers."

In his opinion, Commissioner O'Neill wrote:

"The only question involving doubt in this case is one as to whether the defendant knew that these bills were counterfeit. It has been established that they were counterfeit and that the defendant offered to sell them."

Dr. Burtan, a heart specialist, is represented by Benjamin Hartstein. When he was first arraigned on the counterfeiting charge he said that he would prove that he had been innocently involved in the case through professional services to a patient.

Mr. MANDEL. From the New York Times of May 16, 1934, page 15: Guilty in counterfeiting, New York man convicted in alleged \$2 million ring.

This, again, deals with Dr. Valentine Burtan.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. That one may also be printed in the record.

(The newspaper article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 428" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 428

[The New York Times, May 6, 1934]

GUILTY IN COUNTERFEITING

NEW YORK MAN CONVICTED IN ALLEGED \$2 MILLION RING

CHICAGO, May 5 (AP).—Authorities claimed partial disintegration of a \$2 million international counterfeiting ring with the conviction last night of Dr. Valentine C. Burtan of New York.

The defendant, accused with others with disposing of some \$100,000 in spurious currency, was convicted by a jury which deliberated only 2 hours.

Prosecutors Hall and Sullivan asserted after the trial that the ring had for several years been under the personal investigation of W. H. Moran, Chief of the Secret Service. They said Mr. Moran rated the bills as the best ever circulated in the United States.

Dr. Burtan, they asserted, was a prominent New York Communist, but that since his arrest in this case he had been expelled from the Communist Party.

They said the ring had been formed chiefly to flood the United States and several South American countries with spurious money, in an attempt to discredit this Government.

Senator McCLELLAN. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, this particular episode, together with the details about the Spanish gold episode, should be related generally in our record with the inquiry that this Internal Security Subcommittee is now undertaking with respect to the theft by the Soviet forces in Berlin of \$350 million worth of German bonds.

In 1945 the Soviet occupation forces took from German bank vaults an amount of bonds worth approximately \$350 million. Those bonds, we believe, are now appearing for validation here in the United States. The German-American Validation Board recently rejected a claim of validation for a particular man applying for \$245,000 worth of these bonds, and they rejected this application because they concluded that his particular \$245,000 worth of bonds were, in fact, in German vaults when the Soviet occupation forces arrived in Berlin, and I would like this related, in the record, with that particular Soviet operation.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Orlov, in your experiences in Spain——


Senator, may I offer these pictures of Franz Fischer for the record?

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. They may be admitted in the record.

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 429" and is reproduced below:)

EXHIBIT 429

AMERIQUE (Etats-Unis d')



(Reproduction interdite)

FISCHER, Franz.

Mr. MORRIS. When you were in Spain, Luigi Longo, an Italian Communist, worked generally under you, did he not?

Mr. ORLOV. No. Luigi Longo was an Italian who was one of the chiefs of the Garibaldi Brigade which fought in Spain during the civil war, between 1936 and 1939.

Now, Luigi Longo is the deputy of the Italian party boss, Palmiro Togliatti. He is the secret director of the military forces of the party, which consist of the former members of the Garibaldi Brigade that fought in Spain, and I am quite confident that they have caches of arms hidden all over Italy. That means the leftovers from the World War, in case Moscow gives orders to stage a revolution there.

Palmiro Togliatti was also in Spain at that time with me, and he had been a good friend of mine at that time. He directed the Spanish Communist Party and the Spanish Communist military forces in behalf of Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us what you know about the present Italian Communist Party? You mentioned Mr. Togliatti. He is an Italian Communist, is he not?

Mr. ORLOV. He is an Italian Communist.

As is well known, the Italian party is the biggest and strongest party in the West after the Soviet Communist Party. They have 2 million members in the Communist Party in Italy, which is a tremendous percentage, if you take into account that the whole population of Italy is 48 million.

The power of the Communist Party in Italy has been underestimated. They actually dominate the biggest trade union there, which controls more than half of the Italian workers.

Now, if you consider all that, and the fact that at the head of the Italian Communist Party stands the most able man in the Communist movement—that means Palmiro Togliatti, who had tremendous experience in military conspiracies in the civil war in Spain—you might realize how serious the danger is, that if Moscow orders an uprising in Italy, it might easily succeed.

I should like also to mention that in Trieste, the port of Trieste, which is in the northern part of Italy, very near to Yugoslavia, there is a man by the name of Vidale who heads the Communist Party of Trieste.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Vidale?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes. I knew him in Spain. He was one of the chiefs of the general staff of the International Brigade. He passed also under another name, Contreras.

Vidale was not accidentally placed at that strategic position in Trieste, because, in my understanding, if Moscow orders an uprising in Italy, Moscow will need badly the help of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, who holds in his hands the gates to northern Italy, and in that case, if Marshal Tito would be amenable to Soviet conspiratorial designs against Italy, he would be able to let through volunteers and surreptitiously supply the Italian rebels with arms. And I think that was the chief reason why Russia last year has been wooing Tito to a tremendous extent.

If you allow me, Senator, to elaborate for 5 minutes on that subject, I will give you some data.

Senator McCLELLAN. I will be glad to.

In the course of your elaboration, I would like for you to comment on what advantage you think we are getting by giving military aid to Tito, under these circumstances.

Mr. ORLOV. I would like to refresh some pertinent facts.

In 1948 there was a break between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia.

The reason was that at that time Tito, who had become a Yugoslavian hero, the only head of a satellite state who really liberated his own country without the help of the Red army, but with his own partisans, demanded from Stalin at least a limited measure of independence for Yugoslavia.

Stalin did not like that, and he wrote a letter to Tito, which was also signed by Molotov, warning him against insubordination and containing inambiguous threats or unequivocal threat. The letter read as follows:

DEAR COMRADE: We warn you, Trotsky's—

this is verbatim—

case should be instructive to you.

By that time Trotsky was already 8 years dead, assassinated, liquidated by Stalin in Mexico.

In spite of that, Tito did not acquiesce to Stalin's demand and was expelled from the Cominform as a traitor. Tito did not have anything else to do but to turn for help to the West. He turned for help to the United States, which gave him help which amounted to \$1 billion—\$500 million in economic assistance, industrial, food, and things like that; and more than \$500 million in military tanks, fighter jets, and things like that.

That made Tito a double traitor in the eyes of Russia.

Now, in 1950, Tito signed the so-called Balkan Pact, together with Turkey and Greece, in defense against the Soviet Union. It should be appreciated that Turkey had been a traditional enemy of Russia for hundreds of years. That made Tito a triple traitor in the eyes not only of the Russian Government but of the Russian people.

After Stalin's death, relations, diplomatic relations, have been restored between Russia and Yugoslavia, and that was enough to take care of the relations between both countries. But since 1955 the world has seen something very unusual, an unusual wooing of Tito by the Kremlin.

In 1955 no less important a person than Khrushchev and Bulganin themselves went to Belgrade and officially apologized for the break that had occurred in 1948. In 1956, in June, the beginning of June, Tito was invited to Russia. He had been accepted almost as a national hero. He had been feted as no other foreign visitor had ever been.

Before he came to Moscow, the Cominform was disbanded in deference to Tito, because the Cominform had expelled Tito from its ranks in 1948.

A day before Tito arrived in Moscow, Molotov was fired as Foreign Minister, also in deference to Tito, because Molotov's signature was on the threatening letter that Stalin sent to Tito in 1948. And, as if Molotov had not been humiliated enough, he was made to go to the railway station and bow to Tito.

I will not enumerate all the honors which were bestowed on Tito there. I asked myself at that time what was the reason. A traitor

to Russia in the eyes of the Russians, a triple traitor, why had he been wooed to such an extent, and I wish to say that that wooing went so far that it was done with undisguised obsequiousness.

In his report to the 20th party congress, Khrushchev had this to say about Tito, and about Stalin. First of all, he blamed Stalin for the break with Tito, and then he said:

Stalin boasted—

declared Khrushchev at the 20th congress of the party—

I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito. He will fall.

But that did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin shook not only his little finger but everything else that he could shake, Tito did not fall.

This was humiliating not only to Stalin; this was humiliating to the Russian state and to the Russian people itself.

Then, looking for an answer, for the reasons why Tito had been wooed to such an extent, I came to the following conclusion: that the answer to that strange wooing could be found, first, in the strategic position which Yugoslavia occupies on the map of Europe, and, secondly, that it was dictated by a change in Soviet strategy which was caused by the emergence of, or the appearance of the H-bomb. Before the H-bomb had been invented and before the appearance of nuclear weapons had changed the military thinking in both opposing camps, Russia was madly increasing its war potential, in the hope that some day they will grab the Western World by direct assault.

But the threat of a nuclear war made this plan too dangerous, and Khrushchev and the other leaders of the Soviet Union decided that the retaliatory power of the United States is too strong to attempt plans of open warfare against the West, and that it is time to change their open warfare plans to surreptitious schemes of spreading the power of the Kremlin over the globe by subversion and staging revolutions from the inside.

Then, it is well known, and I think it has been already noted by other analysts, that the target countries where the Russians entertain their plans and ideas of staging an inside revolution are two countries, Italy and France, because there the Communists are the strongest.

But for the success of staging a revolution in Italy, where everything actually has been set and prepared, as I mentioned before, the Kremlin needed the help of Tito because Tito is located at the very gates, Yugoslavia is located at the very gates of Italy.

Was Tito amenable or receptive to Russian plans and conspiratorial designs on Italy? Studying the speeches which had been made in Moscow, at the Moscow Stadium, before some 70,000 members of the Soviet elite, speeches made by Tito and by Khrushchev, and studying also the announcement they made to the press, and even such a trifle as the slogan, "Forever Together," which was spelled out by the multicolored formation of the athletes at the stadium, and then the speech by Marshal Zhukov, who said "from now on we and our Yugoslavian comrades, our armies, will march shoulder to shoulder together," showed me that Tito was quite receptive to such a plan.

What could be actually Tito's interest in such a plan? Well, as we know, every dictator who has entrenched himself in power, begins to dream about territorial aggrandizement. We also know that Tito had been coveting the port of Trieste for a long time, and he knows

very well that his good friend, Palmiro Togliatti, who, at the age of 63, can hardly wait to become the Italian dictator, would hardly begrudge him a city, a port, or a little Italian territory.

There were also other instances which showed to me that a deal was being consummated between Moscow and Tito in this respect: Tito, who, for years, had been excluded from the Communist world, has been allowed by Russia to interfere in the affairs of the satellite people. He demanded that Rakosi, the party boss of Hungary, be dismissed. Khrushchev and Bulganin defended Rakosi as the best man, but the Kremlin had to bow to the demand of Tito.

Now, Tito protested against Chervenkov, the head of Bulgaria, and again the Kremlin had to bow to the demands of Tito that Chervenkov be dismissed, and another man by the name of Yugov was appointed head of Bulgaria.

Then we remember, also from the press, another case that, after the dismissal of Rakosi as head of Hungary, the Kremlin suggested that another man by the name of Erno Gero, a Hungarian Communist, be put at the head of Hungary instead of Rakosi. I knew him very well in Spain. He had been there as assistant of Palmiro Togliatti.

Tito at a conference with Khrushchev in the Crimea protested against Gero, but Khrushchev succeeded, after long hours or days of persuasion, to obtain Tito's consent to the appointment of Gero.

Now, another sign that Tito was consummating a deal with the Kremlin and that the Kremlin, in order to woo him and to win him over to their plan, had to make concessions to him, can be seen from the fact that, if you remember, during last summer, on the order of the Kremlin, all the heads, party heads of all the satellite states, made actually a pilgrimage to Belgrade, where they had to bow to Tito. In other words, the ambitions of Tito were not only territorial but also to play the first fiddle in the party movement of all Communist parties of all satellite states.

That is not a new ambition. That ambition was known to us from the press. In 1948, in Pravda, was published an announcement about the proposed so-called Federation of the Balkan States. At that time the big Communist leader, George Dimitrov, entertained ambitions of combining all the satellite states into a Balkan federation and to head it. It was actually discussed in the press, the Cominform press and Pravda, and later Stalin decided that Dimitrov might become too powerful, and he actually overruled this idea.

But now Tito, remembering the old ambitions of Dimitrov, and seeing that he can put conditions to the Kremlin because he was so needed to the Kremlin for the Italian affair, for the staging of subversive revolutionary uprising in Italy, he put in the biggest demand he could.

Now, as we know, the Hungarian revolution occurred approximately at this time, and the Hungarian revolution, which produced a lot of very interested consequences, has actually set back those plans, the Italian plans of the Russians, for a time at least.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in there, Mr. Orlov?

In other words, it is your testimony here that, based on your knowledge of the principals involved, this Luigi Longo, Togliatti, Gero, the Hungarian, Vidale, the Communist who is—

Mr. ORLOV. Leader in Trieste.

Mr. MORRIS. On the basis of all of your knowledge of these people, and your knowledge of Communist strategy, you believe that the Soviets are planning some kind of a coup, using military forces, the military forces involved in the Communist Party in Italy, and for that reason they are trying to court Tito.

And one of the things you believe they are offering Tito, by way of inducing him to go along with that conquest, is the city of Trieste, the now internationalized city of Trieste?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what it comes down to; right?

Mr. ORLOV. This is my conjecture, and I wish to note that not only the Hungarian revolution has upset the Soviet plans but, if you remember, approximately in September of last year, Tito, who had been given by the Kremlin every sign that they want him to be a man of great influence in the Balkans, suddenly discovered that the Kremlin was double crossing him, that the Kremlin had sent out a secret circular letter to all the Communist satellite states not to take Tito too seriously, saying that:

The Yugoslavian Party is not a true Marxist party in the real sense of the word, and the Italian Party is tinted with social-democratic tendencies.

When he learned about that, he protested, and then you remember how the Soviet Party boss, Khrushchev, made a dash by airplane to Belgrade and then to the island, Brioni, Tito's retreat, where they were wrangling and haggling for a couple of weeks, and then they flew together to Yalta, where they had conferences with the rest of the Soviet leaders, who tried to allay Tito's suspicions, but the result, as I see, was a failure, because now you see a new rift between Tito and the Kremlin.

My idea is that, having recovered from the Hungarian debacle, the Russians might try to reactivate their Italian plan, because, if the Kremlin succeeded in seizing Italy, then they would flank France, which has also a tremendous, a very strong Communist Party, which polled, if I am not mistaken, about 20 percent of the votes in France, and that would be the end of Europe as we know it.

The Communist leaders very often quote Lenin, not believing either in Lenin or anybody else, believing only in their own method of spreading their power over the globe by the means which they see fit. But they remember one precept of Lenin, who taught the Communist Party that a revolutionary, so-called revolutionary situation ripens very rarely, and to miss a revolutionary situation is tantamount to death, or something like that, to complete failure.

So, seeing now that the Communist Party of Italy is losing followers as a result of Hungarian events and of the ferment in all the Communist parties, the Kremlin might decide that, if they wait too long, they may lose that golden opportunity forever, and that is why I would not be surprised if Moscow would maybe—I don't know when, this year or next year—revert to their plan, and if that happens, we shall witness another vigorous attempt to woo Tito back into the Communist fold, to share the spoils.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, we have gone over with Mr. Orlov other testimony, particularly as to how espionage abroad, that is, abroad from the Soviet Union, is financed. We have gone into that. I know there are time limitations here, but that is a whole subject in itself.

So I suggest, if your time commitments are otherwise, that this might be a good time for a break.

Senator McCLELLAN. What are your plans for the afternoon?

This is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator McCLELLAN. The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Friday, February 15, 1957.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:35 a. m., in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan presiding.

Present: Senator McClellan.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator McCLELLAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Counsel, you may resume the hearing from which we adjourned yesterday.

Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER ORLOV—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you could tell us precisely what your assignment was with the NKVD?

Mr. ORLOV. I occupied a number of important posts in the system, NKVD. I do not think I should enumerate all of them, but I may mention that I was commander of the frontier troops of the NKVD; Deputy Chief of the Economic Department of the NKVD; Chief of the Economic Department for the Supervision of the Soviet Foreign Trade; and my last job was that of Soviet diplomat and adviser of the Soviet Government to the Republican Government of Spain on matters pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines during the civil war in Spain from 1936 to 1938.

I also served as a member of the little council in the NKVD, of 6 people who were chosen to evaluate secret documents obtained by NKVD rings from abroad, in order to advise the Soviet Foreign Office on foreign operations and the intentions of foreign governments, and to evaluate the documents also for the Politburo of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were 1 of a group of 6 people who were evaluating foreign documents from abroad?

Mr. ORLOV. Foreign documents, with the view of giving their opinion about the intention of foreign governments, concerning the Soviet Union.

And Stalin would also get it after that.

I was also the author of a textbook on intelligence and counterintelligence, which was accepted by the NKVD. It was called Tactics and Strategy of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. This work was written by me at the beginning of 1936, was accepted by the NKVD, and became the handbook for the NKVD schools preparing Soviet intelligence officers for service abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. That was called Tactics and Strategy—of what?

Mr. ORLOV. Of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

I also directed for a number of years, but this was a sideline, the faculty, you might say, on intelligence and counterintelligence in the Central Military School of the NKVD in Moscow, which was also preparing not only commanding officers for troops but also officers for the intelligence services. And I used to lecture there, but that was just a sideline.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

I wonder if you would tell us, Mr. Orlov, how Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence is organized from the very top.

By the way, is your textbook still in use, to your knowledge, in the Soviet Union?

Mr. ORLOV. I do not know, but I am almost sure, because it created quite a stir.

A number of people were assigned to write a book, and my book was chosen for the purpose, and because, actually, it collected all the cases, the most important cases, of counterintelligence and intelligence work in NKVD, with a view of warning operative officers against mistakes which were committed by others and which brought them to peril abroad, to arrest, and on the ways, actually, of obtaining documents, of engaging spies, of using them, of covering up if they fell through—all those little things which are a must for every intelligence officer.

And because that book actually accumulated all the operative experience of the NKVD, I do not think it could be changed in any way.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us how Soviet intelligence operates, with respect to the various foreign countries.

Mr. ORLOV. I would mention first the lines or targets of Soviet intelligence abroad.

Soviet intelligence is a manifold thing. I must say that intelligence and counterintelligence work in Russia has been turned into a science and almost an art. And through the years the work of Soviet intelligence services have crystallized in a number of directions.

The first direction, the first target of the Soviet intelligence service, is the so-called diplomatic intelligence. That means to find out for the Politburo the intentions of the capitalist governments against each other, and the main thing is to find out the intentions of the capitalist governments against the Soviet Union. That has been done through the years successfully.

And Stalin would receive, have on his desk, at least once a week, a full report on the information obtained by the NKVD in this direction. And very often Stalin would get copies of the diplomatic notes which the foreign offices of capitalist countries were preparing for him, long before those notes were actually received by the Soviet Foreign Office.

The second line of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence is military intelligence. The name itself explains what it is: to obtain complete data on the military strength of the western and eastern

countries, and on military inventions such as new armament, new submarines, new bombs, and things like that.

Then, the third line of Soviet intelligence occupied itself with so-called industrial intelligence. Although intelligence service, as such, has been known for hundreds of years, this was something new, which was created by the Soviet intelligence services.

The purpose of that industrial intelligence was to obtain the secret processes of western industries, mainly of American industries, of new inventions. And for that purpose, the Soviet intelligence service recruited a number of engineers, scientists, inventors, over the world, and especially in America.

And if you remember, for instance, the engineer Gold, who played such a big role in the atomic thing, he used to supply the Soviet intelligence service with matters of inventions in private industry.

But when the war came, all those engineers, like Gold, the most talented of them were mobilized, as we know, for the war effort, and thus they found themselves in the most secret departments of American defense, or British defense, and were able to supply Soviet Russia with all the military inventions which were developed during the war.

The fourth line of Soviet intelligence is the so-called economic intelligence. This economic intelligence has nothing to do with the so-called industrial intelligence, and actually is a defensive operation on the part of the Soviets. It is directed to defend the Soviet foreign trade.

As you know, all the trade which Soviet Russia conducts with the foreign world is monopolized, and the Soviet Government was interested to know whether that trade was being conducted by American companies, or by western companies, on a level.

It has been found out, for instance, in 1931, that industrial trusts of various countries in the West who traded with Russia used to overcharge Russia up to 75 percent. And I must here confess that it was I who, in 1930, discovered the existence of a so-called gentlemen's agreement, or bloc, among the electric companies of the world, and to my desk came documents stolen from, for instance, General Electric in America. I remember a document signed by Vice President Minor, a letter addressed to the German A. E. G. Co., also something like General Electric, to Director Bleiman, and to Switzerland, to another director of the Brown Boveri Co., an electric firm, with a list of prices that ought to be charged the Soviet Union, ostensibly because the Soviet Union's credit was no good.

And the prices were from 60 percent to 75 percent higher than the normal prices at which other companies of the world were able to buy the same electric motors, and things like that.

This cartel, or gentlemen's agreement, has been broken up by the Soviet Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you could tell us how intelligence in the United States operated——

Mr. ORLOV. If you would permit me just to finish these points?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry; yes; excuse me.

Mr. ORLOV. The fifth line of intelligence work is the so-called misinformation. The Soviet Government is not only interested in obtaining the best information it can from abroad, secret information about the activities of the foreign governments, but also to misinform, to mislead foreign governments.

For that purpose, there was a special department which forged diplomatic documents which were sold and peddled around the world, with the view, for instance, of arousing suspicion in Italy against Germany, in Italy against France, or something like that. And that was very successful at times.

The sixth line of Soviet intelligence was a very peculiar one, which I would define as paving the way for the Soviet Foreign Office in ticklish international manipulations. First of all, for instance, the Soviet intelligence helped the Foreign Office and helped the central committee of the party to pave the way for the recognition of the Soviet Union by various countries.

Senator McCLELLAN. For what?

Mr. ORLOV. For obtaining recognition of the Soviet Union, diplomatic recognition, by various countries.

And I know of some people who used to go to the United States to see whether the recognition of the Soviet Union could not be expedited. I am speaking of operators of the NKVD.

That means the Soviet Foreign Office was interested in influencing the policies of foreign governments by pitting one part of a government, for instance in France, against the other. For that purpose, members of the government had been bribed, bought. With influence attained by other means, they would also keep the intrigues within foreign governments alive.

For instance, I had an assignment, it was when I was in Spain, to get in touch with former Foreign Minister of Rumania Titulescu, who was out of power at that time and lived in Menton, on the border of France and Italy, to see whether he would not help the Soviet Union to unseat the Prime Minister of Rumania, Maniu, and surely the Soviet Union was ready to finance such manipulation.

I know of another case when, on personal instructions of Stalin, the NKVD tried to bribe one of the most important members of Mussolini's Cabinet, who was the Minister of Corporations. Well, I do not know whether he is alive and I would not like to mention his name right here. That was in the early thirties, and it had been arranged through an NKVD representative in Italy that that Cabinet Minister should come to Berlin to accept his bribe.

He came to the then head of the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin, by the name of—excuse me, I will recall the name, I forgot it—and when the member of the Italian Cabinet came to the head of the Soviet trade delegation, they had a talk, and the head of the trade delegation had an envelope for him. There was \$15,000—yes; the name is Lubimov.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the Soviet head of the trade delegation in Berlin?

Mr. ORLOV. In Berlin, in Germany.

Later that man, Lubimov, became the Soviet Commissar for Light Industry in Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. So he gave this member of Mussolini's Cabinet \$15,000?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes; \$15,000.

And the aftermath of that story: When he saw that he had only \$15,000 in that envelope, he decided it was better to go and tell the story to Mussolini. So he came and talked to Mussolini, and Mussolini protested about it, you know, in an unofficial conversation with

the Soviet Ambassador, and Stalin's directive was: Too little money, you ought next time to try \$50,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us why he was being bribed?

Mr. ORLOV. The idea was that that important member of the Cabinet of Mussolini had a following, and there was a hope that if the Soviet Union could obtain the services of that man and conduct an intrigue within the Government, maybe they might succeed finally in unseating Mussolini.

Mr. MORRIS. Just a minute, now, and see if I understand that.

You say the bribe of \$15,000 was offered to a member of Mussolini's Cabinet—

Mr. ORLOV. Cabinet, yes.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing). For the purpose of just getting his general sympathies, because he had a following?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

He had a following, and with a view that in future developments he might help, under Russian influence, to conduct political intrigues within the Mussolini Government itself.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did this take place?

Mr. ORLOV. This took place in 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of the Cabinet member involved?

Mr. ORLOV. He was the Minister of Corporations.

Mr. MORRIS. Of corporations?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

I forgot to add that he made a trip back to Berlin and returned the \$15,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did he return the \$15,000?

Mr. ORLOV. Because he had shown already to Mussolini, proved his devotion to Mussolini by that, and Mussolini instructed him to go back and return that money.

And that was the case when Stalin said: Too little, you ought to have given \$50,000.

Senator McCLELLAN. I thought it was Mussolini who said it was too little.

Mr. ORLOV. No, not Mussolini.

Senator McCLELLAN. Maybe I misunderstood.

Mr. ORLOV. Stalin said: "It is too little, you ought to have given \$50,000."

And after that, he came to Berlin and returned the \$15,000.

Now, the seventh line of the NKVD work was engaged in influencing the decisions of a foreign government, not only in obtaining information but influencing decisions through powerful agents placed in high places in foreign councils.

You may remember even from the American experience that during the past decade you had in the very high councils people who were willing to help Russia in the Chinese direction, not only with information but were influencing the policy of the American Government in connection with Germany, and other countries.

Senator McCLELLAN. Can you give us the names of anyone who has not heretofore been exposed, who was engaged in that operation?

Mr. ORLOV. Well, I do not know whether I should give the name of the man.

Senator McCLELLAN. Will you give them in executive session?

Mr. OLOV. I might give them in executive session.

Senator McCLELLAN. I suggest, Mr. Counsel, that at the proper time we have an executive session and interrogate the witness on that line.

Mr. MORRIS. We will do that as soon as possible.

Mr. ORLOV. The eighth line of the NKVD work is guerrilla operations. The purpose of guerrilla operations, it is self-understood, is sabotaging war installations, arsenals, warships, and things like that.

The NKVD has a number of schools which prepare very skillful sabotage agents.

When I was in Spain, I had there about six schools——

Senator McCLELLAN. Had what?

Mr. ORLOV. Six. I organized six schools for saboteurs, which were used for sabotaging enemy installations, behind enemy lines.

They were mostly recruited of Spaniards and of members of the international brigades, mostly Communists. Among them were a number of Americans, Englishmen. I remember at one opening of the school in Barcelona for about 600 students, during the intermission I spotted a group of about 30 or 40 persons speaking English.

So I approached them, and we talked in English, they were members of the international brigades, of the British International Brigade——

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you know of any Americans attending those schools?

Mr. ORLOV. I do not know the Americans, but I have seen and talked to those people, and they did a good job behind enemy lines.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you know where any of them are, now?

Mr. ORLOV. I do not know where they are, now, but they are probably in the United States.

And what I want to say is that that guerrilla line of NKVD operations was developed during the second World War into a tremendous business. At the head of that business stood a man by the name of Etington. His other name was Kotov. Defector Khokhlov, about whom you read in the newspaper, and who I think testified somewhere here, wrote that during his times in the Soviet Union, my former assistant, Kotov—he called him General Kotov—from Spain directed all those operations.

The guerrilla operations were so vast during the Second World War that saboteurs were counted by the tens of thousands, and I would not be surprised if Russia has here now on the territory of the United States a few hundred saboteurs who will get active as soon as war danger arises, or when the cold war becomes hot.

Senator McCLELLAN. In that connection, could you give any advice or counsel that would enable either the Congress, this committee, or the FBI, or any other agency of the Government, to identify them and take other proper action?

Mr. ORLOV. My advice in that respect would be, first, to guard the most sensitive and important installations. When I am speaking of the most sensitive, those are the atomic, hydrogen, and nuclear weapons, missiles, and things like that.

Because knowing well how guerrilla operations are conducted by the Russians and their methods, I would not be surprised if a few days before the war started, a pseudo-American battalion—that means a battalion dressed in American uniforms, with English-speaking officers—would march by a certain place, for instance, where atomic

bombs are stored, and if that place is guarded by an American platoon or by an American company, and so on, nobody would even suspect that the approaching group of American soldiers stepping by is an enemy outfit. And then, those would be 90 percent Russians dressed in American uniforms, with 10 percent of American guerrilla fighters who served in Spain, who can conduct themselves as officers, and that suicide brigade would make an attack.

Similar attacks could be made anywhere else, where very important things like, for instance, guided missiles are stored.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Orlov, I wonder if I may break in there.

While you had these positions in the NKVD and while you were running the sabotage schools, how did intelligence operate in the United States, and how many rings were there in existence at the time of your separation from that service?

Mr. ORLOV. I can judge by certain facts. In 1938, a country like the United States, like France, like Britain, had one director resident. That means a chief representative of the NKVD, with six assistants, Russian assistants—

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the situation that existed in the United States when you broke away in 1938?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

And this is the picture which existed here: There was here a chief director resident of the NKVD, by the name of Gusev, a man who had been in the former years my assistant. Then Gusev had six assistants. Each assistant had three American assistants, from the Communist Party usually, who were the contact men with the spies in the United States.

Each of the Russian assistants took care of at least three rings. So you multiply 3 rings by 6 assistants, and that makes 18 rings, 18 spy rings.

Since then the picture has become even more ominous, because since then, as you know, a war followed when America and Russia were allies, and Russia had the greatest ease of planting spies here, of bringing their people here.

Not only that. Since the war, Russia has acquired a number of countries which are called satellites: Those satellites have now embassies and consulates in this country. Consulates and embassies have always been covers for Soviet espionage, and it stands to reason, there is no doubt in my mind that the NKVD has in every embassy of that kind also their own rings.

Then there is the United Nations, which did not exist before the war, and it has been established that there were Soviet spies in the United Nations.

Even if the number of rings which the NKVD possesses now in the United States is not larger than it had been in 1938, then still, there ought to be 18 rings. Two rings, as we know, two spy rings, have been exposed, one a military ring from the Red army, by Whittaker Chambers. The other ring was exposed by Elizabeth Bentley, who came and reported to the American authorities.

Now, nobody else from other rings came and volunteered information. It stands to reason that at least 16 rings are at large and have the free run of this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Orlov, these rings, to your knowledge, were directed by Soviet intelligence operatives; were they not?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes; they were directed by Soviet intelligence operators, and they comprise only the NKVD rings. I am not speaking about the rings which are directed by the Fourth Department of the Soviet Army.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the military intelligence ring. That is something separate; is it not?

Mr. ORLOV. Something separate.

And I have read that a former Soviet defector by the name of Ege gave an estimate of the number of those military rings in the United States as approximately 20.

Mr. MORRIS. And Ege testified, Senator, before this committee, and he said, to his knowledge, that the Soviet military intelligence had 20 rings in operation.

Senator McCLELLAN. Who was that?

Mr. MORRIS. His name is Ege.

But the rings you are talking about were NKVD rings?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. These are rings that are directed by Soviet officials; right?

Mr. ORLOV. By Soviet officials.

Mr. MORRIS. But do you know below, when you get into the working range, for the most part, who are the people who do the work?

Mr. ORLOV. The people who do the work were Americans, or any other foreigners who lived here, and at least from 40 to 60 percent of them were usually American Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. And the rest of them?

Mr. ORLOV. The rest of them are non-Communists, working either for money or for some other reasons.

And I should like to add, these rings which I define here, although they conduct themselves illegally and commit espionage, they are called in Russia a legal network. Why is it called legal? Because it is conducted from legal coverups from Soviet embassies, which are legal, and directed by officers who have legal passports.

But besides those rings there is another set of NKVD rings in the United States, which are called underground rings. They are called so because the Soviet leaders of those rings do not serve in the embassy or in the United Nations, but live under false passports as foreign businessmen or as American citizens and conduct their espionage.

They have private lines of communication with Moscow, they never use the diplomatic pouch. They are forbidden even to approach the Soviet embassy.

Senator McCLELLAN. They usually try to become American citizens, do they not?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes. They come with false passports—

Senator McCLELLAN. I know, but they usually try to seek American citizenry?

Mr. ORLOV. They try to become American citizens. If they are not satisfied with their forged American passports, then they try to obtain somebody's naturalization papers and to get naturalized in the usual way as American citizens.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the Senator was asking, was he not, that generally they draw an American citizen to do their work?

Senator McCLELLAN. No. I had in mind that the leaders of those rings ostensibly try to become American citizens, to further cover up their identity and their purpose.

Mr. ORLOV. Yes, this is their main purpose. Because every one of them is afraid of an outright forged passport, because if he is arrested, then everything comes out. They would like to adopt an American identity on the basis of true documents, and some of them succeed in immigrating here, obtaining immigration with somebody's help from Europe, and gradually become American citizens.

For instance, that man Zborowsky, whom I mentioned yesterday, he was sent here by the NKVD under his own name in 1941, and in 1947 he was already an American citizen.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how can we know, Mr. Orlov—In order to learn the identity of these rings it is necessary, is it not, for us to get a defection from some one of the Soviet NKVD persons in the United States? Isn't that the way we are going to solve the thing?

Mr. ORLOV. There are many ways of solving that problem. And I must say that Soviet intelligence services are the most skillful in the world.

In this connection, I will ask permission to read a little quotation here, because I would never be able to put it, to formulate it, better than this man has formulated it. I do not know the name of this man, but I have found this in the newspaper, International News Service report, from Chicago, saying:

Dan T. Moore, of Cleveland, former counterintelligence officer in the Middle East, says that never in history has spy warfare been so important as it is now, or such vital secrets to lose or such important secrets to steal.

He added:

"Of all nations on earth during the last 200 years, the most skillful in spy warfare are the Russians. The secrets we lose this year may cause us to lose a war 2 years from now.

"No nation now would think of declaring war unless it is established, through a spy system, that it is going to win."

I think no one could put better the state of affairs and the importance of espionage in our times as this man did. I do not know who he is, but whoever he is, that man could contribute much to the struggle against foreign espionage in behalf of America.

Now, I would like to mention the last, the ninth, line of NKVD work. That is infiltration of security agencies of the United States and of other countries.

They have done, I think, a good job on that. And here I jotted down just three lines, a quotation from Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. He said:

I believe the Communists are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated practically every security agency of the Government.

I took it from a New York Times, September 30, 1953.

Now, concerning the ways and how to combat espionage. There are many ways. The Russians are very skillful in espionage, but they are not invincible, they are not supermen. If that science of intelligence were raised in the western countries to a proper level, why, Soviet spies or any other spies could be checkmated.

One of the ways of obtaining information about the spies, the most direct way, is obtaining defectors.

Senator McCLELLAN. Obtaining what?

Mr. ORLOV. Soviet defectors.

For instance, had a Soviet intelligence officer who conducted the work here decided to defect, he could have exploded the whole network in the same way, for instance, as the American, Elizabeth Bentley, did. Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

In view of your experience and background, what is the prospect of getting those men to defect?

Mr. ORLOV. That is a very good question, Senator.

I think nothing has been done in that direction until now. I know, because I was one of them, and I know what every Soviet intelligence officer feels.

When they started their work, they honestly served their country—they were good patriots. But through decades of assassination of innocent people, of liquidations by Stalin of every NKVD officer who knew his criminal secrets, through all those decades there has been created an atmosphere, a psychological atmosphere, among the NKVD chiefs and the intelligence officers of the Soviet Union, that each of them, at one time or another, usually during periodical purges, would be happy to quit and to start his life anew.

They say, for instance, that the life of pilots, aviators, is very short; but the life span of NKVD officers is the shortest of all. In my memory, there was the chief of the NKVD, Yagoda, his assistants, chiefs of all the departments—I was one of them—and they were all liquidated.

Then came a new prophet appointed by Stalin, Yezhov, who was Stalin's right-hand man. Yezhov recruited new men from the central committee, taught men, mobilized and created a new apparatus of the NKVD, who started their work. Finally, it was unavoidable that those people that worked closely with Stalin learned about his crimes. Wishing to remain in history as the most pure, honest man in the world, Stalin could not let them live either, because some of them might have survived him and written their memoirs. So he liquidated them.

Then came, finally, Beria, a man whom I knew very well because we worked together when we were both young men. As a matter of fact, in the Caucasus in 1926 I was his senior. Beria was a man who seemed to be the best man and most guaranteed man from any execution, because he was a Georgian, like Stalin himself, and very close to him. And finally we have seen that Beria, the new man whom he brought in the NKVD, had been also executed, together with all of them.

After that—

Mr. MORRIS. The point is, Mr. Orlov, you say the life span of all of them is very short and they do not last long?

Mr. ORLOV. They do not last long.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask you:

It seems to me that normal human intelligence would at some time perceive that anyone who went into that field of work, accepted such responsibilities, in view of the past experience and the things that have happened, would know that ultimately he would come to the same fate.

Now, how is it that they are able to recruit them and get them to assume such responsibilities?

Mr. ORLOV. You see, the difference is, in the United States you have to recruit a man, to invite him. Here the President calls up a

man whom he knows to be able and says, "I want to give you a very important job," and he can say, "Well, I am devoted to my family, to my business, and I cannot take it."

In Russia——

Senator McCLELLAN. Over there they are drafted——

Mr. ORLOV. Yes; over there they are drafted.

Senator McCLELLAN. Virtually drafted?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. They dare not refuse. In other words, by accepting it, they may prolong their life, although they may finally come to the same fate; is that correct?

Mr. ORLOV. That is absolutely correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, you have probably 10 years if you do what they tell you, but if you don't it is over now?

Mr. ORLOV. That is it.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. ORLOV. Now, I remember the time when I defected. When all the chiefs of the NKVD had been executed, I saw my assistants around me—Kotov, who was also liquidated with Beria—I saw how they were shaking in their boots. But they did not defect——

Senator McCLELLAN. Did you tell them you were going to defect?

Mr. ORLOV. No; I did not.

Senator McCLELLAN. You said they were shaking in their boots. I do not understand. I am not criticizing; I am just trying to understand.

Mr. ORLOV. Yes, they were shaking in their boots, because we had conversations with one another, and if they did not spell out so-and-so much, you could always feel and know they were afraid to go to Russia.

For instance, I received word to go back to Russia. I received, for instance, an order to send my assistant to Russia, an assistant who was decorated by Stalin personally, and who had carried out great feats. He was invited to Russia to report to Stalin on the Spanish war. And then——

Senator McCLELLAN. You never knew, when you got such an invitation, whether it was for liquidation or for getting information?

Mr. ORLOV. No; we understood that it was for liquidation.

Senator McCLELLAN. Oh, you did?

Mr. ORLOV. Because only 1 month passed, and we did not receive a single letter from him.

Then my other assistants would converge and say that something must have happened, and things like that. "He was an honest fellow—What do you think?" and things like that. And they were gloomy, all of them.

And when I received a telegram instructing me to go to Belgium and to board a ship, ostensibly for a secret conference where a top member of the party would be waiting for me, two of my assistants talked to me privately. One of them said, "I do not like that telegram."

When I asked him, "What do you think; what conference could there be?" about this or that matter. He did not answer me, and looked away. He was afraid to talk, but at the same time wanted me to feel that—and he said, "Why didn't he come here to Spain to talk to you?"

You see, everyone felt danger, everyone actually was trembling.

Now, under such circumstances, every one of them would have defected. Some of them did not, because their families were in Russia. Some of them were afraid because, working abroad, they used to pilfer secret documents from every ministry in the world, and they were afraid that, after all, when they defect, they would be arrested and made responsible for espionage work which they conducted for the Soviet Union.

And the third point was, Stalin issued orders to assassinate defectors abroad. I can name some of the men who were assassinated during that time. One of them was Ignace Reiss. He was cornered and assassinated in Switzerland in 1937. You remember another man by the name of Krivitzky died mysteriously here in Washington. Another man by the name of Agabekov had been cornered 8 years after his defection and killed in Belgium.

In the beginning of 1938, one was killed in Rotterdam, an underground agent.

Senator McCLELLAN. Have there been any killed here in the United States?

Mr. ORLOV. I think that Krivitzky was, and another man by the name of Markin, who was found killed here, too.

Now, another outstanding underground chief, a Soviet Party member and a Soviet national, was killed under the following circumstances in Rotterdam, Holland. He was called for an appointment to a certain cafeteria to meet a Soviet intelligence man from Moscow. He came there. They sipped their coffee, had their talk, and then that man from Moscow gave him a package which ostensibly contained 3 or 4 books. He walked out first from the cafe, the cafeteria, and the underground Soviet agent remained at his table for about 15 minutes.

In 15 minutes he walked out, and when he was in the doorway the bomb exploded. It was in the package, and he was killed.

Those things created a double terror, and no one knew whether he would survive if he defected.

Now, I was in hiding for 15 years, and it was really a miracle that I survived. As a matter of fact, I met one of the Russian terrorists in Cleveland. I mean, I have seen him; I did not talk to him. He was trailing me. But probably they would not kill me outright, because in my letter to Stalin I wrote that if I were killed, my lawyer would publish all the documents. And they would have to trap me, get me into some trap, and make me yield the documents first, before they would kill me.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, one of the problems that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has been having throughout the years has been the acquisition of a defector along the lines that Mr. Orlov is talking about.

Now, in Canada there was the Gouzenko defector, and he really exposed much of the espionage that went on there. Rastvorov defected in Japan, and has been able to tell the country a great deal; Mr. Petrov in Australia; and Mr. Ege in Turkey.

Now, we have never had such a thing in the United States, any NKVD official defecting, and we continue to explore, Senator, whether or not there is any kind of legislation that we might enact, something we might do to give inducements to the people that Mr. Orlov tells

us about from his own experience, who he believes would actually like to come to our side if there was some kind of an inducement or something to put aside their fear——

Mr. ORLOV. May I say something about that?

Mr. MORRIS (continuing). And it is a grave problem, Senator, as far as we are concerned.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you feel, though, there are those over here engaged in spying for Communists that would be glad to defect, if they felt their life would be——

Mr. ORLOV. I am quite sure, because they know that although there is some kind of, what you call a thaw, in Moscow, some kind of liberalization, the time will come when the sacrifice will have to be laid on the altar.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, the thaw is only for a season?

Mr. ORLOV. Temporary.

Senator McCLELLAN. For a season only?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes, for a season only.

Then I must say that the success of the Soviet intelligence services is, to a certain extent, explained not only by their brilliant training, not only by the tremendous help which was given to them by the Communist Party here in the United States, but also by the complacency of the Western governments, which do not combat Soviet intelligence as it ought to have been done.

Let me give you an example——

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. Let me ask you a question:

What is your recommendation, what do you suggest now? As you say, we do not combat it as we should, and we are interested, of course, in getting any defections we can from these people. What would be your recommendation, how to go about it, how can we induce them, and what action can this Government take?

Mr. ORLOV. My recommendation would be that if an important representative of this Government, let's say the Attorney General or a Senator, would make a declaration at a press conference or otherwise, saying that those who quit Soviet conspiracies, those who want to quit their espionage work, those who want to part, to break with their past and go over to the free world, they will be helped to get an immigration visa in this country, with permanent residence in this country, and they will be offered immunity against their own responsibility for the things they have done in this country.

Because, as you know, espionage laws have been corrected in a way which excludes the statute of limitations for espionage. So a man who has been here, for instance, 10 years ago and was sent here again because he knows the English language and he knows the country, he is afraid that he might be put in the dock and be responsible and be sentenced to some 20 years in prison.

Now, why should he take such a chance? If he would be promised complete immunity against whatever he did in this country, if a certain promise would be given to him that he would be helped to establish himself—offering any money to a man of that kind would not be good because people who come to a decision, when they have to break with their country, with their families, with their past which they cherished for many years, their participation in the civil war, in the party, and in the revolution, they will not be moved by money. They would feel insulted. They do not want to feel that they are

regarded as traitors, and they do not want to be traitors in their own eyes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask you another question:

It occurs to me that these agents that they assign over here from Russia, espionage agents and so forth, they select them with some care, do they not, with respect to their family back home, so that they can always hold that as a threat over them?

Mr. ORLOV. Yes; it is usually done so.

But you know, life takes its toil, and if you send a man and leave his family there, he knows he is not trusted any more—he cannot work.

They would be told in Moscow: “Well, you have children; we want your children to get a Soviet education; let them stay in the schools here,” and so on.

But then in 1 year he writes he cannot work here, he wants to go back, and his work slackens—and it is not the same thing. You cannot send a man to risk his life and at the same time show him that he is not trusted.

So finally, within 1 year, they sent him his wife and then they sent him his children.

So, some of them who still have their families in Russia won't exchange the safety and lives of the members of their family for a doubtful future in the United States. They just continue, they return to the NKVD in Moscow and just take a chance that some time, somehow, not everyone is killed, not everyone is liquidated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Orlov, did you know Vasili Zubelin? He was the third secretary, and then second secretary to the Embassy here during the war. Now, he has recently figured in the espionage case in New York, Senator.

Now, can we talk about that particular individual? Did you know him as an NKVD man?

Mr. ORLOV. I know about whom you are talking. I knew him under a different name. In Moscow he was, he lived under his real name, Zarubin, Vasili Zarubin. He was one of the outstanding operatives of the NKVD. I knew also his wife, Lisa Gozsky.

Mr. MORRIS. She was an intelligence operator in her own right, was she not?

Mr. ORLOV. She was an intelligence officer in her own right, and she worked in my department.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about him and her, and what, generally, their assignments were and what their connections were with intelligence in the United States, if they had any connection at that time?

Mr. ORLOV. I know that the most important work which he did was before the war in Germany. That was a dangerous thing, to work against Germany with an underground false passport.

His wife also lived in the underground there.

I do not know what he did in America. What I know is just what I read here in the newspapers about him.

His wife was also a noted operative, and she caused the death of another NKVD operator by the name of Blumkin.

Blumkin, on one of his trips abroad, went to Turkey and had a conversation—it was in 1930—with Trotsky, whose chief bodyguard he was during the civil war. That had been found out, and the wife of

Zarubin was assigned in order to spy on him and to find out everything.

As a result, Blumkin had been shot on orders of Stalin.

By the way, that Blumkin was a famous fellow. When he was only 17 years old, it was in the beginning of the revolution, he was a Socialist revolutionary and adversary of the Communists, of the Bolsheviks. He did not like the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which Lenin signed with the Germans, yielding to Germany a part of Russia, so he called up the German Ambassador in Moscow and presented himself as a "cheka" man, and said:

"We have information that you, Ambassador, are going to be killed, and we want to inform you about it—there is a ring here which wants to kill you—May I see you?"

He said:

"Come right away."

So he came to him, opened his briefcase, and said:

"Here are the papers."

He took out some papers and took out a pistol and shot him to death. That was a famous affair.

The Politburo wanted to shoot him, but Trotsky became interested in that fellow, 17 years old, and had a talk with him. Blumkin said: "I know you will shoot me, but if you will spare my life I will serve the revolution well."

And Trotsky liked him, defended him, and made him chief of his bodyguard and of his military train.

That was why later, in 1929, Blumkin, when he was abroad, went to see Trotsky, which was his undoing.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, before we get off Zarubin there, our evidence in the past has shown us that among the American Communists over here, the American operatives, Zarubin himself was only known as Peter, and his wife was known as Helen.

In fact, the Americans, when dealing with him, the American subordinates dealing with him, never knew his actual name as Zarubin.

Mr. ORLOV, you feel, then, do you, that there is need at this time—at least, it is your advice—for some kind of a public pronouncement by someone, such as a Senator or Attorney General, backed up with specific offers of immunity, permanent residence, avoiding the use of money because that would strike the wrong note, and urging some NKVD personnel in the United States to come forward to make full disclosure?

Mr. ORLOV. Definitely so.

Not only NKVD officers, but I should say any man who takes part in the Soviet conspiracy against the free world. It might be a Soviet diplomat who was not engaged in espionage, and who possesses information which would help to establish the conspiratorial activities of the Soviet camp.

I think the reluctance to defect can be explained also by the complacency which has been shown by the Western government to this problem.

For instance, you remember the Gouzenko case in Canada, where he broke open the atomic ring. Gouzenko, in 1945 or 1946, collected all the documents which have shown there existed in Canada a tremendous ring. He went to the Minister of Justice—he wanted to defect—and showed him the documents.

The Minister of Justice showed it to Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, and Mackenzie King said: "Tell him to go and put those documents back."

But not only that, Mackenzie King, after that, when the documents were examined and found to be of tremendous importance, connected with the atomic spy ring, made a trip to the United States to see the American President, and he went to Britain to see Prime Minister Atlee.

Mackenzie King made a report to the House of Commons, and here is what he said there. First of all, he said:

I told the man Gouzenko he should go back and put it into the Soviet files, that we did not want it. And the reason I did it—

he said—

I did not want to complicate relations with Russia.

And he said he wanted to go to see Stalin. Here it is verbatim:

From what I have heard and know about Premier Stalin, I am confident that the Russian leader would not countenance or condone such action in one of his country's Embassies.

Well, seeing how Gouzenko was treated, actually he could have been killed, not having attained his goal of defection, he could have been sent or extradited to Russia.

As a matter of fact, during the war many people were extradited from America to Russia—defectors.

I have not read the latest book about the FBI, but leafing through, I notice a thing there, described by the authorities themselves:

In 1943, a young sailor, a Russian sailor by the name of Egorov defected. He jumped his ship. So the Soviets demanded of the American authorities that he should be found and extradited. He was found and had to be put on a Norwegian ship. But while he was being put on the Norwegian ship, he fled and hid himself somewhere on a chicken farm.

Then a year later, American police authorities noticed that four men were dragging a fellow to a Russian ship. The American police officers came up and said: "What are you doing?"

Then 1 of those 4 kidnapers introduced himself as Lomakin, as Consul Lomakin, Soviet consul, and said that that man was a deserter, and things like that. And in spite of the protest of the American authorities, they put him aboard the Soviet ship.

Two days later American investigators came to that ship and demanded that this man Egorov be called in for questioning. They brought Egorov, who was blue and black from beating. Egorov begged on his knees not to be sent to Russia because he would be liquidated. But Lomakin, who was also present there, the Soviet consul, said:

"No, you cannot free that man, I have only signed him up as a member of the crew."

And in spite of that, the American authorities did nothing, and that man was sent to Russia, where he surely was shot.

The report of the American authorities on that case is in that book of the FBI. And the authorities were at a loss as to what to do, and the man who wrote the report said:

"That man Egorov will surely be shot dead."

Now, in view of things like that, you must be doubly courageous—
 Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, we are not offering them any incentive whatsoever for defection?

Mr. ORLOV. Not only incentive, but at times it was discouraging.

Senator McCLELLAN. We offered deterrents rather than incentives?

Mr. ORLOV. That is true.

Senator McCLELLAN. For the record, I think one thing should be corrected here.

There has been some reference to the fact that if one Senator, that is the implication of it, would make such a statement, that that would carry the authority of Government. That is the implication of it.

I am sorry sometimes it does not, because I would like to say some things with that effect. But I think it would take action by the executive branch of the Government, probably some legislation by Congress, to authorize it.

Mr. ORLOV. I know, but what I had in mind, Senator, was that a Senator might make an announcement and say:

"I will use my offices, I will do whatever I can to persuade the executive branch to give political asylum to such a person."

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, what is meant is that it should be the policy of the Government, from whatever source authority is required, to establish such a policy.

All right; let's proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I think in view of the time area we stake out here—I have one more line of questioning, and I think I can finish that up very briefly.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you feel now that, for instance, the Soviet Union, present leaders of the Soviet Union, have abandoned the rule of Stalin and that they are now embarking on a new and different course, which course is being reflected even by the American Communist Party here in the United States?

That is two things: the Soviet policy abroad, and the Communist policy here at home. That will be the last question I have.

Mr. ORLOV. No, I do not think that they have actually changed. It is just a temporary liberalization in Russia, which is limited to some free speech only.

Actually, Khrushchev, whom I had known personally, and all the others in Russian leadership, they are the same Stalinists as they were. They have not changed anything, either in their own policy in their own country—because, as we know, their economic policy remains the same. That means stress on heavy industry for war armaments and nothing for the consumer, no consumer goods, very little food, and the shortages of food and goods and the hardship of the Russian people continue.

In the aspect of foreign policy, they continue the same policy of Stalin, of striving to subjugate other countries and other peoples.

Senator McCLELLAN. In that connection, what would be your comment regarding the recent action of the American Communist Party in its propaganda? It seems to me it possibly could be regarded as just window-dressing for the purpose of deception, of trying to make it appear that they are not holding allegiance to Russia Communist domination.

What is your view about that?

Mr. ORLOV. You expressed it better than I could ever do. This is absolute deception, absolute lies. They are still a branch of the Russian Communist Party.

Senator McCLELLAN. They are still Communist revolutionaries, international in scope——

Mr. ORLOV. Absolutely.

Senator McCLELLAN (continuing). And have the same objective.

Mr. ORLOV. And all their resolutions had been approved in the Kremlin beforehand. And they are so disciplined that they carry out to the minutest detail the performance of how to show that they are not disciplined.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. ORLOV. And I should like to add also that in spite of the fact that in his speech before the 20th congress of the party the Soviet party boss, Khrushchev, has admitted that millions of people were exiled, without any guilt, into concentration camps, he did not throw open the concentration camps; they are still there.

In spite of the fact that Khrushchev has so completely exposed the technique of torture in obtaining false confessions, all those who were tried in the famous Moscow trials have not been rehabilitated. All the former teachers of the present leaders of the Kremlin have not been rehabilitated, they still stand in the books as Hitlerite spies.

The leaders of the Red army, Marshal Tukhachevsky and the rest, who have been shot on the charge that they had been Hitlerite spies, they still stand as Hitlerite spies and nobody has rehabilitated them.

And Khrushchev has shown that he is able to use the same methods as Stalin. Let us recall the case of Beria. Beria was shot ostensibly because he was an American spy, but America knows he was not an American spy. And it is so ridiculous, because it was Beria who stole the atomic bomb secrets. So he was not an American spy. But, in spite of that, he and a number of persons were liquidated, ostensibly because they were spies.

Mr. MORRIS. Could I ask you, very briefly, in a few words, how, generally, is espionage financed? Just in a few words, because we have to finish now.

Mr. ORLOV. Yes.

This is very simple. The Soviet intelligence service is financed direct from the Treasury. No shady deals, they are not allowed to counterfeit money for that purpose, or to engage in any contraband to supplement their budgets.

The budget of the Soviet intelligence service, NKVD, as in my time, was \$2,800,000 per month, a very little sum, if you compare it by the sums spent by the Western intelligence services, and there was never a year at that time when they spent more than \$2 million of that appropriation of \$2,800,000.

Senator McCLELLAN. Per month?

Mr. ORLOV. Per month—all over the world.

Senator McCLELLAN. How do they get by so cheaply?

Mr. ORLOV. They get by so cheaply, first, because the Soviet officers worked for the revolution and were satisfied to get very small salaries.

And the main thing is that about 60 percent of the most efficient Soviet spies were Communists, and the Communists were supposed to work for their spiritual fatherland, for Russia, not for money.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, if the American Communists supplant the work of the NKVD officials in the intelligence operation in the United States, there is no money going from the Soviet Union to the American Communists, is there?

Mr. ORLOV. No.

You see, when you speak about the Communist Party, then I may tell you that the Communist Party exists on Soviet money, on the money which comes from the Soviet Treasury, from the Central Committee of the Party. That is why they have to toe the line.

That is why, you see, when there is a split in the Communist Party here, the faction which has split off and has denounced Moscow, goes out of existence, because they are not subsidized. That is why a deviationist group has no chance to exist, although they may have all the arsenal of Leninism and of Karl Marx and Engels in their possession. They have no money. He is the boss who pays the money, and the central committee of the party had a budget for the Comintern which financed all those activities of the Communist Party everywhere in the world.

But concerning the so-called Communist spies, those spies worked without money, or they just took some little sums in order to defray their expenses.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

I would like to thank Mr. Orlov for coming here.

Senator McCLELLAN. The Chair would like to ask him one or two questions. He probably would prefer to answer them in executive session and, if so, that is all right.

I would like to inquire of you whether you know now of any Communists in our Government, in any position in the Government?

Mr. ORLOV. No; I do not.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. And the other is: Do you know any Communists in this country now who may be engaged in espionage that you could identify?

Mr. ORLOV. No, I do not.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is all.

Any further testimony?

Mr. MORRIS. I have no questions, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Orlov.

What is the further pleasure of the staff with respect to hearings?

Mr. MORRIS. There is a witness coming down today, Senator. We will have to have a session with him some time, in executive session, today, and make an announcement later in the day about when he is to appear.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

The committee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following article from the U. S. News & World Report of March 29, 1957, was ordered into the record during a hearing March 29, 1957, at which Senator Olin Johnston presided:)

WEAPON OF GOLD

REDS USE IT TO PUT SQUEEZE ON SPAIN

PARIS.—What may be one of the biggest "shakedown" schemes in history is being tried by Soviet Russia now in an effort to get a Communist foothold in Spain.

The bait in this case is a half billion dollars' worth of Spanish Government gold, taken by the Russians for "safekeeping" during the Spanish Civil War 20 years ago.

The Franco Government is trying to get it back. But, from the way things are going, the price is going to be high. So far, the Russians don't even admit—publicly, at least—that they took the gold in the first place, even though Spain now has documentary proof.

Instead, Moscow is using the gold to try to squeeze concessions out of Spain through roundabout talks in Paris. What Russia wants is an exchange of ambassadors, trade agreements, the right to station "news correspondents" in Spain and to put into effect all the other devices Moscow has used in the past to get the Communists established in new territory.

Delicate negotiations about the gold have been taking place off and on since 1954 between Spain and Russia, even though they don't recognize each other's governments and don't exchange representatives.

LINK WITH UNITED STATES BASES

The talks started just about the time United States military bases were getting established in Spain. The Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Sergei Vinogradov, quietly approached the Count of Casa Rojas, Spanish Ambassador to France, at a big diplomatic party and suggested that relations between their two countries be "normalized."

Since then, the two ambassadors have met privately half a dozen times, 3 times in each other's embassies, for sessions lasting from 30 to 45 minutes each. Vinogradov, while pushing the idea of getting Soviet officials into Spain, has avoided mentioning the United States bases. Nor has he made any nasty remarks about Madrid's anti-Communist policies. Instead, he spends the time urging "coexistence" and emphasizing that countries with wide differences can maintain "normal" relations.

Throughout the talks between the two ambassadors, the Spanish position has been that nothing can be done until two things happen: First, all Spanish citizens in Russia must be returned to their homeland. And, second, the half billion in gold must be returned to its rightful owner, the Spanish Government.

Last year, the Russians finally agreed to send back the Spaniards, most of whom had been in the Soviet Union since the 1930's when the Spanish Civil War was going on. More than 2,000 Spaniards, mostly people who had been sent to Russia as children during the civil war, have now come back. Many of those who grew up in Russia married there and have brought along their wives and children—all Soviet citizens. The presence of these persons gives the Russians a talking point when they suggest setting up an embassy and consulates in Spain. The interests of Soviet citizens, they say, must be protected by the Russian Government.

SPANISH PROOF

The Spanish gold was mentioned only vaguely in the first few talks between the two ambassadors here in Paris because Madrid lacked legal proof that the Russians had taken it. But now the Spanish Government has that proof in the form of an 8-page receipt in the French language signed by 2 high officials of Russia.

The evidence was obtained after more than a year of negotiation with Juan Negrin, an exile who sent the gold to Moscow when he was Finance Minister in the Spanish Republican Government.

For months Negrin refused to give up the papers relating to the gold deal. But, just before his death, in Paris in November, Negrin told his housekeeper to turn the papers over to the Franco government.

With proof in hand, the Spaniards approached the Russians again. They presented photographic copies of the receipt. Ambassador Vinogradov promised to forward the photographic copies to Moscow. That was nearly 3 months ago. The Spaniards are still awaiting a reply.

APPEAL TO U. N.

The Spanish Government is prepared for long negotiations with the Russians. But if direct talks don't bring the gold back, Madrid probably will appeal to the International Court or the United Nations to get action. Spain badly needs the half billion dollars' worth of gold. Franco's government is hard up for cash right now, and the gold would be a windfall equal to all the United States aid Spain has received since World War II.

The Spaniards have told the Russians they will not make any deals to get their gold. However, veteran diplomats wouldn't be surprised to see a Soviet embassy in Madrid, once the gold is back in the Bank of Spain.

The Russians would like access to Spanish strategic materials. They would like diplomatic cover for espionage against the United States bases. They want to get into the country to launch underground anti-Franco propaganda at a time when economic difficulties, strikes and student unrest are plaguing Spain and political troubles about the succession to Franco are beginning to appear.

· FOR MOSCOW: A WEAPON

In the Spanish gold it took for "safekeeping" 20 years ago, the Soviet Union figures it holds a powerful weapon for prying its way into Madrid.

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

MARCH 1, 1957

PART 52

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 o'clock a. m., in room 155, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Robert C. McManus, investigation analyst.

Senator JENNER. The committee will come to order.

Would you call the first witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Dunlop.

Senator JENNER. Doctor, do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. DUNLOP. I do.

Senator JENNER. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ALBERT M. DUNLOP, M. D., ALEXANDRIA, VA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you give your full name and address.

Dr. DUNLOP. Albert M. Dunlop, Rural Free Delivery 4, Box 493, Alexandria, Va.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were born in Savoy, Ill.?

Dr. DUNLOP. In Savoy, Ill., in 1884.

Mr. SOURWINE. You took your A. B. at the University of Illinois in 1908?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you took your M. D. from Harvard University in 1910?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You taught at Harvard Medical School in Shanghai from 1911 to 1916?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You taught at the Peking University Medical College from 1918 to 1931?

Dr. DUNLOP. 1918 to 1931; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in private practice in Shanghai, in the private practice of medicine, from 1931 through 1933?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a professor at the University of Chicago from 1943 to 1946?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in private practice in Shanghai from 1946 through 1952?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were a professor at the University of Hong Kong from 1952 through 1953?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And during the time that you practiced medicine in China you had a clientele which included all classes; is that right?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had rich men and poor men, beggarmen and thieves, I suppose?

Dr. DUNLOP. I expect, and including the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. And including a number of high officials?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I submit that this qualifies Dr. Dunlop as a gentleman of rather unusual experience, and I think that we may go forward.

Senator JENNER. I certainly think so. Proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Dunlop, what can you tell us about the regimentation of doctors in Communist China?

Dr. DUNLOP. The regimentation of doctors started very soon in the Shanghai area—and I am speaking primarily for the Shanghai area, although I know by hearsay of other parts—started in late 1949, when the Communists, in their endeavor to placate the people, or to meet the people with their state medicine, required all organizations, factories, and so forth, to have clinics. And for this purpose, they went out and raked in all of the well-qualified men, and some who weren't so well qualified, to service these places.

In some instances, they were more or less forced to give up their practices and go in.

Well, this taking away of the patients from these private men made their practices, of course, go down to virtually nothing at all. And so, these men, many of them, had to go into the hospitals and clinics in order to earn a living.

That has continued. And today I would say there are a very few medical men in private practice.

When the Communists came into China and into the Yangtze Valley, there were close to 3,500 well-trained, western-trained doctors. I don't include the native physicians, I don't include those who were trained in Japan. I include those men who had been to foreign institutions, either in the United States, England, Germany, or in institutions such as the Peking Medical College, in Peking, which was established by the Rockefeller Foundation. In all, there were something like 3,500.

Within a year, many of those men—I say many, upward of 500 or so—had slipped out of China, and were either in Formosa or Hong Kong. So that a month before I came away, a Chinese colleague told me that he thought at that time—and that was in late 1952, I came out in October 1952—that there could not be more than 2,500 of that original group. And many of them who had not es-

aped had come down with recurrent tuberculosis, and high blood pressure, which we did not ordinarily have in China—it wasn't due necessarily to the rice diet, but the fact is that the Chinese, as a rule, had not had high blood pressure.

Is that what you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir, that is very much along the line.

As a result of this regimentation, how many independently practicing physicians, well-trained physicians, would you say, there are in Red China now?

Dr. DUNLOP. How many are in all China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Are there any physicians allowed independently——

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

I would say that of those original 2,500, there undoubtedly remain at least 2,000 of the well-trained ones.

I knew some of those who are no more.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon the interruption.

The question is: Are those men practicing independently, or are they regimented by the Chinese Communists?

Dr. DUNLOP. They are regimented.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the point.

There is no free and independent practice of medicine any more in Red China?

Dr. DUNLOP. A man may do some after hours in his own office or home, and many of the men had their offices in their homes, but outside of that; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Communists fix fees?

Dr. DUNLOP. Absolutely, yes.

And that is another thing which drove the men out of their practice and out of their private hospitals, into the hands of the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have the Communists done anything to foster the teaching or training of additional physicians?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

They started in the very early days what they called the 2½-year boys. Those were middle-school students who were brought into these large classes, sometimes of a thousand each, in some of the various old, established institutions. And then, there were some that were established especially for the purpose of training these boys who, after 2½ years, could take on a certain amount of major work.

Now, when I say 2½ years, I mean they started from scratch. For instance, all of my instruments were sold to a colleague who went into Sian Fu. And he sent his nose, throat, and ear men—I am a nose, throat, and ear man—down to take over my equipment, check it before it went back. And as we were checking it over one day, he said to me, "Our boys and girls are doing operations after 2½ years of training."

I said, "So?"

"Yes," he said, "that is the present move, to utilize all of the men they can get, as quickly as they can get them, to meet the great need."

Now, the Communists did try to control, after a time, these 2½-year boys and girls by decreeing that no major procedure could be done without consultation with a colleague, a man of some other department of training, such as a gynecologist or obstetrician, if it

was a woman patient, or an internist, if it was to be something that had to do with the abdominal cavity. So that, they turned out a tremendous number of such individuals.

Now, one other aspect of that business of getting enough doctors to meet the need of a country going wild with public health was to insist that all the oldtime native doctors be given modern training. I mean, the old men who treated with herbs, or the men who used acupuncture needles for inserting in different parts of the body, for the purpose of treating the individual. All of these people were required to take special training.

And, some of my colleagues were required to give them night classes in modern medicine, diagnostic work, and especially how to take advantage of the modern antibiotics.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you make a competent physician out of a herb doctor, with a few months in any school, Doctor?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, they tried it for a time, and then they failed. And what they did was to bring back into their medical schools and back into practice the old, traditional medicine of China, or herb and acupuncture practice.

The herb doctors—we have seen them in this country, and in China they are all over. In Shanghai, for instance, there are 10,000 of these traditional tonic men who got their training from their fathers or grandfathers, and so on down.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any good medical schools in China?

Dr. DUNLOP. Good medical schools? Well, you have got the Peking Medical School, to which I was attached for a long time, the Rockefeller Foundation Medical School.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they under Communist control?

Dr. DUNLOP. All under Communist control.

And today, it does not take any undergraduates, but confines itself entirely to postgraduates. And incidentally, today it has a Chair of Herb Medicine and Acupuncture, which is being carried on side by side with modern medicine.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, Doctor, explain what acupuncture is.

Dr. DUNLOP. Acupuncture is the use of a needle of varying size and length, which is inserted into the body in various places, in order to destroy a particular disease. The graduate is required to perfect his knowledge of the different localities into which he can thrust this needle. And then he takes his examination by being required to insert that needle into a mannequin, a brass mannequin, the holes of which have been pasted over with paper. So that if he shoots accurately and gets into the hole, he can pass his examination, and then he is an acupuncturist.

Now, they have used that a great deal. Latterly, in the Peking Medical College they have been using it for the treatment of poliomyelitis, believe it or not. And they say they have cured cases of poliomyelitis by the use of acupuncture needles.

Now, in the old times there was no sterilization of their needle. It might be wiped off through the hair of the operator, or anything might happen.

Incidentally, if I might go just a step further in regard to the acupuncture, the acupuncture people became very proficient in abortions.

They would take a 3 months' pregnant uterus, thrust a fairly long needle through the abdominal cavity into the top of the fundus of the womb, and frequently there was a fairly prompt abortion. It also resulted in the withdrawal of that needle into the abdominal cavity, and then a chain of events started which would either end in the death of the individual or the interference of modern surgery for its removal.

Our man in gynecology at PUMC used to have case after case where he was required to go in and remove this needle, which had been drawn through the contraction of the uterus within the abdominal cavity.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say now they have modernized that ancient practice, now they are sterilizing the needle?

Dr. DUNLOP. Now they are sterilizing the needle, that is the only difference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, there are some other evidences of progress under the Soviets, are there not, such as the transplantation of tissues to treat asthma and gastric ulcers?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

We did a lot of transplantation of tissues after it had been started in Russia at one time. And I think there was a directive of some sort sent down into China that they should put it on there.

Well, the tissue that was taken was merely tissue from some animal, such as the lip of a cow—they even went so far as to take some of the glands of the various animals. That was put into deep freeze or refrigerator, and brought down to a very low temperature for a period, and then when it was to be used, it was brought out and put into an autoclave, that is a steam sterilizing machine, for the purpose of completely sterilizing.

Then a small opening was made through the skin underneath the ribs, preferably on the right side, and that was inserted, and then the skin was sewn up. And that was that. It was supposed to cure all sorts of things.

And so this colleague of mine said he thought it was started in Russia, primarily because they didn't have enough medicines, they had to do something.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is the same principle as the old asafetida bag around the neck, only they put this under the skin?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, they have some various reactions every now and then, and whether or not they have had any cures remains to be seen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, I asked you a question, whether medical schools were good or bad. In your book, you told how the students in the Communist schools, in the medical schools, get the same grades, whether they are good or bad students, they get lectures instead of examination, and they all graduate, if their political thinking is right.

Are those what you call the earmarks of a good medical school?

Dr. DUNLOP. No.

And I don't think that practice had been followed in such places as the Peking Medical School, because our own staff is there. But take that institution which was started in the north of Shanghai.

The man who was in charge told me that those men were divided up into cells. At the time he spoke to me, there was something like a thousand in their freshman class. And they were, first of all, di-

vided into a hundred each, and then each hundred was divided into 10. And they all had captains. The man who led the group, the smaller group, had to see to it that every man in his group knew what was going on. And when it came to the so-called examination time, they all got the same grade, regardless.

Of course, a man had to be politically sound in order to get through.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is a special effort made to indoctrinate doctors in Red China?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

I knew the foreign group, because there were 10 out of 12 in that group that were my old students. They met, first of all, once a week in the evening, and had a class which lasted from 8 until about midnight. And they were indoctrinated by a Communist.

I remember his telling me once that they were required to approve what he told them every now and then. He would say, "Now, don't you think that the Americans have been subversive in the medical schools and these various things they have been doing in an educational way?" And he said, "We would all raise our hands and shout 'Yes.'" He said, "If we don't we are kept after the class, and we are interrogated for 2, 3, 4 hours." He said, "It isn't worth while, and what we agree among ourselves is this: We speak with our lips, but not with our hearts."

I put that in this book, but that is the sense of what goes on with that group.

I don't believe that they have been indoctrinated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that that is a part of the Communist attack on independent thinking?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is a part of it, yes.

And, of course, they started in Peking very early in the game for all educational institutions. They started, first of all, to try to control all of their own people in their own groups. They started in Manchuria in August of 1950.

And then, when they found that some of the educational groups were getting out of hand, they switched that into the educational institutions, and they had a big meeting in Peking when Chou En-lai instructed the staffs as to what they should aim for in the way of indoctrination of the group.

And, in the end, it was the students who indoctrinated the staffs, because they were more accessible to the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do the Chinese Reds recognize physicians as an especially influential group, and attempt to use them for propaganda or for other purposes?

Dr. DUNLOP. I don't think they have done that to any degree. They use the physicians primarily because they can use them in connection with this great movement of public health that they put on for the entire country. They can't do without them.

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell us about individualism among the Chinese? Does that persist in spite of Red Communist efforts to suppress it? And what can you tell us about those areas?

Dr. DUNLOP. I think it does. I think individualism has existed back through the years, and I think it will continue to exist.

I think there is a great attempt on the part of the Communists to try to destroy it. First of all, they have tried to break down the

family unit. I can best illustrate that by the instance of my own colleague, whose son informed on him.

This son, like all of the others among the youngsters, was indoctrinated to the point—they were informing on their own families. It got to the point where, when I went to a Chinese house, if there were any children around there was very little speaking of any sort.

Now, this colleague of mine, a doctor, and a nose-and-throat man, and myself, were very nervous about the whole thing. He was very anti-Communist. The Communists had required all the doctors to tell them how much they had in the way of property, and this colleague of mine withheld the sum of his property. And this youngster informed against him.

Senator JENNER. His son?

Dr. DUNLOP. His son informed against the father. And his father went into his office one Saturday afternoon and filled himself with morphine, and that is where they found him Monday morning—dead.

And that is only one of several incidents of this sort. It has been that attempt, first of all, to break down the family unit, which has led to a breaking down of the individualism, if you will, of the Chinese people. I can't believe that it will succeed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not believe it will succeed?

Mr. DUNLOP. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why not, Doctor?

Dr. DUNLOP. People who have a culture that goes back almost 4,000 years may be dented with this thing, but I don't think that in the end they will accomplish what they are setting out to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying, then, that communism is alien to the ancient culture of China?

Dr. DUNLOP. Absolutely.

And the older Chinese, especially, look upon the regime in Peking as an alien government, not as a Chinese Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, some of those who favor the recognition of Red China and the admission of Red China to the United Nations tell us repeatedly that communism is very much in line with the ancient traditions of China, that China has always been a nation which was governed from above, and that they have developed their own kind of Marxism, and that is really indigenous to China, this Red communism that they have now.

You say that is not so?

Dr. DUNLOP. I can't believe that for a moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, to what extent has the sovietization of China progressed, if you know?

Dr. DUNLOP. To what extent? I didn't get the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what extent has the sovietization of China progressed?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, I think they have insinuated themselves into many aspects of Chinese life. I think there is a great deal of imitation on the part of the Chinese.

Take the matter of banking and accounting. I had some friends who were in the Bank of China. And at one time they told me that all of the accounting, all of the banking, was being changed to the Soviet method of banking, whatever that is.

The Soviets are behind the scenes, not out in front.

As an example of that, you rarely see Soviets walking around in the streets. That was true in my time. What happens now, I don't know, but I don't think there has been any change.

The officials who came over, the so-called—what do you call them?—the people who came in to help direct were carted about in the city in closed motorcars. They took an ordinary car and put some green stuff around the back and the sides where the passengers sit, and those cars were sent through the streets at something more than the ordinary rate of speed, and you never saw these people out in the open.

I don't know whether I have answered your question, or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Do you know the phrase "national deviation"?

Dr. DUNLOP. I don't think I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, taking that phrase with its Communist meaning to mean differences between the Communist Party of one nation and the Communist Party of Russia, based on differences between that nation and Russia—do you understand me?

Dr. DUNLOP. I think I follow you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say to what extent national deviation is tolerated in China, or to what extent there is an effort and an objective on the part of the Communist leaders to make the Chinese Communists just the same as the Russian Communists?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, I think their greatest attempt is to fashion themselves after the Soviet way of living or way of life.

I was very much interested, in sitting down in my apartment in Shanghai, in reading some old articles that appeared in the Post and various places with regard to what was happening in some of the other places, like Rumania and Hungary. We were going through exactly the same thing in Shanghai. There was no difference, as far as I could see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, you spoke of the changes in family life, such as children informing on their parents. I assume there were other changes in family life.

For instance, does social visiting continue under the Communists?

Dr. DUNLOP. It is very much restricted. In fact, you saw very little of it, excepting at the traditional Chinese New Year's time, when it is almost compulsory for a man to go out and visit his friends. But they don't go out and see each other much.

And as far as my visits were concerned, although the Chinese were very friendly to me, I rarely went into a Chinese home just for a visit unless I was pretty sure of the type of home, and knew something about the servants in the home, whether they were Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, did the Communists make a practice of questioning the servants, as well as the children, about what went on in the home?

Dr. DUNLOP. I think they had constant contact with the servants. The cook, in many instances, was required to report on all gatherings in the home over, I think it was, eight people.

Now, that was for another purpose as well, not only to keep tabs on who was meeting in some of the places, but also in order to make attacks on those who were giving the meal.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, in your book you mentioned consignment stores. What are consignment stores?

Dr. DUNLOP. A consignment store—and they sprang up by the hundreds in Shanghai—the people had no money, it had been taken away from them in various ways, and so they began taking things out of their houses, pictures, shoes, clothing, all sorts of things—and these piled into the consignment stores, where the man in charge would put on a little extra fee for the article, which he would then take as his commission, and turn back to the man who brought in the article the amount that the owner wanted to receive. There were 2 or 3 in every block.

They weren't very much patronized. I used to go and do some window shopping and see what people were getting out of their houses—everything and anything.

Senator JENNER. I didn't quite understand that. They took their property out of their homes to the consignment store to raise money; they were out of money?

Dr. DUNLOP. Exactly.

Senator JENNER. Sort of like a pawnshop?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes, exactly; only it was on a different basis. We have pawnshops in China, but it was the same idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, that is at one end of the scale. Now, at the other end of the scale are those who are well off. How did Red China treat capitalists? Were capitalists wooed by the new order?

Dr. DUNLOP. In the very beginning, you might say that they were. It was for the purpose of getting in solid with the commercial city of Shanghai. For a time they wooed the merchants.

And then, after they went into Korea, they needed a lot of money, they weren't getting it by any other means, they made an attack on the merchants, turned on the merchants and made a concerted drive to get away from the merchants as much money as they could in the way of fines.

A merchant might have done something that was a bit irregular, and some of his staff, who were part of the interrogating groups under the Communists, would come along, knowing full well what had taken place, and interrogate him openly about it. And if they could prove it, then the Communists would levy a fine on him.

Sometimes the fine was so severe that it took his entire business.

We had a big canning group there, Ma Ling, which was fashioned after many of our factories at home. It was a modern, up and coming factory. And the Communists, in their interrogation, accused this firm of sending putrid canned meat to the volunteers in Korea, with the result that a heavy fine was put on the manager, the entire property was virtually confiscated, with the result that the manager and his wife took poison—not an unusual thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned in your book that the employees of foreign firms were sometimes held as sort of hostages. Will you tell us about that?

Dr. DUNLOP. I think that was true of all the foreigners in connection with firms that had any outside-of-the-country holdings. During the entire period of the early days—you must remember that the Communists came into Shanghai and into the port cities without very much in the way of money, no solid currency.

I stood at my office window on the Bund in Shanghai and saw the silver and gold go out of the Bank of China across to the river and out of the city.

I would also add, there were American banknotes, because we had a great many American banknotes after our boys were in Shanghai.

Now, they had no money, really, so they made this drive on the merchants, and that meant taking all of the money, really, out of the community, with the result that no one had any money. Therefore, they brought their gold bars from their hiding places, they brought their rings—and even the servants had gold rings, which was their way of storing a little property.

They took their American banknotes and their gold dollars down to the bank and turned them in for the currency of the regime, and that is where the Communists were able to get a tremendous amount of their foreign currency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, if you know, what were the tax policies of the Chinese Reds?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, from my own personal experience, I would say that their policy was to tax all they could get, and ask for more.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have equality of taxation in this country. Is there any such thing in Red China?

Dr. DUNLOP. No; I would say not.

A lawyer friend of mine said that his property was taxed at such a rate that if he took the current value of the property before the Communists came in, the tax would overcome that in $2\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is the policy, then, of all the traffic will bear, and a little more?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

For instance, my first tax on my motor car was the equivalent of \$150 United States, for 3 months. I said to my secretary, "3 months? I thought that was for a year."

"No," she said, "it is only 3 months."

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the Chinese Reds efficient tax collectors?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

They had an article on that tax bill, when it came in, that if you didn't pay it at the time it was due, it accrued in interest at the rate of 1 percent a day. I understand that has been dropped to one-half of 1 percent a day.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, what can you tell us about food exports from China to Russia?

Dr. DUNLOP. In the summer of 1952 especially, I was in contact with the man who was renting a motor to some Russians, who were processing, or rather, inspecting, beef at the abattoir in Shanghai, before this meat was loaded into refrigerator cars to be sent north.

He said that there were five men in that group that went out every morning to the slaughterhouse and inspected meat which would be sent out that day. The Communists had taken ordinary boxcars, had built inner walls, and cut holes in the top of the roofs of the cars so that they could load them with ice.

They would bring these cars into Shanghai, load them with ice for 24 hours, in order to cool them, and then they would fill them up with meat and load more ice in and send them north over the ferry at Nanking. They made fairly good progress north.

They were sending beef, pork, chicken, ducks, eggs. One man who was in a golf tournament with me one day told me that his company had just processed 500 pigs that day to be sent out on this trip north. I said, "You mean 500 pigs, this day?"

He said, "Yes, and every day."

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this at a time when there was a surplus of food in China?

Dr. DUNLOP. Anything but. No, they were beginning to have a great dearth of proteins—fish they could get, but not beef, very little chicken—they could get pigs' feet, because pigs' feet don't ship very easily. And you could see these fellows going through the streets all the time with a pole and lots of pigs' feet in front and back.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were, then, shipping food to Russia at a time when their own people in China were starving?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, they shipped grain to India. Was there a surplus of grain, or was that the same situation?

Dr. DUNLOP. No; that was just a bit of face, or what have you—it was nothing.

I was coming out of China at the time those ships were being loaded in Shanghai, and the comments then were that China could ill afford to send this grain anywhere, because they were trying to import from all sources.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do the Communists engage in un-American propaganda among the people of Red China?

Dr. DUNLOP. Beginning with the attack in November of 1950 in North Korea, they put on a very severe attack on Americans. There were posters on all of the buildings, walls. One of the favorite places was the pillars of the American Club, which were plastered over with these scurrilous propaganda cartoons, for the most part.

The Chinese themselves didn't take to this readily. And many of these posters were torn down at night, if they were in places that were not protected.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't believe that all this anti-American propaganda developed antagonism in the people toward individual Americans?

Dr. DUNLOP. No, I don't.

And when we came out—it became known that we were getting out—I was surprised at the number of Chinese friends who slipped in before we came away, who were very anxious to have us say to Americans, wherever we met them: "Please tell the Americans we do not hate them"—almost in identical words.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, has America really lost China? You have heard the statement that America has lost China, meaning the Chinese people are no longer friendly toward the United States. Is that true?

Dr. DUNLOP. No, I would say not.

During the attacks in Korea and the germ warfare thing, the Chinese would have none of it. They called it "this silly business." They liked to label things like that "this silly business"—Oh, for instance, the wedding business is "the red business" and the funeral business is "the white business." So they call this "this silly business."

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any organized resistance movement in China against the Communists?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, I think there is.

There were two former Communist generals who used to take lunch with us in the club, the American Club, before the club was closed, who undoubtedly were mixed up with some underground movement

in China. They disappeared about a year after that, and I think went to Hong Kong. But before they went, one of them told me that they were having a meeting in Hong Kong with their agents from all over China.

That is the last I have heard of that man. I know nothing further about it. When I went to Hong Kong, I inquired about this man, because he was a well-known man, the one who spoke to me, and no one had seen him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any evidence of anti-Communist guerrilla action around Shanghai?

Dr. DUNLOP. There was in the early days. That was very early cleared away. But for a long time—in May 1949, when the Communists came into Shanghai, we could hear sporadic firing in the suburbs, and further out. But that ceased. Along toward the last, we heard nothing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, were you familiar with St. John's University?

Dr. DUNLOP. I taught there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at St. John's when it was taken over by the Chinese Communists?

Dr. DUNLOP. I went out a few days later, and saw the smashed windows and the bridge which had been exploded and knocked to the ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at St. John's or in Shanghai in early October of 1950, when delegates of the World Federation of Democratic Youth came to Shanghai and visited the university?

Dr. DUNLOP. I must have been, but I couldn't been allowed out in that period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that there were Americans in that delegation?

Dr. DUNLOP. We heard there were; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, I will show you a newspaper story in the Shanghai News of Saturday, October 7. The story is headed "WFDY delegates invited to speak at universities." I will ask you if that refreshes your recollection about what happened at that time.

Mr. DUNLOP. The Shanghai News was an English language Communist sheet. You want specially this about St. John's University?

Mr. SOURWINE. We will put that in the record, Doctor. But the question is whether that refreshes your recollection at all about what took place at that time.

Mr. DUNLOP. I remember there was something of the sort. But you must remember that the newspapers and communications in the city at that time were rather poor, and many things went on that we knew nothing about.

I knew of two men who were hand-in-hand with that group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were they, Doctor?

Dr. DUNLOP. One was John Powell, son of the late Bill Powell, who took over his father's Weekly Review, the China Weekly Review, and went off the deep end with regard to communism, as did his wife, who had been a former secretary of Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the other one?

Dr. DUNLOP. The other one was a man by the name of Berges. He later went to St. John's and was an instructor there. But after the

first few weeks we didn't go out to St. John's at all, the whole thing was closed, so no one went out there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the doctor has opened up a couple of lines of questioning, but to keep things in a row here, may I ask that this Shanghai newspaper story go into the record at this point?

Senator JENNER. It may go into the record.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 429" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 429

[The Shanghai News, Shanghai, October 7, 1950]

WFDY DELEGATES INVITED TO SPEAK AT UNIVERSITIES

AT REVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSITY

A rally to welcome the WFDY delegates was held yesterday morning at 9:30 o'clock by the students of the China Revolutionary University, including those of the Russian Language Institute.

At the auditorium of the former Chi Nan University, the meeting proceeded in a friendly atmosphere, and amidst a thunder of applause Chang Chun-fang, the president of the Russian Language Institute made a welcome speech to the delegates, which was rendered into excellent Russian by a student of the institute.

In his speech on educational activities in the Soviet Union, Valentine Vdovin, the WFDY delegate and the acting editor of the Russian edition of the World Youth, organ of WFDY, vividly described numerous significant achievements in the Soviet educational and intellectual life. Owing to such achievements in the fields of education and learning, rapid progress in the reconstruction of the U. S. S. R. has been made possible. It was stressed that atomic energy is no longer a secret in the Soviet Union, as it has been utilized by the people for improving their standard of living. As this fact was being mentioned by the Soviet delegate, the eager audience burst out into thunderous applause.

Following the stirring speech of the Soviet delegate, Hamou Kraba, General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of Algeria reported enthusiastically to the young student fighters of China on the problems now faced by the people of Algeria. He first gave a brief introduction of the history of his fatherland and then dwelled on the colonial status of Algeria. He also told about the liberation movement carried on by the people of Algeria.

The meeting concluded after student representatives had presented embroidered banners to the WFDY delegates.

Twelve Soviet professors of the Russian Language Institute also attended the welcome meeting.

AT ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY

At 9:30 a. m. yesterday, two WFDY delegates, Comrades Robert N. Ebbels of Australia and Selma Weiss of the United States, were guest speakers at a meeting sponsored by the students of St. John's University, Great China University, and three high schools, at the Social Hall of St. John's University.

Present at the meeting were some 1,500 students and professors of these institutions.

The distinguished WFDY visitors were welcomed by rousing cheers from the eagerly waiting audience.

Comrade Ebbels, who is a member of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students, delivered a short and interesting report on the successful achievements of the Second World Students Conference which was held in Prague last August. He particularly pointed out that the sole aim of the second conference was to call for further unity among all students over the world in defending world peace and in fighting for democratic education as well as for a better future.

Miss Weiss made an inspiring speech, revealing the true facts concerning the democratic youth of America who earnestly seek peace and have been fighting for it, but who have been ruthlessly frustrated by their reactionary government. She believes that with the valuable experiences drawn from the two great revolutions of the U. S. S. R. and of China, the American people, especially the youth, will soon win liberation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, I show you another clipping from the Shanghai News of October 5, 1950. It shows the pictures of the delegates to this so-called World Federation of Democratic Youth, and I call your attention to two of the pictures which are underlined, being Americans in both instances, Selma Weiss, who was Harvey Matusow's girl friend, and David McCanns.

I would like to have you glance over these and tell us if there are any of those pictures that you recognize.

Dr. DUNLOP. I am afraid not. They probably passed me on the street in one of these swanky buses, and I probably turned up my nose at them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that this go in the record—not the pictures, but the caption.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(The caption for the pictures of the delegates referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 430" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 430

WFDY delegates: From left to right, upper row: 1. Robert Noel Ebbels, member of the Executive Committee of the IUS and representative of the Australian Democratic Youth. 2. Vladimir Semitchastny, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League. 3. Lidiya Ilina, Director of the Young Pioneers Department of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. 4. Valentine Vdovin, acting editor of the Russian version of the World Youth, organ of WFDY and USSR delegate. 5. Chun Cheng Hwan, delegate of Korean democratic youth. 6. Vu Xuan Vinh, representative of Viet-Nam democratic youth. 7. Wladyslaw Goralski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Polish Youth. 8. Alois Svoboda, editor of the Mlada Fronta, organ of the Czechoslovakia Union of Youth. 9. Hartwig Helmut, Central Committee member of the Free German Youth. 10. Pascu Stefanescu, Central Committee and Political Bureau member of the Union of Working Youth of Rumania. 11. Cornel Raducanu, chief editor of Scanteia Tineretului, organ of the Rumanian UOWY. 12. Jano Birmann, representing the Union of Working Youth of Hungary. 13. George Vasilev Manafov, editor-in-chief of the Noradna Mlodech of the Dimitrov's Union of the People's Youth of Bulgaria. 14. Qamil Buxheli, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Working Youth of Albania. 15. Natsogdorzh, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. 16. Sandag, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League.

Lower row: 17. Ishkhand, doctor from the Choilbasan University of Mongolia. 18. Rangit Guha, head of the WFDY Bureau for Youth fighting against Colonialism and delegate of Indian democratic youth. 19. Roger Guibert, Executive Bureau member of the National Committee of the Union of Republican Youth of France. 20. Lidie Maiorelli, Central Committee member of the Federation of Communist Youth of Italy. 21. Saverio Tutino, editor of Gioventu Nuova, organ of Italian FOCY. 22. Selma Weiss, director of the Student's Department of Labour Youth League of USA. 23. David Graham MacAnns (sic), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Young Progressives of America. 24. Dick Nettleton, chief of the Organisation Department of the Young Communist League of Great Britain. 25. Flavio Bravo, President of the Socialist Youth of Cuba. 26. Hans Grumma, delegate from the Free Austrian Youth. 27. Hamou Kraba, General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of Algeria. 28. Palle Voigt, chief editor of Framad (Forward), organ of Young Communist League of Denmark. 29. Omar Walmsley, delegate of Canadian democratic youth. 30. Unto Minttinen, delegate of Finnish democratic youth. 31. Jacob Wolff, Central Committee member of the Netherlands Youth League. 32. Mou Mouni Abdou, representative of the Rally of African Democratic Youth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, what effect would a meeting like this World Federation of Democratic Youth have on non-Communist Americans and Chinese, if you know?

Dr. DUNLOP. I think it would have none. And I think we out there felt that all of these peace movements, and all of these various things that took place at that time, were merely window dressing. They were like ships that pass in the night; we paid little attention to them.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I ask that another clipping from the Shanghai News of September 23, 1950, with the headlines "World youth delegation given rousing welcome at Peking," be put in the record at this point.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 431" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 431

[Shanghai News, September 23, 1950]

WORLD YOUTH DELEGATION GIVEN ROUSING WELCOME AT PEKING

PEKING, Sept. 23.—(Hsinhua)—Delegates of the World Federation of Democratic Youth—42 youth leaders representing 32 countries—arrived in Peking this morning after spending 12 days visiting various cities in Manchuria.

The platform of Peking's railway station was packed with leaders of the government and popular organizations, the Mayor of Peking, members of the diplomatic corps, heroes of the army and of labour, and representatives of China's young people. As the delegates stepped off the train, they disappeared under a mass of flowers showered on them by Young Pioneers and then ran a gauntlet of handshakes as they left the station.

The delegates from Korea, Viet-Nam, and Africa especially were surrounded by eager groups who wanted to shake hands, pat them on the back or find some way of showing their affection for these frontline fighters for democracy.

REVOLUTIONARY GREETINGS

Outside the station, the Chien Men Square was packed with thousands of Peking's youth, gathered under crowded red silk banners and massed portraits of democratic leaders of the world. On a plinth backed by flags of all nations, Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, welcomed the visitors. He said, "We welcome with elation you young fighters who are defending world peace. The banner of unity of all world's youth—borne by the delegation of the World Federation of Democratic Youth is warmly welcomed in China.

"On behalf of the youth of China, I bring revolutionary greetings to you and the democratic youth of the world whom you represent. Your courageous fight and industrious work are striking powerful blows in the cause of defending world peace and have always been an inspiration to Chinese youth who are with you in that fight."

Amid long ovations he saluted the youth of the Soviet Union, of Korea, and Viet-Nam, of the new democracies and colonial and capitalist countries—all the youth fighting for freedom, peace, and democracy.

CELEBRATE NATIONAL DAY

Enrico Boccara, of Italy, leader of the delegation, said that the delegates had been overwhelmed by the profound enthusiasm, fraternity, and strong display of international solidarity with which the youth and whole people of China had welcomed them.

"All young partisans of peace throughout the world," he said, "will be with you with their whole heart to celebrate the great day of October 1, the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

"We come to salute your great victories, your great successes in building up the new China. We come to pay homage to your people, your youth, and your great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung. We come to dip our flags in memory of the heroes who have died for the birth of a free and democratic new China, who have fallen in the cause of progressive mankind.

"In the hard struggle against warmongers, the young partisans of peace throughout the world will know on our return that they can rely on the Chinese youth who are determined to bar the way to the imperialists and establish peace.

PEACE FORCE POWERFUL

"They will know that, through your victories, the peace forces will be ever more powerful than the forces of war and that our ideal of truth and liberty will triumph over lies and oppression."

Vladimir Semitchastny, leader of the Soviet delegation, thanked the government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people and their youth for the welcome they had received, and said, "We have come to Peking on the eve of celebrations marking the first anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. All of the delegates are convinced of the remarkable successes achieved by the people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and its leader Mao Tse-tung in all sections of administrative and cultural life of the country.

"Victory of the Chinese people in its war of liberation, successes of the first year in social, economic, political, and cultural reconstruction are a new blow to the whole present-day imperialist system."

ADVANCED NATION

"Soviet youth follow with great attention the building up of the young People's Republic of China. They greet with joy each success achieved by the Chinese people and their youth.

"There is no doubt whatsoever that the two largest units of the World Federation of Democratic Youth—Soviet and Chinese youths—will in future do everything to strengthen the camp of peace and democracy.

"We profoundly believe that the day is not far off when the whole of China's territory will be united under the banner of the People's Republic of China. The day is near when the Chinese people and its youth will overcome all difficulties and under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and Comrade Mao Tse-tung will reconstruct the country and make it into an advanced nation."

The following delegates have arrived in Peking:

LIST OF DELEGATES

Enrico Boccara, head of the delegation, General Secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and representative of Italy.

Robert Noel Ebbels, member of the Executive Committee of the IUS and representative of the Australian Democratic Youth.

Ekbatani, delegate from the IUS and representative of the Iranian democratic youth.

Vladimir Semitchastny, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League.

Lidiya Iliina, Director of the Young Pioneers Department of the Central Committee of the Komsomol.

Valentine Vdovin, acting editor of the Russian version of the World Youth, organ of WFDY and USSR delegate.

Chun Cheng Hwan, delegate of Korean democratic youth.

Vu Xuan Vinh, representative of Viet-Nam democratic youth.

Wladyslaw Goralski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Polish Youth.

Alois Svoboda, editor of the Mlada Fronta, organ of the Czechoslovakia Union of Youth.

Hartwig Helmut, Central Committee member of the Free German Youth.

Pascu Stefanescu, Central Committee and Political Bureau member of the Union of Working Youth of Rumania.

Cornel Raducanu, chief editor of Scanteia Tineretului, organ of the Rumanian UOWY.

Jano Birmann, representing the Union of Working Youth of Hungary.

George Vasilev Manafov, editor-in-chief of the Noradna Mlodech of the Dimitrov's Union of the People's Youth of Bulgaria.

Quamil Buxheli, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Working Youth of Albania.

Natsogdorzh, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League.

Sandag, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League.

Ishkhand, doctor from the Choilbasan University of Mongolia.

Rangit Guha, head of the WFDY Bureau for Youth fighting against Colonialism and delegate of Indian democratic youth.

Slamet, delegate of the Indonesian democratic youth.

Tha Hia, delegate of the Burmese democratic youth.

Roger Guibert, Executive Bureau member of the National Committee of the Union of Republican Youth of France.

Lidia Maiorelli, Central Committee member of the Federation of Communist Youth of Italy.

Saverio Tutino, editor of Gioventu Nuova, organ of Italian FOCY.

Selma Weiss, director of the Student's Department of Labour Youth League of USA.

David Graham MacAnns (sic), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Young Progressives of America.

Dick Nettleton, chief of the Organisation Department of the Young Communist League of Great Britain.

Mese, representing the Federation of the United Socialist Youth of the Republic of Spain.

Jandro, representing the Spanish FOUSY.

Mitsos Kipouros, delegate of the Greek democratic youth.

Mansouri Kazem, delegate of the Iranian democratic youth.

Abdilkarim Mouhallami, delegate from the Union of People's Youth of Syria.

Flavio Bravo, President of the Socialist Youth of Cuba.

Hans Grumm, delegate from the Free Austrian Youth.

Hamou Kraba, General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of Algeria.

Paile Voigt, chief editor of Framad (Forward), organ of Young Communist League of Denmark.

Omar Walmsley, delegate of Canadian democratic youth.

Unto Minttinen, delegate of Finnish democratic youth.

Jacob Wolff, Central Committee member of the Netherlands Youth League.

Salvador Dias, delegate of the Democratic Youth of Brazil.

Mou Mouni Abdou, representative of the Rally of African Democratic Youth.

Mr. SOURWINE. That clipping also reflects the presence of Americans.

And this clipping headed "WFDY Press Conference in Prague on China Tour," showing that the Americans were still there as they toured, I ask that this be put in the record.

Senator JENNER. That may go into the record.

(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 432" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 432

[Shanghai News, November 1950]

WFDY PRESS CONFERENCE IN PRAGUE ON CHINA TOUR

PRAGUE, November 14.—(Hsinhua)—The delegates of the World Federation of Democratic Youth who have been visiting China have arrived here on their way home. They attended the celebrations of first anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic during their 42-day visit to China and participated in the celebration of the 33d anniversary of October Revolution in Moscow. Among those who have arrived here are the leaders of young progressives of Italy, Britain, United States of America, Holland, Austria, Cuba, Brazil, Greece, Syria, French West Africa, and Algeria.

This afternoon the delegates met some 30 Czechoslovak and other journalists here in a press conference organized jointly by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Information and Culture and the Union of Czechoslovak Youth.

UNBREAKABLE SOLIDARITY

Saverio Tutino, Italian delegate, controlling his emotion with some difficulty, told the reporters of the unbreakable solidarity of Chinese youth with their fighting Korean brothers. He said that the delegates were elated to learn,

while they were in Moscow, of the joint declaration of Chinese democratic parties on Chinese volunteers to Korea.

Answering a question on the reception given by Chinese youth to American delegates, David MacAnns (sic), American delegate, a Negro, replied that the Chinese youth know full well the distinction between the American people and the American imperialists who are threatening the world with a new war. He related that a special meeting for Negro delegates was arranged by the Chinese youth as a sign of deep concern felt by the Chinese youth with regard to world's oppressed people.

Bert Williams, secretary of WFDY, said that all the delegates, many of whom have already returned to their respective countries, would certainly make best use of their experience in China and pass it on to their fellow countrymen. At the end of the conference, delegates all rose and sang in Chinese, Red in the East to express their respect to the Chinese people and their great leader, Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you mentioned a man named Berges and a man named Powell. Is that William Berges?

Dr. DUNLOP. I don't remember his first name, but I rather think that is what it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a Capt. Gerald Tannebaum?

Dr. DUNLOP. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Walter Illsley, who was at one time with UNRRA, and was fired?

Dr. DUNLOP. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. He signed anti-American letters in the China Review.

Mr. DUNLOP. No, I wouldn't—we rarely read those things: we objected to them so much. And that name didn't strike a chord of any sort.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one more clipping, Mr. Chairman, to offer at this time. It is also from the Shanghai News of October 29. The headline is "WFDY Delegates Tell Their Impression of China." And the lead is an interview with David G. McCanns, who was a United States citizen, who was present at this conference.

Senator JENNER. It may go in the record.

(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 433" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 433

[The Shanghai News, Shanghai, October 29, 1950]

WFDY DELEGATES TELL THEIR IMPRESSION OF CHINA

David G. MacAnns (sic) (USA), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Young Progressives of America

Premier Chou En-lai has announced to the world that the Chinese People's Republic loves peace and desires peace ardently. At the same time, he has said that the Chinese people shall stand firm against any imperialistic aggression which threatens the soil of China.

A PEOPLE'S CHINA

The Delegation of World Federation of Democratic Youth has spent more than a month in the new China. We have traveled from the north border, touching the Soviet Union, through Northeast China, to Dairen, around to Peking, and south to Shanghai and Canton. We have had the honour to participate in the historic celebration of the first birthday of the People's Republic of China. We have visited your factories and schools. We have seen the historic sites from north to south of the heroic struggle of the people of China for liberation from the oppression of feudalism and imperialist domination; from the despotic, corrupt rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his willing assistants the United States imperialists. Everywhere we have seen the determination of the youth and people of

China to build a new China, a people's China, which, in every way, serves the interest of the common people of China, a China which stands as a mighty fortress alongside the great Soviet Union, in the cause of a lasting peace for all mankind.

BRIGHT FACES

This determination shows itself no less in the strong, bright faces of the young men and women of the People's Liberation Army of China. Young men and women, many of whom themselves participated in the glorious struggle of liberation, and many more who follow in the footsteps of the victorious revolutionary traditions of the People's Liberation Army. We have seen how these bright faces glow brighter at the mention of the name of the Commander and Chief of the People's Liberation Army, General Chu Teh, and chief of new China, Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

We have seen these faces from north to south, intent with listening to the accounts of the struggles of democratic youth the world over; the Soviet youth, youth from People's Democracies, colonial and semicolonial youth, youth from the capitalist countries. Time and time again we have seen the People's Liberation Army men and women warmly and enthusiastically embrace the uniformed, fighting youth of Korea and Vietnam.

INCREDIBLE IN U. S. A.

In Mukden I had the honor to talk, for some time, with a fighting hero, Yuan Chu-mo. Yuan Chu-mo won his honor because in his company, for 3 whole years, no man or woman committed an act against the regulations. To me, coming from the United States and having spent 3 years in the U. S. Army, for one year of which I was a commissioned officer, this achievement is incredible. This could only have been possible because Yuan Chu-mo, himself, knew intimately why he was a member of the People's Liberation Army, and why he carried a gun and why he fought. He understood that he, as a member of the People's Liberation Army, fought in the interest of the common people of China. He knew that he fought against the worst enemies of the Chinese people, imperialism and its lackey, Chiang Kai-shek. He knew that the gun was the only guarantee of defeat over the enemy, who itself carried a gun against the people. He was confident of victory for he knew he, together with his comrades, stood on the side of righteousness and truth.

Only because he knew these things well, was he able to educate the troops of his company to such an understanding of the principle of service to the people. Only because he knew and understood the fondest hopes and aspirations of the men of his company for a bright future, and their willingness to take up arms against anyone who threatened those hopes and aspirations, could he have gained such confidence and respect, realized such discipline from his troops.

PARTY AND CHAIRMAN MAO

And how did he come to understand these things? How was it that he was able to impart this understanding to his troops? When I asked Yuan Chu-mo the question, he answered me very simply, "It was because of the education I received from the Communist Party," he said. "It was because of the correct leadership of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung."

Let the imperialist warmongers of my country take notice. An army whose men and women understand why they fight; an army whose men and women are united firmly with the people; an army whose men and women are themselves united under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's Government, such an army is invincible. Such an army stands in the frontlines in defense of the People's Republic of China, against the provocations of imperialists. Such an army stands in defense of the desires of the working people of China and of the whole world for a lasting peace and a bright future.

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell us about Berges, the gentleman you mentioned?

Dr. DUNLOP. It is all hearsay. I saw Berges on occasions at the American Club with John Powell at luncheon time. I don't think I ever spoke to him. He was a taller man than John Powell, as I remember him. And they never associated with any of the other Americans in the club; as a rule, they sat by themselves.

The only thing that I heard otherwise about Berges was that he carried a flag in one of the parades which were so common in the first few months of the Communist occupation of Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know anything about his attendance at a meeting of 2,000 professors in the Grand Theatre in Shanghai?

Dr. DUNLOP. I have heard that there was such a meeting, but that is all I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet Mr. Berges?

Dr. DUNLOP. No; I wouldn't say that I met him. I saw him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Sidney Shapiro?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is a familiar name, but I don't place him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know what part was played in the anti-American activities in Shanghai by Mr. Berges?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, I would say as—I won't be definite about this—I felt he was with Powell in this Review, this Weekly Review.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you can testify to?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is all I know about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I have two affidavits signed by the Reverend Gerard McKernan, which I would like to offer for the record.

If the committee desires to call this man as a witness, it can be done. The first of these is an affidavit as follows:

I, Gerald M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen, do declare and affirm:

That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954—

I will pause at that point.

Do you know Father McKernan?

Dr. DUNLOP. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing the affidavit):

That I personally know John Powell, formerly editor of the China Weekly Review, and Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), associate of Mme. Sun Yat-sen in welfare work:

That Mrs. Powell (nee Sylvia Campbell) was also associated with Mme. Sun Yat-sen in welfare work;

That I did actually see both John Powell and Gerald Tannenbaum on at least two occasions riding in official Communist government cars in the streets of Shanghai.

Senator JENNER. That may go in the record.

(The affidavit of Gerard M. McKernan, dated July 18, 1955, was marked "Exhibit No. 433-A" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 433-A

AFFIDAVIT OF GERARD MCKERNAN

Senator JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen do declare and affirm,

That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954;

That I personally know John Powell, formerly editor of the China Weekly Review and Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), associate of Mme. Sun Yat-sen in welfare work;

That Mrs. Powell (nee Sylvia Campbell) was also associated with Mme. Sun Yat-sen in welfare work;

That I did actually see both John Powell and Gerald Tannenbaum on at least two occasions riding in official Communist government cars in the streets of Shanghai.

(Signed) GERARD MCKERNAN.

Date: July 18, 1955.

Signed before me at Ridgewood, N. J.

(Signed) NATALIE F. LARSEN, *Notary Public*.

Mr. SOURWINE. The other affidavit, dated August 5, 1955, reads as follows:

I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic Priest and Canadian citizen, do declare and affirm:

That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954;

That Mr. William Berges held up the delivery of UNICEF supplies until Communist attack on Shanghai was imminent, then turned over all supplies to the SFER (Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief), the official Communist welfare group of Shanghai;

That at a general meeting of all welfare groups called by Chou En-lai and held in Peiping (spring of 1951), Chou En-lai stated at one of these sessions that "the party must do something for Mr. Berges, because of the help that he—

Mr. Berges—

"had given the Communist Party welfare efforts in Shanghai";

That Mr. Berges' closest friends in Shanghai were Anna Huang (a Russian married and separated from a Dr. Huang). Mrs. Huang was an admitted Communist and worked with the China Welfare Fund (Mme. Sun Yat-sen's welfare organization)—

I will pause there, Mr. Chairman, and ask the witness:

Did you know Anna Huang?

Dr. DUNLAP. No, I can't identify her.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), also an admitted Communist, with the China Welfare Fund; Mrs. John Powell and her husband, Mr. John Powell, who also took part in Communist activities and organizations;

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum in an argument with me regarding his Communist activities stated "You will never change my mind";

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum gave frequently the "clenched fist salute" at the "Down with America sessions" which occurred at the end of most welfare meetings;

That Mr. John Powell and Mr. Gerald Tannenbaum investigated a house (at the time occupied by an American citizen, later arrested) to check on the house's suitability as a Communist child center.

I ask that that may go in the record.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(The August 5, 1955, affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 434" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 434

AFFIDAVIT OF REV. GERARD M. MCKERNAN

AUGUST 5, 1955.

Senator JAMES O. EASTLAND,

*Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:*

I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen, do declare and affirm—

That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954;

That Mr. William Berges held up delivery of UNICEF supplies until Communist attack on Shanghai was imminent, then turned over all supplies to the SFER (Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief), the official Communist welfare group of Shanghai;

That at a general meeting of all welfare groups called by Chou En-lai and held in Peiping (spring of 1951), Chou En-lai stated at one of the sessions, "that

the party must do something for Mr. Berges, because of the help he (Mr. Berges) had given the Communist Party welfare efforts in Shanghai";

That Mr. Berges' closest friends in Shanghai were Anna Huang (a Russian married and separated from a Dr. Huang). Mrs. Huang was an admitted Communist and worked with the China Welfare Fund (Mme. Sun Yat-sen's welfare organization); Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), also an admitted Communist with the China Welfare Fund; Mrs. John Powell and her husband, Mr. John Powell, who took part in Communist activities and organizations;

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum in an argument with me regarding his Communist activities stated, "You will never change my mind";

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum gave frequently the "clenched fist salute" and the "down with America sessions," which occurred at the end of most welfare meetings;

That Mr. John Powell and Mr. Gerald Tannenbaum investigated a house (at the time occupied by an American citizen, later arrested) to check on the house's suitability as a Communist child center.

(Signed) GERARD M. MCKERNAN
(Rev. Gerard M. McKernan).

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of August 1955, a notary public in the District of Columbia.

(Signed) MARGARET M. ZEMO, *Notary Public*.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, was that a common occurrence, for Communist teams to investigate homes occupied by private citizens, when they wanted to use them for something, and then ousted the citizens and took over?

Dr. DUNLOP. Well, I had that experience in one of my own moves, we had to get out after they had investigated to see whether or not it would meet their needs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, having mentioned Mr. Berges, I have here 3 clippings which bear on the subject—2 clippings; I am sorry—on the subject of his activities.

I ask that they may go in the record at this point.

Senator JENNER. They may become part of the official record of this committee.

(The clippings referred to, were marked "Exhibits Nos. 434-A and 434-B" and read as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 434-A

[Shanghai News, December 15, 1950]

TWO THOUSAND PROFESSORS HERE HOLD RALLY AND PARADE TO RESIST UNITED STATES, AID KOREA

A grand rally was held by 2,000 professors at the Grand Theater yesterday morning to demonstrate their strong determination to resist United States aggression and aid Korea in the interest of national security and defense.

The rally was followed by an orderly parade along Shanghai's busiest thoroughfares with thousands of voices shouting such slogans as: "Down with American imperialism" and "Resist United States aggression," which resounded all the way from the Grand Theater through Nanking Road and on to Honan Road, where the paraders turned in the direction of Foochow Road. Vociferous cheers mingled with warm applause from students, who lined both sides of the roads, greeted the professors to express their common stand with their teachers.

The professors carried banners, pictures and cartoons depicting the mighty strength of the peace-loving people of the world against the warmongers. The procession was led by motorcycles to open the way for the militant marching professors who came from 39 local colleges and institutions.

PARADE STARTS

A band composed of police cadres struck up a march as the professors opened the parade in front of the race course a little after 11 a. m. The parade presented the impression of a forest of portraits, placards, banners, etc. to show the

professors' resolute will to take part in the patriotic movement and to stir students to defend their country in face of United States aggression.

AT THE RALLY

Earlier in the rally, Cheng Wangtao, who was the chairman, declared that the professors will demonstrate their patriotism by firmly supporting and encouraging their students to translate their love for the country into action in defense of the country.

Tremendous clapping followed the speeches of four professors, among them Pan Cheng-liang of Chiaotung University, and Wu Chee-nan of Futan University, who told the rally in deep emotional tones that they have encouraged their own sons and daughters to enlist for the nation's defense work.

The rally resolved to adopt the program of action previously outlined by Shanghai's higher educational workers and pledged to carry out same. The resolution was contained in a message to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

MESSAGE TO VOLUNTEERS

Another message was sent by the professors to the Chinese volunteers in which, they declared, inter alia, that the victory in Pyongyang scored by the KPA and the Chinese volunteers had smashed the so-called general offensive which was intended as the final episode of the United States campaign before the GI's invading Korea returned home for Christmas as MacArthur pompously announced.

The message pledged to back the volunteers with concrete action both spiritually and materially on the part of the professors in order to preserve world peace.

The rally sent still another message of greetings to patriotic Chinese professors in Christian universities in the city, calling on them to expose American aggression on the cultural front in China. The message greeted the mission university professors for the bold stand which they made previously to resist American aggression.

Finally the rally resolved to coordinate their classwork with the study of international events to whip up further patriotic sentiments.

At the conclusion of the rally, 2,000 professors and thousands more of students and people who thronged the streets joined in a final roar of righteous indignation expressive of their grim determination to resist United States aggression, amidst the explosion of firecrackers, the noise of cheering squads, gongs, cymbals, etc.

Practically every window and balcony was packed with onlookers to watch the procession, never witnessed before in Shanghai.

AMERICAN AND SOVIET PROFESSORS PARTICIPATE

Among the professors was William C. Berges of the American-missionary founded St. John's University, who carried a placard urging Chinese students to take up their national defense tasks.

Soviet professors from the Russian Commercial Institute of Shanghai were also in the procession, carrying with them the national flag of People's China and the famous hammer and sickle flag of U. S. S. R., symbolizing the solidarity of the two nations.

Militant and patriotic songs signifying their readiness to face any eventuality were sung by students. The marching professors, four abreast, smiled when they recognized their own students from among the crowds that jammed the sidewalks.

Cheers were especially loud and thrilling when the presidium of prominent professors with garlands, were welcomed by students in the balcony at the corner of Foochow Road, the "Street of Culture" known as the center of the largest bookstores, and Honan Road.

PROFESSOR W. C. BERGES' STATEMENT

In an interview with a reporter of the Shanghai News, an American professor, William C. Berges, of St. John's University, made the following statement:

"This meeting of the university professors of Shanghai, which I am honored to attend, is a moving and powerful expression of a fine people, a determined people to defend their democratic, peaceful life from American imperialist aggression.

"PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN

"As one of the hundreds of thousands of progressive Americans, I fully support the Chinese people's mass movement to defend their own country from aggression and to help the Korean people.

"This meeting has great meaning for all Americans, especially for the mothers of America whose sons have been needlessly sacrificed in Korea.

"Unless American imperialist aggression is checked, thousands and millions of mothers in America and elsewhere will weep for their sons.

"The extension of American aggression must and shall be stopped by the people's might, however. The glorious victory of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers, the Vietnamese people, etc. show clearly that the final victory belongs to the people.

"The American people join with all peoples of the world in resolutely defending peace and putting an end to Wall Street imperialist aggression."

EXHIBIT No. 434-B

[Shanghai News, December 15, 1950]

NANKING STUDENT'S ACCUSATION GROUP WELCOMED AT ST. JOHN'S RALLY

Signifying the solidarity of the students of missionary schools in Nanking, Shanghai, a warm welcome was extended to the representatives from Nanking's Ginling College and Nanking University by the over 1,000 students, professors, and workers of St. John's University and 51 other schools yesterday afternoon at the social hall of St. John's.

The group of 6 from Nanking, 3 representing Ginling College, and the others Nanking University, reached Shanghai yesterday on a mission to lay before the Shanghai students the accusation of the insults made against the Chinese people by three Americans professors, H. Ferris of Ginling College, C. Riggs and A. Roy of Nanking University.

ANTI-UNITED STATES PATRIOTIC RALLY

The first appearance before the students of Shanghai's missionary schools was at yesterday's anti-United States patriotic rally held by the professors, students, and workers of St. John's University.

The gathering, which started at 3 p. m. yesterday, first heard a speech by Prof. Liu Ke-lin of the department of journalism. He was followed by two professors of Kwaughan University, who were all former professors in St. John's but had left the university in 1925 for protesting against the insults of the late Hawks Pott. They further aroused the indignation of the students against imperialists by recounting their own experiences under the highhanded discriminative measures of the American school authorities.

The gathering then heard of the accusations made by a Ginling girl student named Chung Yu-cheng who, together with five other representatives from Nanking, stepped onto the platform amidst thunderous applause and cheers. In eloquent and forceful words, she told in detail the story of Helen Ferris' insults against Chinese people and the indignation of Nanking students which won deep sympathy and strong support from the audience.

AMERICAN PROFESSOR SUPPORT

The other speaker at the meeting was an American professor of St. John's University, named William C. Berges.

As one of the peaceloving people, he pledged himself to support wholeheartedly the protest of the Chinese students against Austin's shameless slanders. His address earned the warmest applause from all those present at the rally.

Before the closing of the rally, a draft message for Wu Hsiu-chuan to be forwarded to the U. N. in protest against Austin's slanders, which was written by representatives of seven Christian colleges in Shanghai and Nanking, was read and duly endorsed by the professors, students, and workers of St. John's University.

The meeting came to a close at 5:30 after singing in unison the Chinese national anthem and shouting numerous slogans.

Following is the full text of Mr. Berges' speech at the meeting:

BERGES SPEECH

"Students, faculty members, and workers: I take my stand as one of the American people fully supporting your protest movement against Austin's hypocritical statement that the missionary colleges in China were an example of America's "friendship" for China. By such arrogant nonsense Austin may hope to fool some people in the West; but he cannot fool the Chinese people, who no longer are forced to obey Austin nor his missionary teachers.

"Who is Austin? A tool of the American monopolists—the ruling clique that is now responsible for the aggressive war against the Korean people. Before liberation this same ruling clique used the missionary colleges in China as an important part of their attempt to put China and the Chinese people under their control.

"What was the result of missionary education? Chinese students were led to turn their backs upon their own country and their own people, and to look toward American 'culture,' represented by cheap, sensational, and often harmful Hollywood films, as their model.

"Shanghai especially was full of young people who envied the purely material aspects of American life, and who tried to be as 'American' in their thoughts and actions as possible. Now many of them realize the harm they have suffered, and are acquiring a new outlook. In response to popular demand, the theaters have stopped showing American films, and gradually the missionary universities will rid themselves of American educational methods and materials left from the past, which are unsuitable for the new China.

"Again let me assure you of my wholehearted support in your exposure of Austin's shameless lie and your condemnation of the insult he offered to the Chinese people. I know that all progressive Americans, here and in the United States support your movement, which is part of the larger one of defending your country from imperialist aggression in any form. You have our sympathy and our active cooperation, whenever you request it, in building a strong and independent China, a people's China, a new China with a glorious future."

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, are there any points that we have not covered here concerning which you have information, that you think would be of value to the committee?

Dr. DUNLOP. I have just this one point that I would like to make.

There has been a great deal said about the so-called overseas Chinese group and their attitude toward Communist China. I saw what might be called the overseas group or the out-of-China group in Hong Kong.

In the beginning, that Hong Kong group was rather pro-Communist. And then after the attack on the merchants, they turned diametrically against it. And when I was in Hong Kong there was great antagonism toward the Communists.

For instance, the Communist flag was put up in only five places in Hong Kong on October 1, which is the Communist national holiday, on October 1 of 1952, whereas there had been hundreds of Communist flags 3 years before.

Now, the point I want to call attention to is the question of whether or not the overseas Chinese have been brought back to the point where they are more in favor of the Communist group.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not questioning that the Communists are making a determined effort to achieve that, you are questioning whether they are successful in that territory; is that right?

Dr. DUNLOP. That is right.

I understand that they are trying to bring them back. From my observation, I would say that, at the moment, especially when there is a renewed effort on the part of the Communists to intimidate overseas Chinese in respect to their own families in China—that was done a number of years ago, it has been renewed—that now the overseas Chinese are inclined not to say anything which would bring about repercussions in China.

I personally feel that it is important that the overseas Chinese do not swing back to the Communists, because they are an important—they have an important backing to give the Nationalist group, and if the Nationalist group were to lose them and they would go back, I think there would be a loss of morale which would be detrimental to the interests of the United States in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, if we should recognize Red China and they should be admitted to the United Nations, what would be the effect upon this group of Chinese outside of China whom you say are so important?

Dr. DUNLOP. I think there would be an inclination on their part to swing back to Communist China. And I think that would be disastrous.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that would be disastrous?

Dr. DUNLOP. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JENNER. I have no further questions, Doctor.

We certainly appreciate your appearing before our committee and giving us this valuable information.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have another witness. Mr. Morris, the chief counsel, will interrogate him.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, would you come forward, please?

Senator JENNER. Admiral, do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Admiral COOKE. I do.

Senator JENNER. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. CHARLES N. COOKE, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED, SONOMA, CALIF.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, while en route to Honolulu last year, I stopped off to see Admiral Cooke in California.

You are Adm. Charles Cooke, and you reside in Sonoma, just north of San Francisco?

Admiral COOKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. While I was there I took some Q and A testimony from Admiral Cooke, and there was no Senator present. While Admiral Cooke is here in the East, I would like to ask him if he will, in the presence of the Senator, state that the testimony that I took at that time, as counsel for the committee, is accurate.

Admiral COOKE. Yes.

I have been furnished a copy of this transcript, and everything in there is true—there is a slight correction as to the circumstances connected with General Fortier coming to Formosa at the time, which is corrected in a later issue—it doesn't make any difference.¹

Senator JENNER. The corrections have been made?

Admiral COOKE. I don't know whether it is in there or not; I have called it to the attention of the counsel.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Senator, the subject of that particular hearing was misinformation given out by our State Department officials, or some of our State Department officials, which information proved to be

¹ The testimony of Admiral Cooke on October 7, 1956, is printed in pt. 36, beginning at p. 2061.

helpful to the Communist cause and detrimental to the cause of the United States.

At the same time, I would like to offer for the record, Senator, an exchange of correspondence, or memorandums, introduced by John K. Emmerson. I think that Mr. McManus, who is here today, is familiar with that, and will be able to identify some of these particular documents.

Now, there was delivered to me in the month of October of last year from Mr. Fred Scribner, of the Treasury Department, the following paper.

I would like to offer that to you, Senator, and I ask, if you will, that that be made a part of the record.

Senator JENNER. I have read it. It may go into the record and become a part of the official record of this hearing.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 435, 435-A and 435-B." and read as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 435

[Inter-Treasury memo—Secretary]

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
DIVISION OF MONETARY RESEARCH,
December 8, 1944.

To: Mr. White.

From: Mr. Friedman.

I believe that you will be interested in reading the attached memorandums entitled as follows:

1. Will the Communists take over China?¹
2. How red are the Chinese Communists?¹
3. The Chinese Communists and the great powers.¹
4. A statement on Japan.
5. Proposed projects against Japan.

The memorandums on the Chinese Communists were prepared by John Davies, political adviser to General Stilwell, on his return from Yen-an during the first week of November.

The memorandums on Japan were prepared by John Emmerson, special adviser to Stilwell on Japan affairs, who went to Yen-an with John Davies and is still there.

Copies of these memorandums have been sent by John Davies to Harry Hopkins, as well as to the State Department. They were given to me by John Davies in Chungking.

12-9/Or. to Mr. White.

EXHIBIT No. 435-A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 14, 1956.

In reply refer to SY/P.

To: Mr. Clarence O. Tormoen, Personnel Security Officer, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C.

From: Dennis A. Flinn, Director, Office of Security, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Morgenthau diary papers.

Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1956, transmitting another document from the Morgenthau diary collection for review and declassification prior to its release to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.

The attached document has been reviewed in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and no objection exists to its release to the subcommittee. This document was previously declassified and, therefore, its declassification at this time is not necessary.

¹ 12-11: Sent to Secretary.

It was the opinion of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs that discretion should be used in the handling of this document by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, and that undue publicity should be avoided to prevent giving unnecessary offense to the Japanese Government.

Attachment: Photostatic copy of "Proposed Projects Against Japan."

EXHIBIT No. 435-B

PROPOSED PROJECTS AGAINST JAPAN

My short study of the activities of Susumu Okano and the Japanese Peoples Emancipation League in Communist China convinces me that we can utilize the experience and achievements of this group to advantage in the prosecution of the war against Japan. Without going into the details of methods and materials, all of which are being carefully investigated here, we can suggest the following proposals:

(1) Effect the organization of an international "free Japan" movement

The Japanese Peoples Emancipation League (Nihon Jinmin Kaiho Renmei) has an estimated membership of 450 Japanese prisoners in north and central China. Its declared principles are democratic. It is not identified with the Communist Party. Upon completion of a course of indoctrination, the more able members voluntarily prepare propaganda leaflets and engage in propaganda activities on the frontlines. There is no doubt that most of them are sincere converts to the antiwar principles of the league.

Intelligence shows that the league is well known to the Japanese Army, and its influence is respected and feared.

Organization of chapters of this association, or a similar one, among Japanese (prisoners, internees, and others) in the United States, India, Australia, and other countries, should be carried out. The result would be widespread dissemination of democratic ideas, the creation of a powerful Japanese propaganda organ (it is indisputable that propaganda from a Japanese source and written by Japanese is more effective than that from enemy sources), and the stimulation of a force useful at the time of invasion and in postwar Japan.

(2) Encourage the organization of cells within Japan to spread defeatism and thereby reduce resistance at the time of invasion

Preparations are now being made to send agents directly to Japan from this (Yenan) area.

Simultaneous organization needs to be undertaken of underground cells within Japan on the same principles as the free-Japan group on the outside. Such activities would necessarily be on a small scale, but ample evidence exists that there are such elements which can be useful to us. Careful preparation is obviously essential.

(3) Set up a radio transmitter in a Communist base area such as Shantung Province for broadcasts to Japan, Korea, and Manchuria

A transmitter on the Shantung promontory would be 400 miles nearer Japan proper than Saipan and 600 miles nearer than the northern tip of Luzon.

The Japanese Peoples Emancipation League has a strong unit in Shantung Province and is now establishing a school there. Consequently, trustworthy Japanese personnel is already on the spot to operate such a station. Additional trained personnel could be recruited from the school in Yen'an and sent to any designated spot.

Identification of the station with a "Free Japan" group would insure broadcasts of immeasurably greater effect than those of stated American (enemy) origin.

(4) Train units of Japanese for activity with American pacification operations and with military government officials during occupation

Eighth Route Army experience has clearly proved not only that Japanese prisoners can be converted, but that they can be satisfactorily and extremely effectively used in propaganda operations on the frontlines. Approximately 350 are now training and engaging in such activities on the north and central China fronts.

Such Japanese personnel, with invaluable knowledge of particular areas and of the language, could be extremely useful in assisting American Army officers in reestablishing order among the Japanese population.

Recruitment of these persons can be made from the personnel of Japanese Emancipation League chapters in China, already trained, and from prison camps under American, Australian, or British jurisdiction. A course of training would be necessary. Issei and nisei in the United States could serve as instructors. Materials and the experience of the Eighth Route Army would be of inestimable assistance in setting up such a project.

JOHN K. EMMERSON.

YENAN, CHINA, *November 7, 1944.*

MR. MORRIS. Mr. McManus, will you identify these papers, to the extent that you know them?

This first document, Mr. McManus, is a memorandum that you encountered in the course of your committee work, is it not?

MR. McMANUS. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Where did you find that?

MR. McMANUS. In the Treasury Department, originally in room 2028, and it was later moved. There is a filing cabinet, a 4-drawer filing cabinet, which was the original filing cabinet of Harry Dexter White.

The subcommittee was notified of the existence of this filing cabinet about October of 1955. And I was designated to study it. I found this document in that cabinet.

MR. MORRIS. And subsequently request was made for a declassification of that document, so that it can be used for the purposes of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee?

MR. McMANUS. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. And, Senator, I call your attention to a memorandum from Dennis Flinn, director, Office of Security, to Mr. Clarence O. Tormoen, Personnel Security Officer, Treasury Department, Washington 25, D. C., dated May 14, 1956, in which the document was declassified.

And, as I say, that, together with this top memorandum, which is a memorandum from Mr. Friedman to Mr. White, the first and third documents having been found by Mr. McManus—you found the first one, too, did you not, Mr. McManus?

MR. McMANUS. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Where did you find that?

MR. McMANUS. That was on the Emerson memorandum.

MR. MORRIS. It was pinned on it?

MR. McMANUS. Yes; it was pinned on it; it was a little yellow sheet.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question, just for the record.

This was received by you from Mr. Scribner in October of last year, that is, October of 1956?

MR. MORRIS. That is right.

MR. SOURWINE. This is material which the committee had requested in the spring of 1956.

MR. MORRIS. When was the request made, Mr. McManus?

Senator JENNER. May 14.

MR. MORRIS. It was declassified on May 14.

MR. McMANUS. I made several requests. The original requests were verbal.

And may I explain the original circumstances of coming in contact with this cabinet.

The subcommittee was informed about the existence of this cabinet, and I was designated to contact, under restrictions—in other words,

I am classified for the handling; I mean to say, I am qualified to handle classified material, but I was only permitted to read the documents in this file, and not permitted to report to the subcommittee what I found in them. I was only allowed to request documents of the Treasury.

Now, originally, I asked for groups of documents. And as I reported to Mr. Sourwine, it seemed to me that in this filing cabinet there was a piece of string that tied all these other stories together about Harry Dexter White, and I wanted documents in bulk.

Well, I began bringing them in to Mr. Clarence Tormoen, who was designated to work with me—I think he was a Special Assistant to the Secretary, and he has since died. I made a request for this document, I should say, in the winter of 1955-56. Nothing came of our request.

And when Mr. Tormoen died, I was put in touch with Mr. Page Nelson, another Treasury official, and I asked him for the document, about June 6.

Mr. MORRIS. And then it was ultimately declassified on May 14, 1956?

Mr. McMANUS. Well, it had been declassified, according to what we later learned, by the time I asked for it on June 6—

Mr. MORRIS. Of what year?

Mr. McMANUS. 1956. And Mr. Nelson informed me that—I kept asking for it, and it wasn't turning up—I made it clear to Mr. Nelson that it was an important document, because it substantiated verbal testimony that we had had, and it related to a person now in the employ of the State Department in a sensitive area in the Middle East, and it was—I don't want to characterize it—it characterizes itself.

Mr. MORRIS. It speaks for itself?

Mr. McMANUS. Yes.

But Mr. Nelson kept informing me that the State Department had not cleared the document.

Now, it shows in this series of letters that it had been cleared before I asked him for it the first time.

Senator JENNER. On May 14?

Mr. McMANUS. May 14, yes.

Senator JENNER. And you asked for it June 6?

Mr. McMANUS. That was the second or third time I asked for it; I asked for it originally from Mr. Tormoen.

Nothing happened. And on approximately August 26, I found another document, also written by John K. Emerson, and asked for clearance on that, and got it within 3 or 4 days.

I have made records of all these conversations.

So I then addressed a letter to Mr. Nelson, in which I asked, how it was possible for the State Department to clear this document so promptly in one instance, and so slowly in another? And I asked for the name of the person in the State Department who is handling this matter, so that I could approach him directly.

Well, he never answered that letter. But as the result of it, Mr. Scribner brought the documents to Judge Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the importance of the document is, just to read two sentences from it, this is a memorandum that apparently ultimately made its way to the very top of our Government at the

time. It is just fraught with misinformation. It says here that the Japanese People's Emancipation League was a non-Communist organization which was operating in China. It has since been characterized by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as a Communist organization, organized by Susumu Okano, who held many important positions in the Japanese Communist Party.

I would like to put that whole thing in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JENNER. It may go into the record and become a part of the official record.

Mr. MORRIS. The whole excerpt from the report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: "The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism."

(The excerpt referred to above was marked exhibit No. 436 and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 436

SUPPLEMENT IV. FIVE HUNDRED LEADING COMMUNISTS

Nozaka Sanzo (alias Okano Susumu)

Member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee, chief of Propaganda and Investigation Section, and director of party school, Japan Communist Party.

Born March 30, 1892, in Yamaguchi prefecture; graduated from Kobe Commercial College, Keio University, 1919; went to London to study the British trade-union movement, 1920; joined British Communist Party and was deported from England, 1921; went to Moscow, returned to Japan and joined the Japan Communist Party, 1922; organized left-wing labor unions and parties in Japan, 1922-1931; imprisoned, 1928-1929; escaped to Moscow, 1931; elected member of Executive Committee of Communist International (3rd), 1935; organized Japanese People's Emancipation League (Nippon Jimmin Kaiho Remmei), a Communist organization, at Yenan, China, 1943; returned to Japan, January 1946; member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee of Japanese Communist Party since 1946; elected to the Japanese House of Representatives, April 1946; reelected April 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. The Emmerson memo goes on to say:

The Japanese People's Emancipation League has an estimated membership of 450 Japanese prisoners in north and central China. It declared principles are democratic. It is not identified with the Communist Party.

And at the very same time, it was apparent that Mr. Susumu Okano, who was the head of this particular league, was a Communist, and known by Mr. Emmerson to be a Communist.

Now, the reason that is important, Senator, is that we have Admiral Cooke's sworn testimony in the record to the effect that Mr. Robert C. Strong, who is now our counselor of Embassy at Damascus, Syria, was dispensing erroneous information to the advantage of the Communists and the disadvantage of us, and here we have Mr. John K. Emmerson, who is now our counselor of Embassy at Beirut, Lebanon, both important positions now in the Middle East.

I would also like to put in the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, the testimony of Mr. Dooman about John K. Emmerson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, may I interrupt just for one question on this document that you have previously put in the record.

This memorandum of May 14 from Mr. Tormoen to Mr. Flinn starts out:

Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1956, transmitting another document from the Morgenthau diary collection for review and declassification prior to its release to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.

This document is not, in fact, a Morgenthau diary document, is it?

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman has testified on page 747, in volume 23, in our Institute of Pacific Relations Report, about the fact that Mr. Emmerson did take Japanese Communists back to the United States for the purpose of indoctrinating prisoners captured by the United States.

I would like also to have in the record at this time the testimony of General Wedemeyer, who said that he had four political advisers in China. I would like to read two excerpts from that. General Wedemeyer said that he had four advisers, they were John Service, John Davies, Raymond Ludden, and John K. Emmerson. And he went on to say that their intelligence reports were inconsistent with American policy at the time, that the reports strongly favored the Chinese Communists and were detrimental to the Chinese Nationalists.

He went on also to say, by way of summarization of their reports, that:

If we had followed their directives and their advice, China would have gone Communist long before it actually did go Communist.

And, as I say, John K. Emmerson, the man I am talking about, was 1 of the 4 advisers.

Another one, Raymond Ludden, now holds a position in the State Department in Washington.

Senator JENNER. On these previous documents, Mr. McManus, that you have testified about, how long had these documents been kept in this file, do you know?

Mr. McMANUS. Well, I was told by Mr. Nelson that this filing cabinet had been there for at least 5 years, and, to the best of his judgment, it had been there probably since the death of Harry White.

I would like to point out, Senator, that when you were chairman, at your instructions we began an inquiry into the policymaking activities of Harry White. And I was sent to the Treasury on that mission, with the support of other persons, and I was never informed at any time of the existence of the file, with these terribly important papers in it, by any of several persons with whom I conferred in the Treasury. And I learned afterward that the FBI had never been informed about the existence of this filing cabinet.

Senator JENNER. In other words, these important documents had been covered up, so to speak; the FBI had no information on them for several years?

Mr. McMANUS. Yes, sir.

I was told when I first went there that they considered it so important they had 10 men working on this cabinet; that was simultaneously with my original examination of it.

Senator JENNER. They considered it so important that they had 10 men working on it, and yet they didn't consider it important enough to turn it over to the FBI or other officials?

Mr. McMANUS. No.

The FBI, when they were told about this thing, thought it was so important that they sent 10 men up there.

Senator JENNER. I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will volunteer this: When I learned of the existence of that cabinet, with the authority of the chairman, I immediately informed the Bureau that the cabinet existed.

Senator JENNER. I see. I was chairman at that time; wasn't I?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Senator JENNER. Anything further?

Mr. MORRIS. We have Admiral Cooke, Senator.

Admiral, could you tell us the posture of the military situation as it now exists in eastern Asia?

Admiral COOKE. I would like to explain that to the chairman and to the Senate, because it is very important to the United States, as I see it.

I have had quite a great deal to do with saving Formosa for the United States, and we now recognize it as important.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, you were the Chief of Staff to Admiral King during the war; weren't you?

Admiral COOKE. I was Chief of Staff at the last part of the war, but I was Chief Strategical Adviser throughout the war, from April of 1942 until the end of the war.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were also there as head of the 7th Fleet, which was the China fleet?

Admiral COOKE. And while I was on that duty, I had a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and heads of the staffs of other governments around the world. Later, as Mr. Morris said, I became commander of our 7th Fleet, stationed in China in 1946. I was there in 1946 and 1947, and the early part of 1948 I was in command of that fleet before I retired.

And I, of course, had warned the Chiefs of Staff, my own Chief of Staff, Admiral King, the head of the Navy, as to what was going to come into the China area after the war was over, the precarious situation, due to the defeat of Japan and the power of Russia.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time felt that we had to build up the power of China, particularly restore its fleet, and restoration of its fleet had to be the result of congressional legislation, which was drafted at that time and later passed by the Congress.

When the war was over and I got out there in early January 1946, I found a different policy was being carried on.

Well, to go back into the past history, which is very important, because it is repetition, we gave up a part of our own fleet in 1922, and gave up our right to build bases in the western Pacific, which passed over the control of that area to the power of Japan and, of course, the control of the sea routes in the western Pacific and along the coasts of east Asia.

The people who wanted to expand Japan and establish the coprosperity area all over Asia managed to get control of Japan, and they began to move into China and move down the coast.

Now, they were free to do that, because there was nothing to stop them, no power to stop them. And, they were hampered somewhat by the war in China, for the Chinese had not surrendered, but having control of the sea routes and the line of communications down south, they had gotten as far as the south end of China before the Pearl Harbor attack brought us into the war.

They got down to Thailand and north Indochina, and the people began to get worried. They said they would not go any farther, but they did go still farther, their objective being to establish a coprosperity area there and get to the rice bowl of southeast Asia, and to reach the oilfields and tin supplies, and so forth, in Indonesia and Malaya.

Now, when the Russians came into the war, there was a sort of a repetition of that. They first took over China, and then their objectives became the industrial capacity of Japan, and also the Rice Belt and supplies of southeast Asia.

After taking over China, then the Korean attack took place; that was the first step. That was not, of course, completely successful, and they were held back. And as soon as the consummation of the cease-fire took place, then they moved on down to Indochina and took north Indochina, which we forecast would happen.

Well, the situation now is that——

Senator JENNER. When you say "we forecast," how do you mean, Admiral?

Admiral COOKE. Well, I am one of the forecasters. Actually, when the cease-fire negotiations started in early July of 1951, I told one of the press representatives out there that, if and when they did it, the Chinese Communists would take north Indochina, and that seemed to be clear to me.

It was finally consummated several years later, and then they moved on in and took that.

Now, that was an objective.

Now, to carry out what is going on in all southeast Asia and Indochina and Malaya, it has been testified before your committee yesterday—and I heard the testimony—about the subversion going on, particularly among the overseas Chinese in those areas, of which there are about 10 or 12 million—in the papers, in the schools, in the banks, and so on. And that is progressing very much for the Communists.

However, in my view—and I think it is borne out in middle Europe—there must be a posture of military power ready to back these things up, as in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. And the necessary communications are along the sea routes.

Well, the one thing that is an obstacle now, the biggest obstacle to this, is the continued occupation of Formosa by the Nationalist Government in opposition to the Communists. This is very important to them—if they had it, they wouldn't be in exactly a position similar to Japan, because we still have Okinawa and the bases in the Philippines, but the key to that whole thing is the possession of Formosa.

Now, the Chinese have a substantial force in Formosa. They have got a very strong force in Quemoy, which is the gateway for the attack against Formosa. And then they have got a substantial force on Matsu.

Part of this thing that has to do here, which was illustrated somewhat in the testimony yesterday before this committee, is the prestige of the free world among the overseas Chinese and, for that matter, the other inhabitants of that area.

In 1949, 1950, and 1951 most of those overseas Chinese were pro-Communist, or the majority. And then, as time went on——

Mr. MORRIS. You say they were pro-Communist?

Admiral COOKE. Pro-Communist.

And, then, as time went on, and they began to learn what communism was and what was going on on the mainland, then they turned toward the free world, and particularly toward the Nationalist Government.

I was in these areas in 1952, myself, and talked to the Chinese in Hanoi and Saigon and Bangkok, and so on.

Well, after the cease-fire was consummated, and after the surrender of Chusan, the feeling that they were going on began to get stronger and stronger, and at the same time the Communists were getting their people into the papers and the schools, the Chinese papers and the Chinese schools, in these areas.

There are millions of Chinese in Indochina and Thailand, and in Singapore. And so now it is uncertain. They send their students, some to the expanded University of Taiwan, but they are also sending quite a number now to Red China.

There was a noted change when the Chusan islands to the north were surrendered, here a couple of years ago. If these islands, offshore islands, fall, there will be a tremendous increase in the change of these overseas Chinese who control the business in the southeast area, back toward communism.

Now, the Chinese have, as I said, a very strong force on Quemoy, and a substantial force on the others. If the Communists decide to attack, part of the attack on those islands will have to be by sea route. And to succeed in doing it—they have moved quite a bit further in a disputed control of the Formosa Strait; if they succeed, a large part of the defenses of Formosa will be liquidated—I mean, if they defeat them. The Nationalists are going to defend them; whatever the United States does, they will defend them.

And, of course, a big part of the buildup of the Communists is in airfields. They have built up many airfields near Quemoy and all along there, so they can bring in bombers, and so forth.

They have a many times stronger air force, of course, than the Nationalist Government, so we are building that up somewhat, and in Formosa there is a very formidable bunch of airfields.

So, if they are attacked, and it succeeds, maybe because we don't come to their aid soon enough or don't come at all, then the probability of the posture—posture is the situation in regard to the strength and attitude of the military forces that I am talking about—toward the Communist occupation and control of all southeast Asia will increase very much.

So right now the Communists are carrying out a sort of a mixture of a peace offensive and a force—they are not bombarding Quemoy at the present time as much as they were when I was out there about 2 years ago. They do carry out one once in a while, then they are beaming radios to Formosa and saying that "We are going to take you peacefully, and when we get you, everything will be all right and nobody will be damaged, and nobody will be hurt," and so on. "But if this doesn't succeed, why, we will use force."

In other words, they play it both ways, whether that is good tactics or not, but they think of it as being good tactics, and that is what is going on.

So that you will see a certain amount of bombardment doesn't do much damage on Quemoy, but ties in with the Chinese on Formosa, where there are about 10 million Chinese.

So that they will try to build up weakness, and also try to convey to the free world that maybe they are not as strong as the free world would like to see them—I mean, those who want to see Free China hold on. So that is one of the tactics.

Another one is to have somebody come over who has had contacts in Peking and try to make social contact with some of the people representing China—like Japan, for instance.

So they can expand that and say, "Well, negotiations are going on." They are not going on at all. But they want to create that impression to the world, to accomplish their own objective of getting it one way or the other, probably a combination of the two.

So I just wanted to bring to the attention of the committee that even though they succeed—and they are succeeding—on the infiltration and subversion in these areas, this will add to the picture, and probably turn it over, if they take that Formosa Strait.

Senator JENNER. Admiral, nothing remains the same—and let's take the Formosan situation—let's assume that another 5 or 10 years of these tactics go on—what happens to Formosa?

In other words, the Army is getting older, and so forth and so on. What is your opinion on that? In other words, will the Chinese Communists win by default on time alone?

Admiral COOKE. If they take southeast Asia, maybe so. If they don't take southeast Asia, I think it does not have to happen.

Now, the economy of Formosa—there are about 10 million people now—is very good, it is the best governed country, as far as I have been able to observe, and I believe most observers agree with that, in all Asia. And the army is not getting old, there are new ones coming in, being recruited right along.

Now, at first—I mean, we sent out a military advisory group of a small size, which has since been expanded, we sent it out in the summer of 1951, giving help. But at that time they weren't recruiting, because they just couldn't afford to do it.

In other words, their whole armed forces is somewhat in the neighborhood of 600,000.

Well, when you bring in recruits, you have got that additional thing, and also the business of retiring those that are too old.

Now, since then, in recent years, the recruitment is going on. It is now going on. They have got a bunch of reserve divisions in which new ones are coming in all the time. And, in age, the business of getting too old is being handled.

So far, the morale has held up. How long it will hold up in a status quo is a very difficult question to forecast. But so far it is holding up very well.

Now, we are giving them some help in the navy, and in the air force, and we are giving it to them in the army, too. But it is essentially a problem of control of the straits, of the water thing, for the present; they may never go back to the mainland, and again, maybe they will, because a situation such as occurred in Hungary is possible any time, much of the majority of the mainland of the Chinese is against the Communist regime—I would say 80 percent, maybe more.

And the Chinese, as you probably heard before—I think Mr. Caldwell said yesterday the Chinese, as an individual, the main thing to a Chinese—and there are about five or six hundred million of them,

and most of them are in this category—is his rice bowl and his individual noninterference.

Well, now, of course, the Communist is 100 percent interference with the individual. So that is a ferment that is there.

When and if it occurs, such as happened in Hungary, but to a greater extent, will we of the free world be ready to cash in on it? That is the important thing.

They cannot invade unless that situation exists, and unless the United States supports them. The United States has got to decide that they will support them before they can carry out invasions even under these conditions.

But if the United States, because of driving into southeast Asia, is drawn into that picture, then they need to get ready ahead to do what they finally want to do at that time.

For instance, in 1945 the Russians decided to attack Korea, and they decided to get ready to do it at the opportune time. They didn't think they were ready for 5 years, and they didn't think they were ready until our troops were withdrawn.

And in 1950, they attacked.

Now, at the same time, we could have been getting some South Koreans ready to repel them, giving them striking power, but we denied it; we said, "You can't have any striking power because you might attack."

Senator JENNER. We gave them some bailing wire; didn't we?

Admiral COOKE. Something like that.

Now, what we need—we have a SEATO treaty, which you know has eight nations in it, going as far as Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines and Thailand, and so on—but the only nation in this SEATO agreement that has any power is the United States.

Of course, free China and free Korea are not in it. But if they decided they want to be with us, they haven't any striking power.

Striking power is, if we box, I hit you and you hit me. Well, all they can do is defend. We want to get up the military power to oppose them, and they will protest all over the place if we build up the striking power of South Korea and free China.

Senator JENNER. The Communists are building up their striking power in North Korea, aren't they, in violation of the truce?

Admiral COOKE. That is right.

Senator JENNER. What are we doing about it, if anything, do you know?

Admiral COOKE. We are not changing—we are abiding by the agreement, truce.

Senator JENNER. In other words, we just close our eyes to the violations of the truce by the Communists?

Admiral COOKE. In effect; yes.

Now, they are building up the power in all China, the airpower, they have got lots of Mig-15's and Mig-17's, and they have—I don't know how many, the last figure I had, they have 1,200 planes—and I know they must have more now, very modern planes.

And they have constructed jet airfields all over China, all the way down to the Canton area now, and particularly opposite Quemoy—they call Quemoy, Kinmen, and that is the island just off Amoy, which is, next to Tsingtao, the best harbor they have in China.

So, if they take Tsingtao, and if the Russians want to use that to base submarines, they will have it. If they don't take it—if the Communists don't take Quemoy, then they won't have it.

Now, the Russians right now are reported to have about 400 submarines. And I don't know the number that is supposed to be in the Pacific, but I have heard the figure, they say it is about a hundred, based in Vladivostok, and maybe some in Port Arthur, and some in Tsingtao, which is North China.

Some operate just north of the Yangtze River in the Chusan Archipelago, which is a very wonderful base, and the best base they would have for a big navy in China, which the Nationalists had to evacuate in 1950 to keep from losing everything.

And then the next thing down here, controlling Western Pacific sea routes, is Amoy. And that is what is in dispute here in the United States, as to whether or not we let the Communists know that we will do something with our Navy and Air, in the event that Quemoy is attacked.

Those are just some of the aspects of this thing for the free world side of it.

That is another potential base for the expanding Russian Navy in the Western Pacific.

Now, of course, they could take Quemoy, and would not take Formosa necessarily right away, as long as the 7th Fleet is in the picture. But the pressure in southeast Asia, Communist pressure against the free world, or against the local controlled sovereignty there, would be much increased.

I think that the United States, considering the SEATO thing, is so strongly dedicated to the preservation of free independence in southeast Asia that if they take it over and have to bring in armed forces to support it, it will lead to war.

In other words, my view is that holding, assisting the free Chinese to hold those offshore islands in question, is more apt to stop war than bring war, very much more so. That is my conviction.

Senator JENNER. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I have one question, to finish this off.

Admiral Cooke, you told me in October that you had learned last January—January 1956—of the formation of a Presidential Commission, headed by the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mr. Killian, and that you therefore wrote to the Navy member of this Commission immediately and told him that you could bear witness to some very serious failures in intelligence that had caused great harm to the United States, and would like to appear before this committee.

You made the offer in January. When you testified before us in October, that offer had not been accepted?

Admiral COOKE. That is right.

I wrote several letters, and finally, about June, I decided they weren't interested. And after the Angus Ward testimony that took place here and was published, I wrote to Mr. Morris and told him I didn't think they wanted it, and if he wanted it I would be glad to get it to him.

And so I testified, and it was released by Senator Eastland for publication on November 12.

A day or two after that I got a call from one of the members, asking if I did not want to testify before them. And so I said, "Yes."

I gave them the transcript of what I had said, and invited questions. And so I have, in answer to their invitation, come to Washington at this time, and have appeared before them.

They gave me a hearing, and I particularly wanted to be before them, not to repeat my testimony, which they have, but to set out in concrete terms the remedial action to prevent any such thing happening in the future—which I have done, and I showed you a copy—I haven't showed it to you.

Mr. MORRIS. Not yet.

Admiral COOKE. I have brought it to their attention, this action that I think should be taken by the United States Government to prevent these things from happening in the future.

And, I have brought it to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations, and to members of the State Department, and also to Congressman Judd, and I will probably give it to Senator Knowland.

So it is a rather comprehensive thing. I am glad to give a copy of this to this committee. I will give it to you—it is only six pages—because I said that concretely and briefly.

Mr. MORRIS. It will be very helpful to us, Admiral Cooke.

Senator JENNER. It will be very helpful.

Mr. MORRIS. May I put in the record now the biographical sketch of Robert Campbell Strong and John Kenneth Emmerson, from the State Department hearing?

Senator JENNER. They may become a part of our record.

(The biographical sketches above referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 437 and 437-A" and read as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 437

Strong, Robert Campbell, b. Ill., Sept. 29, 1915; Beloit, Coll., B. A. 1938; U. of Wis. 1938-39; app. FSO unclass. v. c. of career, and sec. in Diplo. Ser. Mar. 2, 1939; v. c. at Frankfort on the Main Mar. 20, 1939; at Prague June 20, 1939; For. Ser. Sch. Jan. 3, 1940; v. c. at Durban June 5, 1940; at Lourenco Marques, temp. May 6, 1941; at Durban May 28, 1941; FSO 8, Nov. 16, 1943; FSO at Sofia to proceed via Naples for temp. detail in office of U. S. pol. adviser, staff of Supreme Allied Comdr., Mediterranean theater, Oct. 23, 1944; FSO 7, May 16, 1945; v. c. at Sofia July 27, 1945; FSO 6, May 19, 1946; to Dept. June 27, 1946; detailed to Naval War Coll. July 1, 1946; cons. Oct. 16, 1946; FSO 4, Nov. 13, 1946; cons. at Tsingtao Aug. 4, 1947; 1st sec. at Canton June 16, 1949; at Chungking, temp. June 24, 1949; cons. in addition to duties as 1st sec. at Taipei Dec. 31, 1949; FSO 3, May 23, 1950; to Dept. Aug. 4, 1950; special asst. to dir. Office of Chinese Affairs, Mar. 13, 1951; mem., Policy Planning Staff, Jan. 4, 53; 1st sec. and cons. Damascus. Aug. 2, 54; cons. of emb. Damascus, Aug. 3, 54; FSO 2, Mar. 24, 55; m.

EXHIBIT No. 437-A

Emmerson, John Kenneth; b. Colo. Mar. 17, 1908; Colo. Coll., A. B. 1929; Sorbonne 1927-28; N. Y. U., A. M. 1930; Georgetown U. Sch. of For. Ser. 1931-33; instr. in social sci. (sc.), U. of Nebr. 1930-31; asst. dir. Berlitz School of Languages, Chicago, 1933-35; app. FSO unclass., v. c., and sec. in Diplo. Ser. Oct. 1, 1935; language officer, Tokyo, Nov. 12, 1935; v. c. at Osaka Oct. 25, 1937, at Taihoku, temp. Apr. 12, 1939; at Osaka Dec. 6, 1939; 3d sec. at Tokyo Apr. 3, 1940; FSO 8, Aug. 1, 1940; to Dept. temp. Nov. 19, 1941; 3d sec. and v. c. at Lima Feb. 6, 1942; FSO 7, Oct. 20, 1942; 2d sec. at Lima in addition to duties as v. c. Feb. 5, 1943; 2d sec. at Chungking Aug. 10, 1943; FSO 6, July 16, 1944; to Dept. May

15, 1945; For. Ser. officer, Headquarters of Comdr. in Chief, U. S. Fleet, temp. Aug. 8, 1945; FSO 5, Aug. 13, 1945; FSO, office of act. U. S. pol. adviser to Supreme Comdr., Allied Forces, Japan, Sept. 7, 1945; to Dept. Feb. 18, 1946; asst. chief, Div. of Jap. Affairs, Mar. 15, 1946; special asst. to chief Oct. 28, 1946; FSO 4, Nov. 13, 1946; 1st sec. at Moscow May 1, 1947; FSO 3, May 15, 1947; cons. July 21, 1947; cons. at Moscow in addition to duties as 1st sec. Aug. 13, 1947; to Dept. May 13, 1949; detailed to Nat. War Coll. August 29, 1949; FSO 2, May 23, 1950; planning adviser Bu. of Far Eastern Affairs, Aug. 15, 1950; couns. Karachi, July 28, 52; meritorious ser. award 54; FSO 1, Mar. 24, 55; couns. Beirut, Apr. 4, 55. m.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do I understand that Mr. Emmerson is still in the American service, and is stationed in Beirut, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. As I say, Strong is our counselor of embassy at Damascus, Syria, and Emmerson is counselor of embassy at Beirut.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have both been sent from China to the Middle East?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator JENNER. Thank you very much, Admiral.

That will conclude the hearing.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a. m., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.
Present: Senators Jenner and Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher, associate counsel.

Senator JENNER. The meeting will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness this morning is Mr. Rachlin. Will you come forward, Mr. Rachlin?

Senator JENNER. Will you please raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. RACHLIN. I swear.

TESTIMONY OF CARL RACHLIN

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like to sit at that end of the table, Mr. Rachlin?

Senator, before beginning the hearing today, Mr. Rachlin has agreed to come here to testify on the nature of the Communist Party convention that was recently held in New York.

I would like to note for the record that Mr. Ludwig Rajchman was subpoenaed by the subcommittee. The subpoena was issued on Monday of this week. It was served on him last night at the Westbury Hotel on 69th Street and Madison Avenue, New York City, at 7:31 p. m., by a member of the subcommittee staff. Rajchman threw the subpoena to the floor of the hotel rather than accept service.

Immediately thereafter the chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Eastland, sent a telegram, asking that it be personally delivered upon him, notifying him that the subpoena which had been served on him and which he had thrown to the floor was indeed a directive for him to appear at room 319, Senate Office Building, at 10 a. m., this morning.

Senator, I left room 319 between 25 minutes after 10 and 10:30 this morning, and Mr. Rajchman had not yet appeared. I bring that to your attention, Senator, in the event you want to pass it on to the subcommittee, whether Mr. Rajchman is in contempt of the Senate.

Senator JENNER. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. I also would like to mention that Mr. Rajchman is being subpoenaed because his name has frequently turned up in the course of the inquiries conducted by the subcommittee into the nature and extent of the Soviet activity in the United States. He figured in the Harry Dexter White case, in the Alger Hiss case, and the white papers. The fact that he left his position here as financial adviser to the National Chinese delegation and became a Polish delegate gives the committee reason to believe he may have been one of the Soviet superiors of the ring that was operating in Washington.

[To the witness:] I wonder if you would give your name?

Mr. RACHLIN. My name is Carl Rachlin and I reside at 187 Brown Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., and I maintain my office for the practice of law at 11 West 48th Street, New York City, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell the subcommittee whether or not you were an unofficial delegate to the recent Communist Party convention that was held in New York?

Mr. RACHLIN. If I may, I was an unofficial observer. I was in no way a delegate.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us exactly what your role was?

Mr. RACHLIN. The New York Civil Liberties Union, of which I am on the board of directors, was asked if it wished to have any observer present at this convention held only last week. I was called by the director of the New York Civil Liberties Union and asked whether I would like to go. I immediately talked it over with my partner, Lester Migdol, and we thought it would be a good idea if both of us went to this convention for reasons which I would be happy to explain. That is, in addition to the usual feeling that all Americans have about the Communist Party, we had a special interest, because among our clients are several trade unions and one of them, particularly, is in a field which had formerly been under the control of the Communists, and when it had been under the control of the Communists it had been expelled from the CIO, back in 1948.

The old United Office and Professional Workers was one of the unions expelled for Communist activity by the CIO. One of the successor groups of that, which had later been chartered by the CIO, was the Communities and Social Agencies Employees Union and that union is our client. Prior to the expulsion of the Communist leadership, I had been consulted by the people who are now the leaders of that union. And they had consulted with me to help them finally kick out the Communist leadership so that I became deeply personally involved in the activities of Communists in order to assist my clients in preventing a resurgence of Communist activity in that field. Because it was commonly talked about that the field of Communities and Social Agencies was one of the areas in which Communists had a particular interest.

In view of the fact further that my partner who was general counsel of the American Veterans Committee and was one of those instrumental in expelling the Communists from the AMVETS back some 5 or 6 years ago and particularly John Gates, who was one of the leaders of the Communist Party, we had this special interest.

Mr. MORRIS. Now what was it? Was it a closed convention to everybody else?

Mr. RACHLIN. Except for the special observers it was closed to everyone else. There may have been a few visitors, but they were obviously associated with the Communist movement. It was obvious that these people in the rear as visitors were associated with the Communist movement. The press was excluded.

Mr. MORRIS. How many observers were there?

Mr. RACHLIN. To the best of my recollection, 6 or 8. There was a Rev. J. A. Muste, who was a fairly well-known pacifist in New York City, a man introduced to me as Stringfellow Barr, who I understood either is or was the president of St. Johns College of Maryland; there was a man whom I had met before, Bayard Rustin, who again was identified with some of the pacifist movements in New York.

There was a man I had met previously by the name of Roy Fitch whom I knew to be a pacifist. One or two others whose names escape me now whom I had not met before and have not seen since.

Mr. MORRIS. And you did attend all the sessions of the convention?

Mr. RACHLIN. I was there every day but not every session. Unfortunately, I had some family duties with my children that required my being home part of the time. So I did not see all the sessions all the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we feel, in view of the experience that Mr. Rachlin had, he is qualified to give us some testimony about this Communist Party convention. And the Internal Security Subcommittee is interested in this particular convention because of the bearing on events, in the months ahead and the years ahead, of decisions and policies adopted at that convention. Those decisions thus have a direct bearing on the work of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee.

Mr. Rachlin, I wonder whether you could tell us your general observations, your analysis, and your general interpretation of what happened while you were attending the Communist Party convention.

Mr. RACHLIN. I would be pleased to, Mr. Morris.

The convention was held in a building known as Chateau Gardens in New York, which formerly was a church and is now used as a banquet hall or reception hall.

The press was excluded from the convention so that the pretention of the convention being an open convention, of course, was immediately dissipated by the fact that members of the press were kept outside in an anteroom and could not see or hear any of the proceedings that took place.

I, myself, went into the pressroom on 1 or 2 occasions for the purpose of finding out whether it was possible at least to hear and it was not possible to hear from this room.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Communists give any reason for excluding the press?

Mr. RACHLIN. The reason given by Simon Gerson, I understand, who is the propaganda head of the Communist Party, was that if the press were present they might identify delegates from areas where, if it were known that these people were Communists, they would be seriously handicapped in their daily activities.

This was an absurd statement because the press was all around the building and movie cameras were around the building photographing everybody who went in and out of the building.

So the reason was absurd and I am quite sure was merely a reason and now the true basis for excluding the press is apparent.

Now, there are some overall observations that may be of some interest. This, I think, should be pleasing to most people. There were very few young people present. I took particular notice of that. Even though I could not see the faces of many of the people—we were at a little table in the left of this hall so most of the delegates facing the front of the room had their backs toward us so it was not always possible to see the general appearance of all the people but it was quite clear that there were relatively few young people. Many less than perhaps might have been the case back 20 years ago when student activities were much more vigorous than they are at the present time.

Another observation which may possibly be of some interest is that I would estimate that approximately 50 percent of the delegates were women. I am not quite certain of the significance of it.

Senator JENNER. How many delegates would you estimate were there?

Mr. RACHLIN. Approximately 300, Senator. I am quite certain that figure is relatively accurate. How many people they represented is not clear because they are given in relative terms and one cannot be sure.

However, I made a rough estimate based on the culling together of statistics from various sources. At one point during the convention, the Communist Party announced that they were going to have approximately 40 district representatives to the national committee of whom 11 would be from the State of New York, which was roughly the percentage of Communist Party members in New York to the whole United States.

They indicated that New York actually had a higher percentage than the 11 would indicate. However, going through the list, say California would have 5 and Illinois 4, and so on. At the end of the reading a person got up and asked, "Well how about Missouri? There doesn't seem to be any delegates from Missouri." The interesting answer was that "we gave representation on the basis of at least 100 members," and apparently the inference was there were not 100 members of the Communist Party in the State of Missouri.

But using that—and the general figures that were talked about—the figure of 100 in that area seemed to be the basis of representation—so, figuring 40 delegates to the national convention, using their own figures, I think there probably is about 2,000 members in the State of New York, and perhaps 7,000 or 7,500 in the United States.

Now, I have no special way of knowing that. That is an estimate I made trying to cull together statistics.

Senator JENNER. Any Indiana delegate?

Mr. RACHLIN. I will be able to tell you that in a moment. I took fairly copious notes.

Senator JENNER. All right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. If you have representation of the various States—

Mr. RACHLIN. I would be glad to read them into the record.

Senator JENNER. That would be good.

Mr. RACHLIN. First of all, there were to be 20 delegates at large to the National Committee of the Communist Party under its new setup.

And then there were to be 40 from the various districts as follows: New York, 11; California, 5; Illinois, 4; New Jersey, 2; eastern Pennsylvania, 2; Ohio, 2; the entire southern region of the United States, 2; New England, 1; western Pennsylvania, 1; Maryland, 1; Indiana, 1; Wisconsin, 1; Minnesota and the 2 Dakotas, 1; the Rocky Mountain region, 1; Oregon, 1; Washington and Idaho combined, 1; and this totals up to 40 and, together with the 20 at large, makes a total of 60 which will be the new national committee. The 40 from the districts, as of the closing of the convention, had not been selected partly because, I think, there is a good deal of internal jockeying in the Communist Party as to who is going to come out as topmost.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Rachlin, in connection with the numbers, your estimated number of 7,500, that is on the basis of just the broad representation?

Mr. RACHLIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover has made the statement that there are now between twenty and twenty-five thousand Communists in the United States.

Mr. RACHLIN. He would have much better sources of information than I. This was a rough estimate that I made without having any special knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. For instance, based on your observation, there was no one from Missouri?

Mr. RACHLIN. That is right—I am sorry, there was no one from Missouri, and the entire southern region had only two. Using a few little figures, a few little things like that, I made the estimate which could be inaccurate.

Mr. MORRIS. If Missouri had less than 100 and was not represented then whatever the number, if they were less than 100, were presumably unrepresented?

Mr. RACHLIN. If I understand what they did, they were somehow included in the southern region. I am not sure of that.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. We appreciate the difficulty.

Mr. RACHLIN. Now, I mentioned previously that approximately 50 percent were women. Another observation that most of the delegates were elderly or getting along in years. There were very few young people. Among the limited number of spectators who obviously were attached, as I said, to the Communist movement in one form or another, the average age was even older. This, I took as a rather heartening sign that the Communist Party seems to be making no impression or very limited impression on the younger people in the country and I was particularly aware of that and my partner and I discussed that observation.

Now, it was quite clear that the main concern of the Communist Party at the present time and one which should be of great interest to all Americans, is that they have felt and feel particularly their isolation from the rest of the United States. No matter what the political representation might be, Liberal, Conservative, Republican, Democratic, they feel they are completely out of touch with the United States and this convention was designed to create the atmosphere and the machinery to return them to the main stream of American life.

This was expressed in two generally different attitudes, though having the same overall purpose, in my estimation.

One might be called the attitude of the unregenerate Stalinized position led by William Z. Foster who, of course, has been the leader of the Communist Party in the United States perhaps since its very beginning, I guess. Foster is an elderly man—of some 75 years of age—whose introductory speech was read to the convention by Ben Davis, who had been some years ago a city councilman in the city of New York.

The other position which follows some of the more deviating positions of the Communist Party is led by John Gates. John Gates is the editor of the *Daily Worker*, and his general attitude, and of his followers, is that the Communist Party must create a kind of independence from the Soviet Government. It must appear to make decisions on its own and based on what they consider the merits rather than the position given to it by the Soviet Government.

Senator JENNER. Did the words "national Communist" appear?

Mr. RACHLIN. That term, itself, did not appear as such but Foster in his introductory statement to the convention the first day, Senator, came very close to suggesting or using those terms, because he compared Gates and his followers and the whole group that circulates in and through the *Daily Worker* to being modern Browderists, and modern Lovestoneites, the term meaning, as he explained the term, Lovestone being the Communist Party secretary who preceded Browder and was an exponent of the idea of American exceptionalism, which was the term used. America was supposed to be the exception to the general Marxist-Leninist principles of revolution and Foster accused Gates of following that position and also accused Gates of following the position of Browder who used the term "20th century Americanism," again trying to create a kind of Communist within the framework of American life and Gates, in his position, is supposed to be following that kind of thing because Gates does want to abolish the Communist Party as a political party and keep it up as a kind of political association.

It is something less than a party, and Foster uses the old Stalinist terms in referring to his own opponents. The terms they used which were mildly amusing, Gates is a rightwinger or opportunist and also he is a liquidationist. This apparently a new term of abuse which the Communist Party uses to refer to the people who wish to do what Gates does, that is, abolish the Communist Party and create this Communist political association which, by the way, had been done for a brief time in the middle forties during the last years of Browder's term as a general secretary to the Communist Party.

But, when Browder was expelled after the famous letter from Jacques Duclos, the leader of the French Communists back in the middle forties, the Communist Party re-created itself from the political association.

Interestingly enough, there was another Jacques Duclos letter read to the convention, which was a similarly hard letter, urging the American Communist Party to take a hard line favorable—undeviatingly favorable—to the Soviet Government, and Foster, in his introductory speech which I said was read to the convention by this Ben Davis, urged support of the Duclos letter and, in other words, wanted all-out support of the Soviet Government, and, of course, it is well known that the French Communist Party is among the most Stalinist of all the Communist parties throughout the world.

Now, interestingly enough, Dennis—who was the national secretary of the Communist Party and I see, according to the daily press today, is due to testify here Monday—said, “We listen to Mr. Duclos’ letter but we reject it.”

Now, this again is undoubtedly part of the general tactic of trying to bring the American Communist Party back into the mainstream of American life. And so Dennis took the position in his remarks that they should reject the Duclos letter, they should create internal Communist Party democracy and permit dissents from Communist Party positions.

On that point, however, I would like to show the inherent contradiction and how these words are really tactical rather than basic in belief. There was a resolution passed on “democratic centralism” and “monolithic unity.” These are words that are Communist words; nobody else that I know of uses these terms. But it is interesting to see from the last paragraph of this resolution that it is quite clear that their desire to have internal democracy in the party is merely tactical and for the purpose of fooling the public. I would like to read this short statement referring to “monolithic unity.” The Communists generally mean by “monolithic unity” a unified position that all follow undeviatingly. And here is what this says in the resolution:

As to “monolithic unity,” originally this term meant simply a common ideology or outlook as opposed to a Marxist ideology. In practice it came to mean a rigid conformity of views on all matters of theory, policy, and tactics. The concept of a common ideology must be retained as essential to a Marxist party.

Here is the sentence that is the key to how tactical this is rather than basic: “But the term should be dropped because of the harmful practices and connotations that have grown around it.”

In other words, they are going to have monolithic unity but they are going to call it spinach or something else in the hopes that we will be taken in by this change.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Rachlin, may I break in at this point? Where you are talking about differences between various groups—Mr. Chairman, we have a source of information from among the Communists themselves who has been reporting to the subcommittee on these events and, as you may know, he himself will testify before this subcommittee, but I think it probably will be restricted to executive session.

I would like to read to you his analysis which we have just received from him, this man who is going to testify and to ask you for your comments on his particular statement:

Because of certain facts which came to my attention, it was possible for me to submit in my recent statement to the committee a forecast of the character and the tone as well as the suggested analysis of specific decisions, public and private announcements, of the recent Communist Party, United States of America convention several months before it took place. The convention itself confirms my previous statement that the controversies and final decisions to break with Moscow were all deliberately prearranged and, what is even more sinister, all of it was done under the direct guidance of and with the approval of the Kremlin.

To accomplish this result, the Kremlin played upon real convictions and differences of opinion on the part of leaders and rank and file of the American party over an 11-month period and achieved their final desired result in the recent unit convention. It is unimportant that certain principal participants in the convention did not and still do not know they were pawns in the Kremlin-controlled farce. The purpose of the so-called break with Moscow and the avowed abandonment of force and violence along with one’s party dictatorship, etc., is the

path to a "Socialist America" by democratic means, is to secure legality of the American arm of the Kremlin in order to build a large mass party out of the present decimated organization within the next 2 years.

I wonder whether you would comment on this man's observation.

Mr. RACHLIN. I would be glad to. There is little doubt in my mind, I would agree basically with the comments made by your informant. There is no doubt, the positions taken by the three different groups, the group led by Foster, the group led by Eugene Dennis, and the group led by John Gates, while they have the appearance to differ they are not essentially different, and the differences are tactical rather than philosophic.

Furthermore, all three of these people are longtime Communist Party leaders. This is no new blood coming to the fore for asserting new principles. These are the people who have led the Communist Party for the last generation, and I find it difficult to believe that these differences are more than how to get back into the good graces of the American people, and not symptomatic of a real basic difference of philosophy.

I think, if there were a real basic difference of philosophy among the 3 or any one of the 3, that person would not be long for the Communist Party. I think the thing to do, however, before any of us here, this committee or any American who watches this thing carefully, we ought to at least—I won't say just suspend judgment—we ought to watch carefully for the purposes of seeing how far Gates is going to go in his so-called position toward greater democracy. I, for example, will try to watch it as closely as I can. As I even told one of the people who was the so-called host of this delegation, a national committeeman by the name of Blumberg, this was only a tactical question; that I could not see any serious change in the Communist Party at all.

What I told him at the time was—

it is all well and good for you people to go through the pretense of creating criticism of the Soviet Union of acts that happened several years ago, but I do not see any criticism of any current activity. For example, all Americans, no matter what their personal political views of a unified position on Hungary, we, all of us, dread the Soviet intervention in Hungary. We all recognize it as interference in the affairs of a small state trying to come out from the Communist control. And yet you people have not criticized the Soviet Government for what is obvious—

using your words—"Soviet imperialism."

When I see that, maybe I will take a new look but until that time, I am convinced that your actions are just tactical differences and not basic.

Therefore, in general, while I do not know anything about the plans of the Soviet Union with regard to this convention, I would basically agree with the conclusions that you read to me in that statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there, in fact, any resolution on Hungary?

Mr. RACHLIN. None whatsoever on Hungary and, interestingly enough, there was a minor undercurrent among some of the unimportant people there—

Senator JENNER. Didn't you hear anything discussed at all?

Mr. RACHLIN. There were things discussed. For example, the things that were discussed were really technical points like how they should use the term "Marxism-Leninism."

The Gates crowd wanted to soften the use of the term so it would not appear they were following Marxist-Leninist dogma. Whereas,

Foster was insisting that there be undeviating wholehearted and complete unswerving support of the term "Marxism-Leninism." However, there were a few of the delegates who got up on the floor and actually made statements which——

Senator JENNER. I want to interrupt to state that you may go ahead. I have to attend another meeting. Senator Watkins will be here to relieve me.

Mr. RACHLIN. Shall I continue?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, continue, Mr. Rachlin.

Mr. RACHLIN. For example, there was a delegate who got up and said that Foster advocated a converted aspect of Soviet policy. This antagonized everybody. He said under Foster the Communist Party waited for the Soviet Union to support peace before the United States Communist Party did.

And this delegate went on to add that the United States Communist Party must see the contradictions in the Soviet Communist Party and not wait to receive the line from the Soviet Government.

This was just an unimportant delegate. He said, for example, that Pravda, the Soviet daily paper, does not print any stories about the United States Communist resolutions which were at all critical in any way of the Soviet Government except Dennis', and Dennis' statements were excised. Then he made a vigorous attack on Foster as being one who was just following undeviatingly the Soviet line.

I am just trying to show here that while the leaders of the party are going in one direction, there is some kind of undercurrent among some of the people, a few of them seemed generally disturbed. For example, a young woman from California, whose name I do not know, got up and said, "It is not enough to say we did not know what was going on," that is referring to the Stalinist murders and things of that sort—she went on to say, "Our policy"—meaning the Communist Party policy—"in the United States was complete subservience to Stalinism."

Oddly enough, there was a fair rippling of applause at the finishing of this statement. I think this is a good sign. It means there are some people in the Communist Party who may be preparing to actually break from the Communist Party. There was one girl who got up and criticized the leadership of the Communist Party. She said, "You taught us to know more about Russian history than about American history. This influence is not going to carry the party by even the remotest possibility. The party is still in the hands of the professionals and will be for a long time."

"But I hope that some day some of us will be able to develop ways of encouraging these people to refuse the Communist Party and rejoin the rest of the United States."

Mr. MORRIS. On that point, the subcommittee is very desirous of trying to determine if there are defectors and who the defectors are, because naturally they are prime sources of evidence. We are very eagerly looking for someone who is a defector and someone who would testify about the work of the Communist Party.

Did you learn of any particular defectors?

Mr. RACHLIN. No, except this: Several of the newspapermen had received a story from somebody inside the convention, and the rumor was going around to the effect that, at the end of the convention, somebody was going to get up and severely criticize all the leaders: Foster

for being no different from what he always has been, and Gates for selling out a liberal position on these issues, and the rumor was that he was going to get up and say there was no resolution on Hungary, there was no resolution on the Soviet anti-Semitism. But, as far as I know, this event never took place and who this person was, I do not know. But there is no doubt there were rumors going around that this was going to happen.

Mr. MORRIS. You say there was no resolution on Soviet anti-Semitism?

Mr. RACHLIN. No resolution on it; no, sir. This was obviously a cause of undercurrent because this had been publicized throughout the press of the United States, I guess throughout the press of the world. This was one of the issues that was completely avoided.

And nothing was said at all.

Now, there are 1 or 2 other points that I might indicate. Of the 20 people who were elected to the national committee of the Communist Party as delegates at large, I have their names—I was saying of the 20 people who were elected to the Communist national committee at large, I tried to estimate from the information that I heard how they divided it among the 3 groups. And the way that I have it of those 20, I would have 6 or 7 among the Gates group, approximately 6 among the Dennis group, and 7 among the Foster group. There obviously is some fight for power going on, because no new national chairman or new general secretary was chosen. I think the conclusion from that was that they could not agree among themselves who was going to hold the seat of power on this score.

I made a rough estimate of the people in the different groups. They read off the people who were elected. While one could not be sure who was in what group, there was some evidence of who belonged to whom. As I indicated, they were fairly equally divided.

Now there are 1 or 2 things that we might watch for in the future. For example, a term we are going to hear with great frequency from now on, which is going to be a Communist slogan, will be the anti-monopoly coalition. This term was used by all sides and it indicates, following up your point, that differences may have been more apparent than real. Everybody, whether it was forced or real, used the term "antimonopoly coalition." And we can rest assured that that term is one we are going to hear at great length.

Another thing that they made quite clear at the convention and which, in a way, was disturbing, is that the Communist Party is going to make an extra special effort to infiltrate into Negro mass organizations. I read in the press later that Roy Wilkins, who is the head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, publicly repudiated them, but there is no doubt from the nature of the national committee elected—approximately 5 or 6 of the 20 were Negroes—that the Communist Party is going to make an extremely special effort to infiltrate and take over control of Negro groups. I trust this will not happen and it is one we will all have to watch carefully.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell me this, Mr. Rachlin: Would it be your opinion that, at the present time, the Communist Party as a mass organization is not successful now, and one of the purposes of this convention was to try to arrange a framework whereby they could get back in operation as a mass organization?

Mr. RACHLIN. That statement, Judge, is absolutely correct. There is no doubt they are not a mass organization. They are, fortunately, completely isolated from all general activities in the American life. I have the feeling, from the comments that were made, that this is true not only of their political life but also their social life. Their social life, as a result of their being isolated by all Americans, is only with themselves. They have no contact with people except in the most casual way, except Communist Party members.

Mr. MORRIS. Now we are talking about the Communists as Communists?

Mr. RACHLIN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. If there is—and the subcommittee is constantly encountering it—evidence of covert activity, underground activity, of secret Communist Party members who do not operate as Communists, therefore do not participate in the so-called Communist mass movement; who even have instructions, not to associate with Communists, then when we talk about the diminution of the Communist forces we are talking about the Communist organization and not the underground?

Mr. RACHLIN. That is right. In view of the fact they had some outside observers like myself present, there was no evidence whatsoever of any underground or covert activity. Everybody there, except the observers, was an open member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Watkins, may I mention this is Mr. Carl Rachlin, a New York attorney who has attended the recent Communist Party Convention in New York as an unofficial observer. He represented the New York Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. He has attended virtually all the sessions of the convention. He is a trained political observer. He represents many trade unions which have a Communist problem within them, and he has consented, at our request, to come here to give us his firsthand observations and analysis of the recent Communist Party convention. As you know, Senator Jenner had to leave to attend another session.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you this question: Was this a closed convention?

Mr. RACHLIN. Senator, it was closed with the exception of a few observers like myself. It was closed to the press. There were some guests there, but they were obviously in one way or another identified with the Communist Party. The press was not admitted.

As a matter of fact, because of that, the press would grab hold of me to give them some details, and I was in a sense responsible for some of the stories appearing in the public press. The New York Times and the New York Herald-Tribune in fact quoted me on some of the things that took place because they could not get any reliable information from within the convention itself, except the handouts of the propaganda office of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In that connection, were the handouts given by Gates a fair representation of what was going on inside?

Mr. RACHLIN. Gerson was handling all the press releases for the Communist Party. They were merely the briefest summaries, one might say. There were no details as to what took place. They would not give information on who said what, except in the case of a man like Dennis or Foster.

Every effort was made to cover up any real discussion that might have taken place. All that was given out was just the vote, and the resolution was such-and-such, and a copy of the resolution that was passed; but there were no efforts made as to any discussion that might have taken place.

Mr. MORRIS. There was an effort made, at least some few delegates would like to have a resolution on Hungary and Soviet anti-Semitism?

Mr. RACHLIN. That is right, it was quite clear that some of the delegates wanted those resolutions, and the press knew it. Apparently they had some representatives in the Communist Party that advised them.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see any evidence that the Communists were adapting and regulating the machinery of their party in such a way that they had an eye on the Smith Act prosecutions?

Mr. RACHLIN. From my observations, there is no doubt that that was one of their objectives. And they had a special resolution on the Smith Act which I have in front of me. And the whole tenor of the convention was to create the appearance of separating themselves from the international Communist conspiracy, with the idea they could then defend under the Smith Act and that they were not part of the Communist conspiracy and they might defend in other areas of government security or industrial security where there would be the question of being part of the apparatus of Communist conspiracy. There is no doubt their terminology is geared to create the appearance of separation so they can take a stronger position in court.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, if they passed a formal resolution and the resolution purported to be the official position of the American Communist Party which is in real variance with the organization, by promulgating those official positions, they feel they can possibly confuse the courts and confuse the Government?

Mr. RACHLIN. I am sure that is what they hope to do. There is no doubt that they hope to create that illusion.

But that was just part of the whole atmosphere, Judge Morris. That is part of it, but they are trying to create the impression that they are good Americans and maybe their views are different from yours or mine, but that they are really good Americans and that their main interest is the United States.

That is the impression they are going to try to create. And they are going to use the term—they are going to try to align themselves with all kinds of groups, even refer to the fact they want to align themselves with conservative groups who might be interested in opposing what they call the coalition of large corporations into monopolies. And that is going to be one of their big slogans, the antimonopoly coalition and that is one of the things we will have to watch for.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Rachlin.

Senator, do you have any questions?

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. One other thing, you are acquainted with the term "Aesopian language"?

Mr. RACHLIN. I have read about it, I am familiar with the term.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you comment whether or not there was any Aesopian language used in connection with the convention?

Mr. RACHLIN. Well, there is no doubt—for example, that paragraph I read from their resolution on democratic centralism and monolithic unity is a use of the Aesopian language. And they are very blunt about stating that they are going to try to give the appearance of one thing so as to make people believe they mean something else.

In other words, they are going to use a term which will have a specific meaning to them, which they hope will confuse you and me and the American public. All three positions of the Communist Party when they criticize the Soviet Government or any activity of any Communist Party throughout the world is a kind of use of Aesopian language, because it is done with a view to creating an illusion which most of them—almost all—do not really believe.

Some of the members of the Communist Party undoubtedly do believe the criticism of the Soviet Union that the Communist Party passes out. But among the leadership, there is little belief it is more than a tactical question with them.

Just perhaps a few more observations I might make: Some of the leading well-known Communists were not reelected to the national committee. Betty Gannett, who has been the subject of prosecutions under the Smith Act and been a well-known Communist for many years, was apparently badly beaten in her efforts to be elected to the national committee.

Simon Gerson was defeated for the national committee. I referred to him before as the one in charge of propaganda. Blumberg, who had been a member of the committee for a long time, was likewise beaten for election. How the ballots were counted, of course, I do not know but there were actually, from the appearance, half the number of people running who were defeated. That was interesting and it may be because—even if there are no real differences in ideology, there is a difference in the efforts to obtain power, and I am sure that the efforts to elect people to the national committee was an effort to create a power situation whereby one or the other of the three groups could assert enough power. On the question of continuing the Communist Party as a political organization, the group led by Dennis supported the group led by Foster.

Dennis wants to continue the Communist Party as a political organization as opposed to Gates, who openly stated that he wants to terminate the Communist Party as a party, but does want to continue it as a political association.

On the other hand, on resolutions that had anything to do with the program, the Dennis group by and large supported Gates group against Foster. For example, the draft resolution, which was the subject of all their programmatic material which indicates the efforts that the Communist Party has gone to to create the appearance of rejoining the American people, was supported by Dennis and rather severely criticized by Foster. Foster, for example, was for all-out support of the Soviet Government in its activities in Hungary, and so forth, whereas Dennis and the others play around with words that all add up to nothing on the subject.

So that, I think the thing perhaps that we can do in the future is to watch the power fight. Because the fact that they could not elect a national chairman and a general secretary indicates to me that they are in a power fight. It may be of use to all of us—because, if it

becomes a real power fight and people are expelled or leave, obviously such people can be the sources of great information to all of us.

If I may utter one word of caution: This is the thing that might be of help to all of us: One of the things I have learned over the years in having to watch the Communist Party because of the situation mentioned earlier by me, was that the Communist Party, unlike any other political group in the United States—I do not care whether they be Republican, Democratic, or Socialist—is the whole life to the people who are its members. It is not merely something you do once in a while on maybe regular occasions, or argue about with your friends while listening to the radio, it is everything. The Communist Party member does nothing which, in his own mind, is not in some way identifying him as a Communist Party member, whether it is his job or social life or politics or as a member of a trade union. And the word of caution I want to utter—and I do not want to sound like a psychologist because I am not, even though in one of the trade unions I deal with I deal with a lot of social workers—it is not like the ordinary American who disagrees with his political party. It involves an emotional upheaval. In encouraging the people to break with the Communist Party, I think one of the things we have not recognized strong enough is this difficulty they face.

I was speaking to the reporter who interviewed Howard Fast, when he broke with the Communist Party just a few weeks ago. You know Howard Fast was a moderately popular novelist and was associated with the Communist Party a long time. He broke with the Communist Party a month or so ago. And the reporter indicated very clearly that this had been on Fast's mind for many, many months but it involved a great effort on his part to come to the final break. So this is a thing we perhaps ought to try to understand a little more. And we ought to encourage them. The first thing they do is—of course they all react almost unanimously in the same way, that their emotional break is different, and they are not going to become a public spectacle and discuss internal affairs of the Communist Party. I think the thing that we have learned about such people is that all of them eventually will discuss these matters publicly and disclose what information they have. Many of them find it difficult at first. And the only word of caution that I want to urge—if I may be so presumptuous—is to say that we should try to recognize this difficulty among some of these people who have this emotional difficulty and encourage them and perhaps play along with it for a while, because our experience has shown that every one of the people who have broken with the Communist Party at one point or another, in a matter of months or maybe a year or more have come forward and disclosed information which has been of great value to all of us.

So this is the thing that I have watched over the years, and I recognize the difficulty because it is important for all of us to have the information.

At the same time, if we are overzealous, we may create a kind of blocking which would prevent the person from disclosing the necessary information.

MR. MORRIS. I might mention that the subcommittee has found that to be very true. We had recent dealings with somebody who has defected recently and he has indicated that he would be willing to talk, but did not want to be subpoenaed and go on the record.

Now, if we want to be strictly formal about it, the Senate committee should not deal with anyone who has broken with the Communist Party unless he is under oath. But we realize he is emotionally involved and by applying strict attitudes toward him, we may freeze him in a certain position. And we have found it takes at least 3 years for a man who is a Communist to become completely detached so he can be in a position to see the world situation clearly enough and his own situation clearly enough that he can begin to give testimony and evidence against the conspiracy.

Mr. RACHLIN. I have found that to be the fact and I am very happy to hear what you have said, Judge, because we are all anxious to get this information. The reason I mention that specifically now is there is an undercurrent—they are not among the top leaders, because they are too hardened and too dedicated to break away, but I feel, because of the Hungarian situation, because of the revelations of Stalinism and the revelations of Soviet anti-Semitism, there are going to be public breaks in the not too distant future. And we ought to encourage this. The circumstances of events over the past few years have made it difficult for the Communist Party.

If I may make this further one last comment: In the thirties it was possible, for various reasons, for the Communist Party to work with other groups as they did. One of the reasons was that the great public enemy at that time was not Russia but Nazi Germany. Most of us were concerned with Nazi Germany, Russia only as a secondary force. Second, none of us had the experience in the thirties that we have now as to what Communists are, actually, what they are like.

But at the present time quite certainly the efforts of the Communists to come back to the main stream of American life—because all Americans and most people throughout the world recognize the Soviet Union as the great hungry power trying to absorb free peoples and destroy democratic government.

So their efforts—they will not have the same friendly atmosphere they might have experienced in the 1930's, and while we should watch carefully, I do not think we ought to be too frightened that they are trying to come back into American life. I do not see any serious possibility of it becoming a strong influence.

Senator WATKINS. You do not think for a moment the American people are frightened about the possibilities?

Mr. RACHLIN. Not even remotely, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. You used the word "frightened."

Mr. RACHLIN. I misused the term. What I meant is—I am trying to think what I did actually see.

Senator WATKINS. We can be vigilant but not frightened.

Mr. RACHLIN. That is right; there is nothing to be afraid of at all. The American people have had a lot of education on this subject, through all the legislative activity, through good public groups, and what not. There is not much danger that the Communists will gain any influence in any of the mass organizations in the United States.

Senator WATKINS. Maybe you have already expressed just how you came to cover this convention—did you take notes?

Mr. RACHLIN. I took rather detailed notes which I have in front of me.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Watkins, he has been reading from the notes he actually took at the time.

Mr. RACHLIN. I have on several occasions referred to my notes.

Senator WATKINS. Did you make direct quotes?

Mr. RACHLIN. In 1 or 2 cases I actually made direct quotes.

Senator WATKINS. From what? In other words, what you have been giving us is a summary?

Mr. RACHLIN. Yes; based on my recollection and my notes.

Senator WATKINS. How long did this convention last?

Mr. RACHLIN. It ran over a period of 4 days, beginning on the Saturday, a week ago, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, and the convention closed last Tuesday evening a week ago.

Senator WATKINS. Did you attend all sessions?

Mr. RACHLIN. The sessions were all day long—I am sorry, Senator. I attended all the sessions but not all parts of all sessions. There were times that I had duties at my office which unhappily took me away. And, also, family duties—playing with the children took part of my time, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rachlin, on behalf of—Senator Jenner asked me to thank the witness for him before he left—on behalf of Senator Jenner and the chairman of the committee and myself, I want to express our appreciation to you for arranging your business so that you could come here and tell us about this convention.

Mr. RACHLIN. I was happy to be here.

Senator WATKINS. I join with my colleague, Senator Jenner, and also Judge Morris in thanking you.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the witness tomorrow will be Mr. Beichman, who was the reporter for Christian Science Monitor who covered every one of the sessions at this convention. However, he was not at the vantage point of Mr. Rachlin. But he is scheduled to be a witness tomorrow. And we may have one other witness.

Mr. RUSHER. With your approval we would like to place in the public record of the subcommittee certain documents submitted to us by Mr. Nicholas who testified before the subcommittee on May 10, 1956; records of the Communist Party and travel agency which arranged transportation for the Communist Party.

(The above material appears as an appendix to pt. 23: Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States.)

Mr. RUSHER. Secondly, a continuation of the testimony of Dr. Andriyve who testified before this committee last year, a former Soviet citizen who defected to the West and who has made a careful analysis of the meaning of de-Stalinization.

(The above material appears in pt. 45: Scope of Soviet Activity.)

Mr. RUSHER. Thirdly, a memorandum prepared by the International Commission of Jurists on the Hungarian situation in the light of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

(The above memorandum appears as appendix I following the testimony in this volume.)

Mr. RUSHER. Fourthly, three articles with regard to recent subject matter before the committee on the question of Spanish gold now held by the Soviet Union. These articles appear in the New York Times on Sunday, January 6, Thursday, January 10, on Monday, January 21.

Senator WATKINS. Of this year?

Mr. RUSHER. Of this year.

(The articles above referred to appear in pt. 51: Scope of Soviet Activity.)

Mr. RUSHER. Lastly, a statement by the executive council of the AFL-CIO dated February 4, 1957, entitled "The Situation Behind the Iron Curtain."

With your consent, we would like these placed in the public record.

Senator WATKINS. They may be placed in the public record.

(The AFL-CIO statement referred to above appears as appendix II following the testimony in this volume.)

Mr. MORRIS. May we stand adjourned until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning?

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess until tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock.

(At 11:45 a. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 11 a. m., Thursday, February 21, 1957.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a. m., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senators Jenner and Hruska.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; and William A. Rusher, associate counsel.

Senator JENNER. The committee will come to order.

Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before beginning the session today, I would like to put into our public record a statement in connection with the subpoena that was issued for Ludwig Rajchman. We have here a confirmation from the Western Union that the telegram that Senator Eastland sent after Mr. Rajchman had rejected our subpoena and threw it on the floor, the subpoena that served notice on him that he was due down here, that the telegram was delivered at 7:30 a. m. yesterday at the Hotel Westbury in New York.

I would like to make that statement part of the record.

Senator JENNER. It may become part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness is Arnold Beichman.

Will you stand and be sworn?

Senator JENNER. Do you swear that the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD BEICHMAN, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Senator JENNER. Will you give your name and address for the record, please?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Arnold Beichman, 20 West 84th Street, New York.

Senator JENNER. What is your occupation?

Mr. BEICHMAN. I am a newspaperman.

Senator JENNER. For what newspaper?

Mr. BEICHMAN. I am a contributor to the Christian Science Monitor and the AFL-CIO News, and the New Leader.

Senator JENNER. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. You also have some other positions?

Mr. BEICHMAN. I am chairman of the board of directors of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, which consists of several hundred cultural figures and scientific personnel who are opposed to communism and have been fighting it for several years.

The chairman of that national committee is Prof. Sidney Hook, of the New York University Department of Philosophy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Beichman, in connection with that particular experience, the experience that you have set forth, you drew on that particular background, did you not, in connection with the assignment that you had last week of covering the New York Communist Party convention?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you appeared at the convention in what capacity?

Mr. BEICHMAN. As a reporter for the AFL-CIO News, and for the Christian Science Monitor.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you cover every session of the convention?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir—that is, you couldn't cover the sessions, because they wouldn't let you in. We were the pariahs. And we had to wait in a little anteroom which was called the press room. So, to that extent, we covered the sessions.

Senator JENNER. In other words, it was a closed session, to all intents and purposes?

Mr. BEICHMAN. It certainly was, Senator.

Senator JENNER. And all you got was handouts?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir—well, we got oral comments, but it was impossible to follow through with any questions, because the spokesmen would simply say, "I don't know." And when we would ask, could we talk to, say, Foster, or Dennis, or Gates, they would say, "Well, we will see," so that what we got were self-serving declarations, but without any opportunity to cross-examine the responsible leaders of the Communist Party as to what they meant.

For example, they said in one statement they gave us that there have been mistakes made in the Soviet Union, but some of these mistakes are being corrected—I am paraphrasing. I asked the spokesman, "What mistakes are you referring to, and which mistakes have been corrected?"

"The statement speaks for itself."

I asked, could we interview any of the leaders.

"We will try."

We never got any satisfaction. At one point we signed a petition, three of us, three reporters, which we submitted to Simon Gerson, who was the deputy spokesman, three reporters, one from the Herald Tribune, one from the New York Times, and myself, saying we wanted to see John Gates. Apparently this had some influence. Gates came out and said he couldn't talk, because there was a gentlemen's agreement not to give any private interviews.

That was the extent of our contact with the leadership.

Senator JENNER. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Beichman, the first report that proceeded from the convention, the first reportorial report that proceeded from the convention, indicated pretty generally—it is hard to generalize—I have here now the newspaper articles of three established east-coast newspapers. The headline on one is: "Reds in U. S. Vote to Cast

Off Moscow." The second is: "U. S. Reds Vote End Control by Soviet." Third: "U. S. Reds Quit Foster and Kremlin." They are the headlines in the newspapers of February 13, the day after the final session.

Now, the subcommittee has been looking into this, and we find pretty generally that Gerson, Si Gerson, as public-relations official, was in fact giving out handouts as to what happened at the convention, whereas what actually happened there was at variance with what he gave out.

Now, I wonder if you could generally state whether or not, on the basis of your having access to whatever you—you tell us about that—whether, in fact, the Reds in the United States have voted to cast off Moscow, whether they have voted to end control by the Soviet, whether they have quit Foster and the Kremlin.

MR. BEICHMAN. Judge Morris, the only way the Communist Party of America can be independent of Moscow is to be anti-Moscow. There is no way it can be anything else but that.

If I may analogize for a moment, supposing we think to 1938, when we had a Nazi bund in America, and supposing the Nazi bund had a convention and, "We are going to be independent of Nazi Germany; from here on in we are going to interpret Mein Kampf the way we think, according to American conditions. However, we still believe in nazism, we still think that Hitler is a great fellow."

Would anybody for a moment say that the Nazi bund had become independent of Nazi Germany?

I think the analogy would hold here, because the Communist Party today, is in what the agencies on Madison Avenue call the soft sell phase. They are not pushing quite as hard. We used to say there was a hard sell in advertising, and there is a soft sell. And the Communist Party on the propaganda level is in the soft sell stage; it has to be.

There have been some very serious ideological problems in the Communist world. They have had an uprising in East Germany in 1953. You had a Poznan uprising. You had a Hungarian uprising. You have had an uprising even in Tiflis, in the heart of Soviet Georgia.

These have revealed an ideological bankruptcy. In the days of Stalin when Russia suffered defeats, as, for example, under Hitler, under Mussolini, under Franco, those were external defeats which they could weather, because this showed they were resisting the so-called march of Fascism. To the Communist movement, internal defeats of this kind where the masses behind the Iron Curtain refused to accept Soviet dictation, and thereby demonstrate the bankruptcy of Soviet ideology, this becomes a much more serious problem within the Communist Party throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe, where you have seen some defection, in France, or in Italy, among intellectuals, and among some of the trade unions.

Because of that I think the Communist Party in America has had to go into its soft sell phase. It did that once before—as a matter of fact, it did it twice before—in the midthirties, with its popular fronts, and during World War II under the aegis of Earl Browder, when they suddenly came out and said they were willing to accept the united front with anybody who believed in winning the war, including the National Association of Manufacturers.

That is a quotation from Earl Browder. I don't think the NAM went for it.

However, at the present time the Communist Party is probably in one of its strongest positions that it has been in, despite its defeats, because tests demonstrated quite clearly that it has shucked off a lot of its weak links, so-called, and what they are down to is the hard core.

For example, out of the 20 members elected to the national committee, 14 are men who have either been in jail or are under indictment under the Smith Act, or for harboring fugitives—14 out of the 20 under indictment for harboring are in jail—that is a hard core, because those are people who are willing to give up their freedom.

For what? They know perfectly well there is no chance of establishing communism in the near future. It is to protect and to nurture and to strengthen Soviet foreign policy.

In other words, what you have seen at this convention is, they have seen perhaps the errors of their tactics, but not the errors of their ambitions.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Beichman, if I may, to get back to the first question I asked you, were you able to draw any conclusion on the basis of your analysis of the resolutions that ultimately came to you, and your general understanding of what went on there, as to whether or not the Communists in the United States did vote to cut off Moscow?

Mr. BEICHMAN. No, sir. And I think it is easily provable.

Mr. MORRIS. What is easily provable?

Mr. BEICHMAN. That they have not voted to cut themselves off from Moscow. They can't.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I wonder if you would address yourself to whether as a matter of fact they did or did not?

Mr. BEICHMAN. They did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us why you make that statement?

Mr. BEICHMAN. For example, cutting itself off from Moscow would entail certain specific acts. For example, they held out the hand of friendship in one of their resolutions to the American Socialists, or what they called Social Democrats. But they didn't talk about freeing the Socialists behind the Iron Curtain, democratic Socialists who have been imprisoned by the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain.

They didn't ask for the freedom of political prisoners, let alone ask for a fair trial. They didn't ask for an end to the one-party system. They didn't ask for a withdrawal of Soviet troops in Hungary. They haven't asked for freedom of the press or opinion. They haven't even asked in an area in which many Communists in America are interested, the issue of anti-semitism—they didn't even dare raise that at the Communist Party convention.

And in one specific act, the case of Alter and Ehrlich, two Polish Jewish Socialists who were executed by Stalin, allegedly because they were allied with the Fascists, despite the admissions of some Polish Communist newspapers that those were frameup trials, nevertheless the Communist Party here avoided taking any issue with that.

Now, to say you have broken with something without showing where and how is purely, as I say, a self-serving declaration. They have not broken—if I may go back now—because they cannot break—because the day they break with Moscow there will be a new Communist Party in America which will have the label "Communist Party,"

and then those who broke become just a little sect on the level with the Trotskyites, or the Greenback Party, or the Vegetarian Party, with as much significance.

They exist because they are the arm of the Soviet Union in America. So when they break here they are no longer the arm. Where have they broken?

Senator JENNER. What about Titoism in America?

Mr. BEICHMAN. I don't think it is of any major consequence.

Senator JENNER. Could they go that far?

Mr. BEICHMAN. No, sir.

Senator JENNER. You say they can't break, but can they have a title break?

Mr. BEICHMAN. They have not, because—it is very interesting—in Foster's speech at this convention he particularly attacked a so-called pro-Tito movement in the party.

There has been no talk in the Daily Worker about Tito for months now. In fact, throughout the Communist world today there is now a developing anti-Tito movement all over again—not that Tito is any less of a Communist than he was.

Senator JENNER. I was interested in your ideas on that. In other words, how do you tell the difference between communism, international communism, and national communism?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Words, because when it gets down to cases, where do they stand? The issue has been acceptance of the primacy of the Soviet Communist Party. Jacques Duclos, in his greetings to this Communist Party convention, made it very clear that you have to accept the primacy of the Soviet Communist Party, because they are the experienced fighters, and so on. And it is important to note that the Kremlin, in two of its major ideological organs in January, came out for a full support of the Foster leadership of the Communist Party.

Despite the fact that, for several months before the convention, the Daily Worker and its editor, John Gates, did criticize the Soviet Union, when it came to a showdown, when the chips were down, they went completely with the Foster move.

For example, the magazine Party Life—I am now reading from an article in the Baltimore Sun by Howard Naughton, Moscow correspondent, January 5:

"Party Life is the chief ideological organ of the Soviet Union." It denounced Gates, it said "it comes out against the dictatorship of the proletariat, against the party of the Leninist type," and so on.

On February 4 in the New York Times there was a story that the Soviet—that the magazine called Soviet Russia, has come out against the Gates group and for Foster.

The greetings by Jacques Duclos to the Communist Party convention denounces the revisionists, as they called them, who want to change the Communist Party.

And then we come to the Foster speech. Foster says:

We must not change the Communist Party in any way.

The Gates faction had said:

We want to change the Communist Party and make it a Communist political association,

and Foster won hands down on that.

The next one was to endorse Foster—Foster called for the endorsement of the theoretical base of the Communist movement under its philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. There was going to be a great quarrel, because Marxism-Leninism, the Gates group said, could not always apply it quite the same way to American's different conditions, different customs.

The Gates group accepted the Foster evaluation without change. They said they would be opposed to democratic centralism and monolithic units, it is called, which means one-party dictatorship.

When it came to a showdown they accepted it, the Gates group, always in the interest of unity in the party.

Foster, on the Hungarian question, where the Communist Daily Worker had said:

We stand with the masses of Hungary—
where they said—

We do not condone the Soviet policies in Hungary or those of the Hungarian Communist Party—

when it came to a showdown the resolution that was passed by this convention says:

The imperialists intervened in the Hungarian tragedy—
a complete reversal, accepted in the name of party unity.

Throughout everything that Foster demanded in his speech they came—the Gates group accepted it, always in the interest of national unity, of party unity.

Now, of course, there were debates, there were votes, but I think that was purely to pull the wool over the eyes of the innocents. They had never had debates before, they had never had votes, now they could say, "Look, we had a vote, and it has carried with so many people voting against." But it was, I think, the great hoax of our time, to pull the wool over the eyes of innocents and dupes. And we met some of them who were observers at this Communist Party convention.

I asked one of the observers, whose name I would rather not mention, "Do you think there is now democracy in the Communist Party in America?"

And the answer was, "Sure look at the debates, look at the votes; I think there is more democracy"—note, "more democracy"—the implication being that previously there had been some democracy.

I think that this has been an example, gentlemen, of one of the great fakes of our time, one which we have gone through before. I think the Communist Party is in a spot and has to come out of it. And I think they have succeeded very well, because a lot of people who might have left the Communist Party can now say, "Well, look, here is Gates, he was opposed to a lot of the stuff, but he is staying in the party in the interest of unity, he will fight it out in the party, therefore we can stay in while Gates is there."

That there have been no defections is to me the most interesting thing.

MR. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Beichman, would you say that that is a parallel or counterpart of the situation that prevails in the Soviet Union, the fact that you have a faction that, when the political climate seems to be in one direction, that particular faction, or the person identified with the particular faction within the framework of the

party, is trotted out, as the case may be, in this case general secretary—do you find there is a parallel in that?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir. Until Stalin consolidated his power you did not have differences in the Communist Party in this country. You have had different factions. When Stalin consolidated his power he ran the Communist Party in America, as he ran the Communist Parties of any other part of the world.

Today you have an obvious internal struggle with Khrushchev as the No. 1 and the so-called collective leadership. This immediately reflects itself in the Communist Party here, as it has in other parties, notably that of Great Britain. But they always come back—these are temporary, minor, and relatively insignificant phenomena.

Mr. MORRIS. We had a witness yesterday, Mr. Beichman, Carl Rachlin, who was an official observer, and he said that these differences are tactical differences, he used the expression 4 or 5 times.

Mr. BEICHMAN. Exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. What would you say to that?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Purely tactical difference, and like that famous saying of Earl Browder in 1936, that "Communism is 20th-century Americanism," it has about as much significance as that.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Beichman, we have some testimony available to the committee from a witness who indicated that in his judgment and opinion the so-called final decision to "break with Moscow" was deliberately prearranged, and all of it was done under the direct guidance—as a matter of fact, under Moscow—and that the purpose of the so-called break was to secure a sort of legality and an atmosphere of respectability for this American arm of the Kremlin, but everything else has just stayed put, just as it has always been. What comment would you have on that thought?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Senator, I couldn't say, because I don't know if it was prearranged—I have got no evidence, and I have no information one way or the other.

Senator HRUSKA. What would you say as to its plausibility?

Mr. BEICHMAN. There is a certain amount of plausibility to that. I would still say, however, that undoubtedly there have been differences within the Communist Party, using your words "tactical differences." In other words, "We are losing an election, we are losing a union, we are losing organizations, we are doing it the wrong way, let's try it a different way, maybe if we say we are against what they are doing in Hungary we can attract more people. Maybe if we criticize Khrushchev for being anti-Semitic we can save some of our members who want to leave. Maybe if we are more emphatic on the Negro question we will keep people together in the party more close," and so on. It may be that there were some differences in the Communist Party.

Senator HRUSKA. Would you say that they are superficial, and the underlying basis and the fundamental basis still remains, and that the alliances with the international Communist organizations are still the same?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Absolutely. Their resolutions show this committee that they intend to maintain the closest fraternal relationship, as they say, with Communist Parties throughout the world, despite the dissolution of the Comintern and the Cominform.

Senator HRUSKA. Can you specifically point to some of those resolutions and give us your comments on this?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir.

For example—this is Resolutions Committee No. 5, it doesn't say it is in the Communist Party, it is a mimeographed sheet of paper. But I was handed this by Mr. Gerson, the Communist Party spokesman, at the convention.

Senator HRUSKA. What did he say it was?

Mr. BEICHMAN. He said this was a resolution on relations—I am now quoting:

* * * on relations with other Marxist parties—

et cetera, and that resolution, which was passed by the convention, says:

Serious mistakes and shortcomings in relations between the U. S. S. R. and other Socialist states, as in the examples of Poland and Hungary, have been revealed, and some have been corrected.

It was at that point we tried to ask him, what were the corrections, but we couldn't get any information.

Membership in the national working class or party includes the right and the responsibility to make friendly criticism of brother parties or the actions of Socialist governments. At the same time, it requires that such criticism shall be within the framework of recognition, that the fundamental conflict of all peoples is with the forces of imperialism—

which means us, which means democracies, imperialism being the Aesopian word that they use.

Now, what that means to me is that there will be certain criticisms made—I don't think significant criticisms—certainly in the future, but that the enemy is still democracy, still freedom.

Senator HRUSKA. How many resolutions of that kind were handed to you?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Senator, I haven't counted them, but if you have ever covered a Communist Party convention, you have been drowned in the sea of paper that they hand out.

Senator HRUSKA. Would you care to estimate how many?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Infinity.

Senator HRUSKA. You weren't there long enough to have gotten any—

Mr. BEICHMAN. I have got a suitcase full of nonsecret documents—I would say probably 50, plus draft resolutions and amendments to the draft resolutions, and amendments to the amendments—that goes on and on, if I may, ad nauseam.

Senator HRUSKA. And you have indicated already that nowhere in those resolutions or anywhere else has there been a stand taken which would be in opposition to the so-called Moscow or Kremlin line of communism?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Nowhere.

Senator HRUSKA. Nowhere any opposition?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Not only that, but they have reemphasized their position, so that there is no misunderstanding—they have reemphasized their position on things like the class struggle, for example.

Now, there had been some talk in the Daily Worker that there is no real class struggle, perhaps, in the United States, so maybe we have to use a different approach. But Foster told them off. He talked

about the sharpening class struggle in the United States, and they accepted it in his formulation.

One of the cute things is that the Daily Worker has been saying that "we are not for violent revolutions, we believe in the constitutional road to socialism."

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there a general secretary of the party?

Mr. BEICHMAN. No. Technically there are no officers, they are all acting.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you account for that?

Mr. BEICHMAN. I think perhaps a lawyer who knows the Smith Act could account for it, better than I can. Technically, they are in no position to elect, because they only elect at their convention 20 members of their national committee. They have to elect 40 more by States—in other words, to make a total of 60—and presumably, when they elect those 60, they would elect the officers.

Senator JENNER. May I ask, were you permitted to see who came and went to the convention? You were off in an anteroom, you say?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes. In fact, we had a rather amusing incident.

We were off in a press room about half the size of this one, with perhaps 30 to 40 photographers and reporters—it was even smaller than this one—and half of that was closed off by a screen about 6 feet high, behind which there were typists—we could hear typing going on. And we were never allowed back there.

At one point, I got very curious to see what was behind those screens. So I got up on a chair and stood up. And I could see that it led into a little hallway. And I figured that that hallway led into the meeting room on my left. As I stood up there, I saw Eugene Dennis, whom I recognized, standing probably about 25 feet away. And I turned to one of the reporters who was standing on the floor, and I said: "Gee, there is Eugene Dennis standing there."

So he got up on the chair and said, "Where?"

And I pointed, "There is Dennis in the hallway."

There was a Communist watchdog standing by the screen to prevent us from going through, and he saw us standing on the chairs, and he heard me say, "There is Dennis," and he quickly ran up to the corridor and closed the drapes. And somebody said, "There goes the Iron Curtain."

Senator JENNER. Did you see Mr. Foster?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes; just once.

Senator JENNER. How close were you to him?

Mr. BEICHMAN. He came out of the meeting room—in the street.

Senator JENNER. To your knowledge, was he there at the convention every day?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Every day, I don't know.

Senator JENNER. He was at the convention?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator JENNER. Would you say that he was so ill that he wasn't able to stand a trial, yet he could conduct a Communist meeting in New York?

Mr. BEICHMAN. I think doctors can answer that question far better—he looked to me like he was breathing, and the body was warm—I don't mean to be flippant—

Senator JENNER. For several years he has been too sick to stand trial, but he is not too sick to conduct a Communist meeting in New York.

Mr. BEICHMAN. I didn't mean to be flippant with you, Senator, but that was a question that occurred to us in New York, but we had no means of judging, since we weren't actually present at the meeting. We were told many times that he was so tired that he wasn't in the meeting room himself, we were told it by Mr. Gerson, and now I have passed the message.

Mr. MORRIS. One of these headlines that I read to you at the beginning of the hearing was that the United States Reds had quit Foster and the Kremlin. Now, had the United States Reds quit Foster?

Mr. BEICHMAN. No. Foster is, I think, the major power in the Communist Party—there may be people who are secret operators, I don't know, but Foster's speech today is the Communist Party line, and it hadn't changed—

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you say that?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Because the resolutions adopted by the convention are based on Foster's speech. And I think his speech is the answer to what happened.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that the speech that Foster made was the basis of the resolutions that were finally adopted?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you give us some examples?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Foster said:

We must reaffirm the continued existence of the Communist Party. It is the main single thing the convention must accomplish.

The first day of the convention the Communist Party passed a resolution which said—I am now quoting from the resolution adopted at the morning session of February 10—

1. That this convention go on record to affirm the continuation of the Communist Party of the United States. Our chief task is to strengthen, rebuild, and consolidate the Communist Party and overcome its isolation.

That this convention opposes the transformation of the party into a political or educational association.

And then, since there had been some opposition from the so-called Gates faction, they said that this, the first two points, should not close the door to all constructive exploration and discussion of the subjects as may be, repeat, as may be organized by the incoming national committee.

Now, when you deal with the Communist movement you have to play games with words, too, because they never quite mean what they say, and you have to interpret what they say. I think there isn't going to be very much debate in the Communist Party from here on in as to whether there should be a Communist political association, or changing the name, or anything else.

This is just a sop that was thrown in to satisfy some of the opposition. The party is still the party, still the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, wasn't there a speech made by William Z. Foster on November 26 that forecast many of the things that took place?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that.

Mr. BEICHMAN. Foster was very critical about the Gates faction, and spoke in very harsh terms about the attempt to transform the Communist Party into what he called—here is what he said:

The Communist Party of the United States cannot be some vague "Marxist"—[in quotation] "Marxist"—party without a real theoretical basis. It must be founded solidly upon the general principles of Marxism-Leninism skillfully adopted to the American scene.

That is what happened, no change.

The New York State Communist Party, which probably has half the membership, and probably half the delegates to the convention, had called as late as January 3 of this year for changing the Communist Party name and turning it into a nonparty political action association. That was thrown out the window. But they could have debated it, maybe.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Beichman, yesterday, in connection with the last statement you made, Mr. Rachlin who was there as a nonofficial representative, said that of the 40 delegates there were 11 from New York. How many delegates were there altogether?

Mr. BEICHMAN. 298, or 300—let's say roughly 300, it varied, and 298 was the figure they finally used.

Mr. MORRIS. They had a large group, did they not, of 40 that were formally elected to be the delegates?

Mr. BEICHMAN. No, they elected 20 and 40 are to be elected in coming months by the State Communist Party. So it will be a total of 60 when they have elected their full roster of central committee members.

Mr. MORRIS. Were their indentities known, the 40 to be elected?

How about the delegates who attended from the various States in the Union?

Mr. BEICHMAN. They didn't give any names.

Mr. MORRIS. They didn't give any names?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Just the people you saw that you knew—Steve Nelson, Foster, Dennis, Gerson, et cetera—the people that were open Communists that you knew, you could recognize. Claude Lightfoot was there, I recognized him, Fred Fine, Sid Stein, and others, whom you could recognize from photographs in the Daily Worker, and so on.

Senator HRUSKA. Were you given the names of the 20 who were elected to this committee?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir, they were made public in the newspaper, you have the clipping.

Senator HRUSKA. You were not given the names of those who generally attended the convention?

Mr. BEICHMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I alluded to the information that was being supplied to the subcommittee by a man whom we described as someone who was moving among the Communists and was accepted by them. He came in yesterday afternoon, and he was sworn, and testified to, and affirmed some of the information he had given us as true facts.

One thing in particular, the thing that Senator Hruska mentioned today, I think I would like to read into the record in its total. But I would like to point out that he bases this not on any word that he received from Moscow—that is the point you said you didn't know

about—but on the basis of his own observation from talking to some of the Communist leaders who accepted it. I would like to read this into the record.

Senator JENNER. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Because of certain facts which came to my attention, it was possible for me to submit in my recent statement to the committee a forecast—

By the way, Senator, he told us that there were going to be no officers elected at this convention in December, and he has given us an estimate as to who the men were who were going to be elected—and who was going to be elected secretary-general—but I think I had better not put that into the record at this time—

My recent statement to the committee was a forecast of the character and tone, as well as a suggested analysis of specific decisions, public and private pronouncements of the recent CPUSA convention several months before it took place. The convention itself confirms my previous statement that the controversies and final decisions to “break with Moscow” were all deliberately prearranged, and what is even more sinister, all of it was done under the direct guidance of and with the approval of the Kremlin. To accomplish this result the Kremlin played upon real convictions and differences of opinion on the part of leaders and rank and file in the American party over an 11-month period and achieved their final desired result in the recent “unity” convention. It is unimportant that certain principal participants in the convention did not and still do not know that they were pawns in a Kremlin-controlled farce. The purpose of the so-called break with Moscow and the avowed abandonment of force and violence, along with one-party dictatorship, et cetera, as a path to a “socialist America,” by democratic means, is to secure legality for the American arm of the Kremlin in order to build a large mass party out of the present decimated organization within the next 2 years.

Mr. Beichman, have you noticed any deterioration of hard-core Communist power in the labor unions that you are conversant with?

Mr. BEICHMAN. I think the answer to that question is yes that they are trying to get into the trade-union movement in America—well, that is history, it goes back to 1920, when Lenin said in his book *Left Wing Communism*, and I quote:

We must resort to all stratagems, maneuvers, illegal methods, evasions, and subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on Communist work within them at all costs.

There is no question that this is their intent. Their draft resolution on trade unionism made it very clear that they intend to be more active, more skillfully active, if you will, than they had been before.

Their resolution, about 7,000 words, is a confession of complete defeat. They were mistaken in this and they were mistaken in that. But now they are going to do it more intelligently.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the background of the particular question I asked Mr. Beichman, the subcommittee in its analysis of the Communist strength in labor unions during the last year, as you know, will be reflected in the forthcoming annual report, when you look at specific reserves of power that the Communists had control over the last few years, you will see that there was no break in their actual power, even though the overall prestige that you refer to, Mr. Beichman, is on the decline because of the international situation and the breaks within their own organization.

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Now, as some one who is following the labor movement on a day-to-day basis, as you have stated, have you noticed that there is any break in Communist power as opposed to Communist prestige in the labor movement in the last 2 or 3 years? I don't know about before that, the situation was very different.

MR. BEICHMAN. You mean—let's say in the midforties and up to say, 1948, 1949, and 1950, of course they did have a very major role, because they had officers, and they controlled unions. At one point they had probably 10 unions in which their officers, Communists, avowed Communist Party members, were in charge. That obviously is not the case. There isn't a Communist in the AFL-CIO executive council out of 29 men. Out of those 29 men I would say you have 29 good, solid, tough, knowledgeable anti-Communists, from George Meany down, men who have gone through the battle with the Communist movement, and have licked it in their unions.

On a local level, certainly, you have Communists who have penetrated. But I think they are being watched very carefully.

MR. MORRIS. I am sorry, Mr. Beichman, I didn't mean in the AFL-CIO trade union, I don't mean that, but in the unions that the Communists controlled, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.

MR. BEICHMAN. Harry Bridges, the Mining and Smelter Workers, the Electrical workers, yes.

MR. MORRIS. In all those unions that the Communists do control as a result of the developments of the last 2 or 3 years, have there been any defections?

MR. BEICHMAN. No, sir.

MR. MORRIS. Because we are searching out defections, and we have those particular three unions under careful study before the subcommittee.

MR. BEICHMAN. There has been no defection.

MR. MORRIS. And we can find no diminution of their power, and, in fact, in many cases they are extending that power.

MR. BEICHMAN. Exactly.

MR. MORRIS. I wonder if, as an official observer, you could tell us something about that?

MR. BEICHMAN. I think in the three unions that I have referred to, their power is just as great as it ever was. And I think that industry must bear some burden of responsibility in this area, if I may intrude a comment.

I think what is important is what they are going to do now about the trade union movement. And I refer you to the Daily Worker of January 20, where George Morris, its labor writer, said:

Only very recently has there been stronger and more consistent effort on the part of progressives—

I interpolate here that "progressives" means Communists and fellow travelers in Daily Worker parlance—

progressives to establish their rights and make their contributions within the conservatively led unions. It can be expected that, following the convention of the Communist Party, and revival of their influence and activity, the worker progressives in the labor movement will reach a still higher level.

They are not going to give up, because the trade union movement is the major base that they must have. Without control of the trade union movement they cannot seize power. In Czechoslovakia they first had to suborn the trade union movement, and then they came to power.

Senator HRUSKA. As a matter of fact, they made that evident in Hungary, too.

Mr. BEICHMAN. Exactly that, I was going to say that; it was the trade unions in Hungary and the workers who rose up on October 23. And one of the first actions they took was to announce that they were going to withdraw from the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions, and they would seek to join the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. That was the first thing.

In a sense, it is a revelation of the bankruptcy of the Communist ideology that the revolution in Hungary came from the workers and the intellectuals—10 years of Communist propaganda, 10 years of brainwashing, had no effect, they rose up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think that as far as the session that we have had previous to this with Mr. Beichman is concerned, I have pretty generally covered the field that he has indicated he is prepared to talk about.

Is that right, Mr. Beichman?

Mr. BEICHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And I am speaking for myself, knowing Mr. Beichman and asking him to come down here, we arranged the schedule for him to come, and I want to thank him for coming.

Do you have any more questions, Senator?

Senator HRUSKA. No more, except to join in the expression of appreciation to you for your coming here at this time and giving us this very valuable information.

Mr. BEICHMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was done in connection with the coming hearings, we have asked Mr. Eugene Dennis to testify—in fact, he has been subpoenaed to testify—I have arranged so that he will be here at 1:45 for an executive session on Monday afternoon, and we will have an open session at approximately 2:15. And after that—now, one thing we have been straining to do, Senator, I would like to have the record show—is to find a defector from the Communist Party who would be willing to testify. And we find it is very difficult.

We have one man who broke—I can't think of the date—in 1949 or 1950, and who hasn't testified before a congressional committee before, although he has testified before the SACB, and he said that he will testify on the basis of his interpretation of the Communist Party convention and what it means.

The reason we want someone who has been in the party is that by virtue of that fact he is qualified to testify.

Mr. BEICHMAN. I wanted to enter in again for just a moment to try to clean this up.

I hold here two clippings, one an A. P. Dispatch, and one a U. P. Dispatch, both from Moscow. The A. P. Dispatch is headed "U. S. Reds' Stand Hailed by Pravda." And the U. P. Dispatch says, "Pravda Hails U. S. Reds." And Pravda says, it hailed the Commu-

nist Party in the United States for remaining loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

I think that about closes that question of whether they are independent of Moscow or not.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the fact that Pravda applauded the stand that they took——

Mr. BEICHMAN. In a very friendly way, no criticisms, "Bless you and go and do your good work."

Senator HRUSKA. If that is all, the meeting is adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
The Hague, Netherlands, January 4, 1957.

DEAR SIR: The enclosed paper on legal aspects of summary trial procedure in Hungary supplements the information given and views expressed in the papers published by the Commission on November 16 and December 7. The Commission considers that it is important to appreciate the extent of the powers given to the Kadar regime under the decrees discussed in this paper and the threat which they must present to established conceptions of justice recognized by all nations with developed legal systems.

The Commission does not however claim to have full information on the extent to which these powers have been exercised; the object of this paper is to make clear that the passing of these decrees constitutes a breach of a treaty and of conventions to which Hungary and the Soviet Union were parties. Although there are some indications that in its very grave economic situation the Kadar regime has hesitated to use the powers of summary trial to the fullest extent, nevertheless it is in the view of the Commission important to establish as fully as possible the legal background against which the historic events in Hungary have developed.

This paper may be reprinted in whole or in part or used as the basis of comment without further reference to the Commission but it would be appreciated if the name of the Commission was given in connection with any use made of this summary and a copy of the relevant article or news item sent to the Commission.

Yours truly,

A. J. M. VAN DAL,
Vice President, International Commission of Jurists.

SUMMARY TRIALS IN HUNGARY

1. Recent decrees and laws passed by the Kadar regime in Hungary must be profoundly disturbing to members of the legal profession throughout the world, who are concerned to ensure that accused persons in criminal trials are accorded the safeguards recognized in all developed systems of law. Furthermore, it would appear that in certain aspects these decrees and laws constitute a violation both of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947,¹ and of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were ratified by the Hungarian Peoples Republic² and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. The relevant decrees and laws are set out in full in an annex to this paper. They may be summarized as follows:

A. Decree-Law of November 10, 1956 (hereinafter called Decree A).³ This authorizes the Procurator's department to present a prosecution before the court in a wide range of offenses:⁴

(i) without submitting a bill of indictment.

(ii) without the issue of summons or fixing of a day for hearing by the court.

¹This Treaty was concluded by U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, U. S. A., Australia, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia with Hungary at Paris on February 10, 1947.

²English text: Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne, vol. I.

³Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, November 10, 1956, 14.00 hrs (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, part II B, No. 777, November 15, 1956, pp. 8-9).

⁴These include "murder, wilful manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, any kind of crime committed by the unlawful use of firearms, including the attempt to commit the aforesaid crimes."

These powers are limited not only to cases where the accused was caught *flagrante delicto* but also extend to any case where "the Procurator's department can submit immediately the necessary evidence to the Court." The Prosecutor's department is specifically authorized to rely merely on a verbal presentation of the charge at the trial. It would appear that under this procedure the accused may have no foreknowledge of the offense with which he is charged and can have no adequate opportunity to prepare his defense.

B. Decree-Law of December 9, 1956, amended December 12, 1956 (hereinafter called Decree B).⁵ This empowers Military Courts to try the offenses listed in Decree A and adds to the list certain other offenses, notably the failure to report knowledge of the possession of firearms by third parties, other than next of kin. The appointment of other courts of summary jurisdiction by the Presidential Council of the Republic is also authorized by this Decree. The amendment of December 12 provides a mandatory death sentence for offenses specified in Decree A and B. Thus, a person tried in accordance with the procedure laid down under Decree A stands in peril of his life with virtually no provision for his defense.

C. Decree of December 15, 1956 (hereinafter called Decree C).⁶ This regulates in greater detail the composition and powers of Military Courts. This Decree exempts certain categories of accused (persons who are suffering from serious illness or who are insane, as well as pregnant women) from the jurisdiction of Military Courts and limits the sentence on those under 20 to imprisonment. It also envisages the substitution of imprisonment for the death sentence "if the reestablishment of peace and order no longer requires the imposition of the death penalty." But this Decree provides that there shall be no appeal except by way of revision⁷ and a petition for clemency can only be made by a unanimous decision of the court; failing such leave the death sentence has to be carried out within two hours. In view of the latter provision it is not unfair to suggest that no serious miscarriage of justice, should it occur, could be rectified, except posthumously.

D. Decree-Law of December 20 (hereinafter called Decree D). This in effect, reintroduced the system, abolished by Imre Nagy in 1953,⁸ whereby the Procurator's department on the recommendation of the police can order detention without trial for a period not exceeding six months.

3. The situation created by the above Decrees is not the exclusive concern of the Hungarian government but must be considered in the light of international conventions and treaties binding on Hungary.

A. The Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947. Part II, section 1, article 2, provides *inter alia* that "Hungary shall take all measures necessary to secure all persons under Hungarian jurisdiction * * * the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms."

Although the precise meaning to be given to this article is a matter of interpretation, it clearly constitutes a legal obligation, which is to be inferred from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Roumania.⁹ In interpreting this article it is not possible directly to rely so far as criminal justice is concerned, on the provisions of Articles 9-11 of the Universal Declara-

⁵ Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, December 9 and 12, 1956 (BBC Summary, loc. cit., No. 785, December 13, 1956, p. 4 and No. 786, December 18, 1956, p. 2).

⁶ Radio Budapest, December 15, 1956; German translation in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, December 17, 1956, p. 1.

⁷ Article 10: the appeal by way of revision is a characteristic of the countries which followed the Soviet system. In Hungary the revision can only be initiated by the Procurator or the President of the Supreme Court and is heard by the Supreme Court (Sec. 225 of the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure 1951: III tv. amended under Law 1954 V tv. 8). Cf. Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe, Washington, D. C., November 1956, p. 360.

⁸ Resolution No. 1034/1953 (VII.26) Mt. h. published in *Törvények és Rendeletek Hivatalos Gyűjteménye*, 1953, p. 193 (also in *Nepszava*, July 26, 1953) English translation: Highlights, loc. cit., October 1953, No. 5, p. 10.

⁹ Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania (Second Phase): Advisory Opinion of July 18, 1950, p. 228. In this Opinion the Court held that although the Governments of those countries were legally bound to carry out the provisions of the Peace Treaties relating to settlement of disputes, including the appointment of their representatives to the Commissions provided for by the treaties, the Secretary General of the United Nations was not authorized to make such appointments after the parties refused to do so. Judges Read and Azevodo dissenting. Judge Krylov concurred with the opinion but was unable to concur with the reasons dealing with the problem of international responsibility as these in his opinion went beyond the scope of his request for opinion.

tion of Human Rights, 1948,¹⁰ or on Articles 5-6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.¹¹ Nevertheless it is well established in interpreting treaties that reference may be made to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" a source of law specifically recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is difficult to conceive that these principles would be held not to include: Freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 9; European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5 (1).

The right of the accused to be informed of any criminal charge preferred (European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 5 (2), 6 (3) (a)).

The right of the accused to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11, 1; European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 (3) (b)).

It is significant that the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), which has been consistently supported by the U. S. S. R. and by other Eastern European countries, in the findings of its Committee on Penal Procedure (Brussels Conference, May 1956), attended among others by leading Soviet and Hungarian lawyers, include *inter alia* the above-mentioned rights among the elements necessary "in a system of criminal procedure to preserve the rights of the individual." (The text of the findings is set out in the annex to this paper.) Indeed in some respects the Committee goes further in requiring:

From the moment of arrest every accused must have the right to consult with his legal advisers without surveillance (Report of Committee on Penal Procedure, Article 5 (c)).

There must be at least one appeal in all criminal proceedings (*ibid.*, article 7).

No state of emergency abrogating these principles shall be permitted in time of peace (*ibid.*, article 9).

It is therefore submitted:

1. that the words "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms" in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947, must be interpreted as including the above-mentioned rights of accused persons in criminal trials.

2. that the decrees and laws of the Hungarian Government particularized above are in breach of section 1, article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947.

B. Geneva Conventions of 1949. The views of the International Commission of Jurists on the application of these Conventions to the present situation in Hungary were fully discussed in the paper entitled "The Hungarian Situation in the Light of the Geneva Conventions of 1949" published on December 7th, 1956.

This Commission considered that certain provisions of the Conventions were applicable to the Hungarian situation whether the conflict were to be regarded as "internal" or "international."

(i) If it is regarded as "internal" then "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, afforded all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" is prohibited (Art. 3, Convention IV).

For the reasons above given and from the explicit wording of Decrees A, B, C, and D above cited, it is evident in the view of the International Commission of Jurists that they do not afford such guarantees and therefore, that the Kadar régime is in breach of the Convention.

(ii) If, on the other hand, it is regarded as an "international conflict" it is firstly relevant to note the provisions of Article 47 of Convention IV: "Protected persons" * * * shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention * * * by any agreement between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power * * *. It must follow that, if the Government of the Occupied Power, introduces measures at the instance of the Occupying Power, such measures are subject to the provisions of the Conventions dealing with the administration of justice by the Occupying Power.

¹⁰ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is neither a treaty nor an international agreement and is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation. (See Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, 1950, p. 399.)

¹¹ The European Convention on Human Rights was signed on November 4, 1950, by the members of the Council of Europe, and came into force in 1953 after ratification by 10 countries. Neither Hungary nor the U. S. S. R. are parties to this Convention.

These provisions deal separately with the protection of civilian persons and with members of the armed forces.

(a) As far as civilian persons are concerned, it is sufficient to mention articles 71-73 of Convention IV which provide for "regular trial" and give the accused person the rights of defence and of appeal.

(b) As far as members of the armed forces are concerned, a term which includes both members of organized resistance movements and inhabitants who carry arms openly to resist the invading forces (Article 4A of Convention III) the following provisions of Convention III protect those who fall into the hands of the enemy:—

Detained persons are entitled to be tried by independent and impartial courts the procedure of which affords the accused the rights of defence and appeal (Articles 84, 99, 105 and 106 of Convention III).

The fact that the Decrees of the Kadar régime do not afford accused persons such rights as are provided under the Conventions both to civilian persons and members of the armed forces has been sufficiently demonstrated in paragraph 2 of this paper.

Annex A

DECREE-LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE¹²

(November 14, 1956)

Article 1. (i) In cases of murder, wilful manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, and any kind of crime committed by the unlawful use of firearms, including the attempt to commit the aforesaid crimes, the Prosecutor's Office may take the perpetrator to court, without submitting a Bill of Indictment, if the perpetrator has been caught in the act, or if the Prosecutor's Office can submit immediately the necessary evidence to the court.

(ii) Under (i) above the Court will not fix a date for the hearing nor issue summonses. The Prosecutor's Office will present the indictment verbally during the trial. It is the duty of the Prosecutor's Office to see that witnesses and experts appear in court, and that other evidence is submitted to it.

Article 2. This Decree-Law becomes effective on the day of its promulgation.

ISTVAN DOBI,

President of the Presidential Council.

ISTVAN KRISTOF,

Secretary to the Presidential Council.

Annex B

DECREE ON SUMMARY JURISDICTION¹³

(December 9, 1956)

Article 1. The Presidential Council of the People's Republic proclaims Summary Jurisdiction over the whole territory of the country, starting at 18.00 hours [local time] on 11th December, as regards the following crimes: murder, wilful manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, crimes committed by wilfully damaging enterprises of public interest or enterprises producing vital supplies for the population, attempts to commit any of these crimes, and the possession without license of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Article 2. Those who have in their possession firearms, ammunition, explosives etc. without license must hand them over to one of the organs of the armed forces of public order by 18.00 hours on 11th December 1956. Those who hand over their arms etc. between the promulgation of this Decree-Law and the date fixed for the handing over cannot be punished for hiding arms.

Article 3. (i) Conspiracy with the object of committing the crimes mentioned in Article 1, and organisatory steps taken to commit such crimes are subject to summary judicial procedure.

(ii) Those who obtain credible knowledge of other persons possessing firearms, ammunition etc. without license, and do not report this [two words indistinct] to the authorities, commit a crime and are subject to summary jurisdiction. This decree is not applicable to their next-of-kin.

¹² Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, November 10, 1956, 14.00 hrs (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part II B, No. 777, November 15, 1956, p. 8-9).

¹³ Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, December 9 and 12, 1956 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, No. 785, December 13, 1956, p. 4).

Article 4. The Government will take steps to promulgate this Decree-Law. The promulgation can be made also through the Press, radio and posters. The procedure under summary jurisdiction comes under the competence of the Military Courts, but the Presidential Council of the Republic may take steps to appoint other courts of summary jurisdiction also. The Presidential Council of the Republic authorises the Government to define the rules of summary jurisdiction in detail.

Article 5. This Decree-Law enters into force on the day of its promulgation.

ISTVAN DOBI,
President of the Presidential Council.
ISTVAN KRISTOF,
Secretary to the Presidential Council.

AMENDMENT TO DECREE ON SUMMARY JURISDICTION ¹⁴

(December 12, 1956)

The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic is amending its Decree-Law concerning Summary Jurisdiction as follows:

The third paragraph of the basic Decree ends with the following clause: If the accused is declared guilty by the summary court of justice on any of the charges falling within the categories of summary process, the verdict at the same time involves the imposition of the death sentence. The amendment comes into force at the time of its promulgation.

ISTVAN DOBI,
Chairman of the Presidential Council.
ISTVAN KRISTOF,
Secretary of the Presidential Council.

Annex C

DECREE ON MARTIAL LAW ¹⁵

(December 15, 1956)

Article 1. The application of this law belongs to the competency of the military courts, but the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic reserves the right to itself, to designate also other courts.

Article 2. The court-martial shall be composed of one professional judge and two people's assessors.

Article 3. Every person who is to be tried by a court-martial has to be taken into custody.

Article 4. Only those accused who were found in flagranti or whose guilt can be proved before the court may be referred to a court-martial.

Article 5. Persons who are insane or seriously ill as well as pregnant women must in no event be referred to a court-martial.

Article 6. The duration of the trial may in no case exceed three times 24 hours. If the appointed time cannot be observed, the case has to be transferred to an ordinary court.

Article 7. The court-martial proclaims the death sentence in case it is convinced that the accused committed the crime on account of which he has to appear before the court-martial.

Article 8. The court-martial may impose imprisonment for from six to fifteen years, if the re-establishment of peace and order does no longer require the imposition of the death penalty.

Article 9. The accused can by no means be sentenced to death in case he is less than 20 years old. In such a case a sentence to imprisonment for from 10 to 15 years shall be pronounced, and if the accused is under 18 years of age, imprisonment for from 5 to 10 years shall be imposed.

Article 10. Persons sentenced by a court-martial are entitled to lodge an appeal only in case the trial is revised.

Article 11. After the sentence is pronounced the court has to decide immediately on the filing of a petition for clemency. Such a decision can only be taken unanimously.

¹⁴ Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, December 9 and 12, 1956 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, No. 786, December 18, 1956, p. 2).

¹⁵ Radio Budapest, December 15, 1956: German translation in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, December 17, 1956, p. 1.

Article 12. In case the court-martial refuses to file a petition for clemency, capital punishment has to be executed within two hours.

Annex D

DECREE ON DETENTION FOR PUBLIC SECURITY¹⁶

(December 20, 1956)

A decree issued by the Presidential Council said that "persons whose activity or behaviour endanger public order, especially production, can be placed under detention for public security. On suggestion of police authorities the State Prosecutor can order detention which will be carried out by the police."

The Chief Prosecutor must investigate the case of the detained person within 30 days and internment can last a maximum of six months. The decree is valid for one year.

The decree did not mention internment, but used instead the expression "detention for public security." It was not published in the government press which is on sale to the population, but only in the official gazette which has a very limited circulation.

Annex E

SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS,
BRUSSELS, MAY 1956

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON PENAL PROCEDURE

On the basis of the discussion there was general agreement on the elements requiring to be present in a system of criminal procedure to preserve the rights of the individual. This agreement was reached by lawyers from different countries and different social systems. These elements and the suggestions agreed by the Committee to them are set out below :

1. *Nullum crimen sine lege*

We have observed with regret many infringements of this principle in which we re-affirm our belief. We consider that the doctrine of analogy ought not to form part of any procedure and that offences should be clearly stated. In particular, we reject the conception of collective punishment.

2. *The need for the accused to be brought to trial speedily*

(a) The period from time of arrest to appearance before a magistrate or judicial functionary should not exceed 48 hours.

(b) To ensure this there must be effective legal sanction, civil or criminal and unjustified detention should give a right to an action for damages.

(c) During the preliminary investigation the accused must not be kept in detention more than three months without the permission of the Court after public hearing of the parties.

3. *Fair trial*

(a) It is desirable that Courts of first instance should contain a lay element appointed on democratic principles.

(b) No punishment involving deprivation of liberty to be imposed except by a judicial tribunal.

4. *No discrimination against the accused*

There shall be no discrimination in the forms of penal procedure or punishment for reasons of race, religion, class, or any other cause. This point arises because in some legal systems, particularly in colonial countries, sections of its population are tried by a procedure which provides less guarantees than those afforded by the procedure to which other members of its population are subject.

5. *Right of defense*

(a) An accused without means shall be entitled to effective legal aid and representation by a qualified lawyer of his own choice before all tribunals without exception.

(b) That the accused and his Counsel shall have the same rights at the hearing as has the prosecution.

¹⁶ As reported by Associated Press, Budapest, December 20, 1956.

(c) From the moment of arrest every accused must have the right to consult with his legal advisers without surveillance.

(d) That in countries where the preliminary investigation is in private defending counsel should be entitled to be present with the accused at all stages of the preliminary investigation and to have access to the prosecution dossier before the examination or confrontation of the accused.

(e) Lawyers should not be subjected to prosecution or pressure because of their professional status on behalf of their clients.

6. Proof

(a) A confession particularly made to the police must be corroborated by independent evidence before it can be the basis of a conviction. Evidence of an accomplice also requires corroboration by independent evidence.

(b) Conviction must be based only on facts proved in evidence.

(c) No arrested person shall be subject to any physical pressure, threats, or promises calculated to produce a statement.

7. Appeal

There must be at least one appeal in all criminal proceedings.

8. Punishment

(a) Corporal punishment should be abolished.

(b) The death penalty should be abolished in time of peace.

9. State of emergency

No state of emergency abrogating these principles shall be permitted in time of peace.

We consider that one of the strongest guarantees of the application of these principles is to assure full and fair publicity for all criminal proceedings with the exception of those involving state secrets or matters of serious indecency.

We put forward these proposals as minimum suggestions only in the belief that their adoption would involve significant advances in nearly every criminal procedure throughout the world. We urge all lawyers to do whatever they can to secure their implementation in their own countries.

APPENDIX I-A

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
The Hague, Netherlands, December 7, 1956.

For immediate use

DEAR SIR: The enclosed paper on "The Hungarian Situation in the Light of Geneva Conventions of 1949," summarizes the international law governing the actions of Soviet forces and the Hungarian Government in Hungary. It supplements the paper on "Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression" published by the Commission on November 16, 1956.

It may be reprinted in whole or in part or used as the basis of comment without further reference to the Commission, but it would be appreciated if the name of the Commission was given in connection with any use made of this summary and a copy of the relevant article or news item sent to the Commission.

Yours truly,

NORMAN S. MARSH,
Secretary-General, International Commission of Jurists.

THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949

The reports from Hungary about mass arrests, summary trial,¹⁷ deportations,¹⁸ and other measures which are alleged to have infringed the Rule of Law have attracted worldwide attention.

¹⁷ Cf. Decree on criminal procedure of November 10, 1956 (Radio Budapest, November 10, 1956, 14.00 hours, as monitored in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part II B, No. 777/1956/, pp. 8-9, with text of Decree).

¹⁸ Cf. Report of Radio Budapest, November 14, 1956, 15.00 hours (BBC, The Monitoring Report, No. 5, 200/November 15, 1956/, p. 1), as well as the case of Imre Nagy and his group. According to several testimonials of Hungarian refugees, camps of deportees exist in Soviet Carpatho-Ukraine.

The present Government of Hungary contends that the national uprising suppressed by Soviet armed forces is an internal affair of Hungary. The Soviet Union holds the same view.

It is, however, to be remembered that there are rules of international law which apply even if the conflict in question is merely a civil war. These rules are laid down in the Geneva Conventions for the protection of the victims of war,¹⁹ concluded in 1949 and ratified among others by the Soviet Union,²⁰ and by the Hungarian People's Republic.²¹

The obligations entered into by the signatories of the Convention depend on the character of the conflict, and are more specific if it is an international conflict and less detailed if it is an internal one.

I. OBLIGATIONS IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT

If it is assumed that the conflict is an internal one, the parties are bound to apply among others the following provisions at least:

Persons taking no active part in the hostilities shall be treated humanely. The following acts in particular are prohibited:

"(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;

"(b) taking of hostages;

"(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

"(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guaranties which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" (Art. 3, Convention IV).

During the negotiations the Soviet Union supported²² a draft approved by the XVIIth International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in August 1948²³ which served as a basis for discussion at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in 1949. This text reads:

"In all cases of armed conflict not of an international character * * * the Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present Convention [i. e., as a whole, not only Art. 3 mentioned above], subject to the adverse party likewise acting in obedience thereto."

When this text met with opposition on the part of a number of government delegates, the Soviet Union introduced the following version of the provision:

"* * * The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present Convention which guarantee: humane treatment of the civilian population; prohibition within the territory occupied * * * of reprisals against the civilian population, the taking of hostages, * * * damage to property * * * prohibition of any discriminatory treatment of the civilian population * * *,"²⁴

The delegate from Hungary also favoured as wide as possible an application of the Convention to civil wars:

"The essential aim of the Conference was to extend the field of action of the Convention as much as possible for the protection of the victims of conflict."²⁵

II. INTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT?

The view that events in Hungary represent merely an internal conflict has no basis in international or Hungarian law. It is the considered view of the

¹⁹ Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (hereafter called Convention I).

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereafter called Convention II).

Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter called Convention III).

Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereafter called Convention IV).

²⁰ The Belorussian and Ukrainian Republics are also signatories of the Conventions.

²¹ English text: Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949. Berne (hereafter cited Record), Vol. I; French text: Actes de la Conférence diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Berne, Tome I; Russian text: Zhenyevskie konventsii o zashchite zherty voyny, Izdanie Vedomostei Verchoynogo Soveta SSSR (publication of Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), Moscow, 1954, 219 pp.; German text: Bundesgesetzblatt, Bonn, Teil II, S. 781 ff.; Die Genfer Abkommen zum Schutz der Kriegsgesopfer vom 12 August 1949 hrsg. vom Deutschen Roten Kreuz, 2 Aufl., Bonn 1953.

²² Cf. Record, Vol. IIB, pp. 13-14, 34, 37, 42, 44, 47, 76, 93, 325-327.

²³ Art. 2, par. 4, of the Draft. Text: Record, Vol. I, p. 113.

²⁴ Amendment of the Soviet Union, July 21, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex Nr. 15, p. 28). Corresponding amendments for the other Conventions.

²⁵ Joint Committee, First meeting, April 26, 1949 (Record, Vol. IIB, p. 11).

International Commission of Jurists that the events in Hungary amount to an international conflict with two adverse parties—the Hungarian nation on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other side. The reasons for this view are as follows:

1. The suppression of the national uprising in Hungary constitutes an aggression in the sense of the Soviet definition of aggression proposed to the United Nations in 1953 (cf. the paper "Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression," released by the International Commission of Jurists, November 16, 1956).

2. The overthrow of the Nagy government and the setting up of the Kadar regime was effected with the help of Soviet armed forces and constitute an "indirect aggression" in the sense of the Definition just mentioned.

3. The request for military assistance made by the Kadar government was therefore not valid under international law.

4. The request was also invalid in Hungarian constitutional law. The armed attack began before the Kadar regime was in power. Five days later—on November 9—a constitutional amendment was enacted to legalize subsequently the existence and the acts of the Kadar government.²⁶

5. The request, even if validly made, could have had no legal effect on the application of the Convention, since Art. 47 of Convention IV stipulates:

"Protected persons * * * shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present convention * * * by any agreement between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power. * * *"

The Soviet and Hungarian Governments are therefore under a legal duty to carry out those obligations which the Geneva Conventions provide for cases of an international conflict.

III. OBLIGATIONS IN AN "INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT"

The obligations apply to all cases of armed conflict between two or more of the Parties as well as "to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance" (Art. 2/2/2/2).²⁷

The obligations of the signatory states in such cases include among others:

A. *With respect to all Victims of War*

The provisions mentioned under this heading "cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based in particular on * * * political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by the war" (Art. 13).²⁸

1. Particular protection of the wounded and children (Art. 16–22, 24).

2. Allowing free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and, if intended for children and mothers, also of essential foodstuffs, clothing, and tonics (Art. 23).²⁹

3. Allowing family correspondence and facilitating enquiries made by members of dispersed families (Art. 25, 26).

B. *With respect to Civilian Persons*

The provisions mentioned under this heading cover all persons who are nationals of a State bound by the Convention and find themselves in the hands of an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. The protection extends to all persons who are not covered by one of the other three Conventions (see note 3) (Art. 4). The protection lasts for the duration of the occupation (Art. 6). If a protected person is suspected or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the Occupying Power he forfeits certain rights under Convention IV, but retains at least the right of fair and regular trial (cf. *infra* under 10) (Art. 5).

4. Human treatment, respect for the person, honor, family rights, religious convictions, customs. Equal treatment, "without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on * * * political opinion" (Art. 27).

5. No exercise of physical or moral coercion (Art. 31). Prohibition of any measures causing physical suffering or extermination of protected persons, including e. g. torture, or any other measure of brutality (Art. 32).³⁰

²⁶ Decree of November 10, 1956. Text broadcast by Radio Budapest, November 9, 1956, 19.00 hours (BBC Summary, Part IIB, No. 777 (1956), p. 7).

²⁷ Article common to all four Conventions.

²⁸ This and the following article refer to Convention IV.

²⁹ Cf. Text proposed by the Soviet Union (Record, Vol. III, Annex No. 222, p. 114).

³⁰ Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex No. 231, p. 116), supported by Hungary in the 13th meeting of Committee III, June 15, 1949 (Record, Vol. IIA, p. 717).

6. Prohibition of collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terrorism (Art. 33).³¹ Prohibition of taking hostages (Art. 34).

7. Prohibition of "individual or mass forcible transfers,"³² as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, * * * regardless of their motive." (Art. 49, cf. also Art. 52, 76-77.)

The phrase "into the territory of the Occupying Power or the territory of any other country" was incorporated on the suggestion of the Soviet Union.³³

8. No sanctions or any measures of coercion against public officials or judges, should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience (Art. 54).

9. Duty to ensure food and medical supplies to the population (Art. 55)³⁴ as well as hospital establishments and services (Art. 56). Duty to allow and facilitate relief schemes for the population if inadequately supplied (Art. 59-62). Red Cross Societies shall be able to pursue their activities (Art. 63).³⁵

10. Respect for existing criminal legislation (Art. 64). Duty not to enact retroactive criminal laws (Art. 65). Courts of the Occupying Power shall apply only those provisions of law which are in accordance with general principles of law (Art. 67). The penalty shall be in proportion to the offense (Art. 67-68). There shall be no prosecution for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation (Art. 70). No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a regular trial (Art. 71). An accused person shall have the right of defense (Art. 72) and a convicted person the right of appeal (Art. 73). They shall be detained and serve their sentences in the occupied territory (Art. 76).

C. With respect to prisoners of war

The Convention also protects apart from the traditional category of "members of the armed forces of a Party" the following persons among others:

(a) members of organized resistance movements, if they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, if they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

(b) members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

(c) Inhabitants who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, if they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war (Art. 4 A).³⁶

The Convention applies to these persons from the time they fall into the power of the enemy until their final release (Art. 5).

The inclusion of the persons mentioned under a-c was considered imperative considering the experience of Nazi occupation of Denmark and other countries which were invaded without resistance on the part of the armed forces. The innovation was supported by the Soviet delegate who declared:

"Citizens who took up arms in defense of the liberty of their country should be entitled to the same protection as members of armed forces."³⁷

He spoke also in favour of protection of members of resistance movements (partisans).³⁸ The Hungarian delegate supported the Soviet Union in both cases.³⁹

The individual obligations of the Detaining Power include among others:

11. Duty to treat prisoners of war humanely (Art. 13).⁴⁰ Respect for their person and honour (Art. 14). Equal treatment "without any adverse distinction based on political opinions" (Art. 16).

³¹ Cf. Text presented by the Soviet Union, June 7, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex No. 234, p. 117).

³² The words "individual or mass" are missing from the Russian text, as reproduced in the source quoted, supra, note 5. The English and French texts are, however, authentic (Art. 55/54/133/150).

³³ Amendment of the Soviet Union, May 12, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex No. 45, p. 130).

³⁴ Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 28, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex No. 282, p. 136).

³⁵ Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 28, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex No. 292, p. 139).

³⁶ This and the following articles refer to Convention III.

³⁷ Committee II, Fifth meeting, May 16, 1949 (Record, Vol. II A, p. 426).

³⁸ Loc. cit., p. 429.

³⁹ Source as in notes 21 and 22.

⁴⁰ Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, May 4, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex No. 99, p. 64).

12. Duty to allow prisoners of war to send and receive letters and cards (Art. 71).

13. Duty not to bring a prisoner of war before a court unless it offers the essential guaranty of independence and impartiality as generally recognized and in particular, a procedure which affords the accused the rights of defence (Art. 84, 105) and of appeal (Art. 106).

14. No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed. No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit his guilt. No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his defence and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel (Art. 99).

15. Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities (Art. 118).

D. Provisions for enforcing these obligations

The following provisions are incorporated into all four Geneva Conventions in order to assure their strict performance.

1. The Parties "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances" (Art. 1/1/1/1).⁴¹

2. The protected persons "may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention" (Art. 7/7/7/8).

3. The Convention "shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers" (Art. 8/8/8/9). The Parties may agree to entrust to an impartial organisation the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers (Art. 10/10/10/11).⁴²

4. The Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering to be committed, any grave breaches of the Conventions (Art. 49/50/129/146 and Art. 50/51/130/147).⁴³

The Hungarian delegate stated that the Hungarian Military Penal Code, in force since February 1, 1949, stipulates severe penalties for violations of the Convention.⁴⁴

5. An enquiry shall be instituted concerning any alleged violation of the Convention (Art. 52/53/132/149).

IV.

In publishing this paper the International Commission of Jurists hopes to act in the interests of the signatories of the Geneva Conventions, including the Soviet Union and Hungary, since Articles 47/48/127/144 of the Conventions provide:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake * * * to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, * * * so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population."

December 7, 1956, International Commission of Jurists, Buitenhof 47, The Hague.

APPENDIX II

THE SITUATION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

Statement by the Executive Council, AFL-CIO, Monday, February 4, 1957

The growing revolt for national independence behind the Iron Curtain is a development of the greatest historic significance. Its outcome will be a decisive factor in determining whether mankind will be able to insure peace, whether human freedom or Communist despotism will prevail.

The satellites are in the throes of an economic crisis aggravated by years of ruthless Soviet exploitation and looting. Moscow sought their resources for speedily building its own gigantic war machine, for developing the Chinese Communist war potential. Years of Communist oppression have generated bitter resentment and deep-going unrest, mass strikes and open revolt. At first, the Kremlin sought to dispel the mounting discontent by softening certain

⁴¹ This and the following articles are common to all four conventions.

⁴² Cf. an amendment by the Soviet Union, July 20, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex 26, p. 34), and the reservation of the Soviet Union and Hungary to Art. 10/10/10/11.

⁴³ Cf. Amendments of the Soviet Union of July 20 and 21, 1949 (Record, Vol. III, Annex Nr. 53 and 53 A, pp. 44).

⁴⁴ Record, Vol. II B, p. 32.

features of its dictatorship, by introducing some so-called liberal reforms. After the 20th Soviet Communist Party congress and the Khrushchev indictment of Stalin as a mass murderer, the forces of revolt—particularly among the workers, students and intellectuals—began to assert openly their demand for democratic rights, better conditions of life and labor, and national independence. This historic development reaches its highest point to date in the inspiring Hungarian democratic revolution. This heroic revolt has intensified political unrest throughout the Iron Curtain domain.

By resorting to brute force, Moscow has for the moment slowed down the trend toward disintegration, but it has not overcome the crisis. Whether the Kremlin reverts to the method of Stalinist massive suppression by armed force, as in Hungary, or accepts the more subtle technique of national communism, as in Poland, its fundamental aims are the same—to prevent freedom and genuine national independence. Soviet savagery in crushing the Hungarian revolt has aroused the conscience and moral indignation of the civilized world as no other event has done in many years. The international Communist movement and Soviet prestige have been seriously weakened in the free world. Communism is now detested most by the very people whom it has pretended to serve most.

Hastening to stem the tide of doubt and disintegration in the camp of world communism, the Soviet ruling clique has vigorously reasserted its primacy in international communism. This primacy was promptly acknowledged by Chou En-lai and Gomulka in their support of Russia's barbarous suppression of the democratic revolution in Hungary.

In this situation, the free world must guard against perilous pitfalls and the continuation of errors in policy, such as: (a) lack of unity, passivity and inadequate military strength; (b) timidity of policy in the face of Soviet threats and appeasement measures which can only help bail Moscow and its satellites out of their serious difficulties; (c) hesitation and refusal to break with colonialism (Algeria, Cyprus); (d) failure to assist adequately the promotion of economic development and improved living standards in the industrially underdeveloped countries committed to the building of democracy; (e) slowness in eliminating shortcomings in the social, economic, and political fabric and institutions of the free nations.

Toward helping the democracies to utilize the crisis behind the Iron Curtain in the interest of peace and freedom, we urge our Government to:

(1) Reassure the captive countries that America will: (a) oppose all policies for an agreement with Moscow based on delineated spheres of control (mutual acceptance of old and new colonialism) and will not accept as final their present status; (b) not allow these lands to serve as spheres of exploitation or areas from which to launch invasions of other countries; (c) repudiate all efforts and elements seeking to replace the present despotic regimes with other reactionary governments or to impose on them any particular economic, political or social system; (d) seek U. N. supervised free elections to enable them to establish democratic governments fully sovereign in their foreign as well as domestic relations.

(2) Place the problem of the captive countries and German reunification before the U. N. which should call upon Russia to abide by the Yalta agreement providing for free elections in the satellites and to comply with its promises regarding German reunification in freedom.

(3) Urge the U. N. to appeal to the free governments of Asia, especially India, to declare their solidarity with and pledge support of the Hungarian freedom fighters in their courageous passive resistance to Soviet colonial oppression and exploitation.

(4) Provide the victims of Soviet tyranny in Hungary with free food—via the International Red Cross or an especially designated agency—and desist from aiding the quisling Kadar regime through selling it consumers' goods and industrial products.

(5) Condemn the puppet Kadar regime for executing the leaders of the workers councils and seek to have the ILO expel it for its flagrant violation of all human rights.

(6) Sever diplomatic relations with the Kadar regime and seek its unseating, as a foreign-imposed government, from the U. N.

(7) Demand that the Rumanian puppet government should free Hungary's legitimate Premier Imre Nagy, upon pain of expulsion from the U. N.

(8) Seek to have the U. N. invoke economic sanctions against Russia for its persistent refusal to heed the U. N. decision that it withdraw its invasion army from Hungary.

(9) Urge all free governments to join in giving full support to the Hungarian National Government representation (Kethly, Kiraly, Koevago) as rallying center of Hungarian freedom fighters seeking full national independence and freedom.

(10) Cancel all plans to have the Communist dictator Tito and the Falangist dictator Franco visit the United States. Such visits would serve no useful purpose for the democratic forces in their worldwide struggle against totalitarians of every hue and stripe and would be an affront and injury to the peoples of Yugoslavia and Spain now increasingly demanding human rights and democracy.

The following newspaper articles were ordered into the record at a subsequent hearing of the subcommittee:

[AFL-CIO News, Washington, D. C., February 16, 1957, p. 13]

LABOR NO. 1 TARGET OF UNITED STATES COMMUNISTS

By Arnold Beichman

NEW YORK.—The Communist Party of the U. S. A. has concluded its first convention in 7 years with a decision to attempt to penetrate the AFL-CIO.

It was also announced to the world that henceforth the Communist Party is going to be "independent" of Moscow. It formulated its new program at a 4-day convention from which the press was barred. Whatever the newspapers printed about the convention came from "official spokesmen" who were obviously under orders to answer no questions on anything discussing the American trade-union movement.

THEY JUST "CONFESS"

Nowhere in the 7,500-word statement on trade unionism did the Communists ask why they had been defeated by the labor movement. They just "confessed" and having done so, denied with fiery indignation that it is "Communist policy" to interfere with, "bore from within," or to seek to capture or control the trade unions.

The Communist Party bemoaned the fact that "what is dominant in the AFL-CIO leadership is a trend bitterly hostile to the Soviet Union and other 'Socialist' countries."

"This dominant trend," said the Communist Party resolution, "equates negotiations with 'appeasement,' keeps an iron curtain between workers of our country and workers of Socialist lands and rejects the possibility of peaceful coexistence."

STRESS "CHANGES"

The task of the convention was primarily to persuade Americans that Communists have changed, that they don't follow Moscow orders. Here's what they did:

They charged that "the imperialists intervened in the Hungarian tragedy" although a few months ago the Daily Worker conceded that the Hungarian uprising was not Fascist-inspired.

They said they would love to work with Socialists in America but they forgot to call for the liberation of Socialists in iron curtain prisons.

They dumped a proposal to dissolve the Communist Party, and to change its name.

So far as is known, they said nothing in any resolutions which was critical of Soviet anti-Semitism.

A few weeks ago the Daily Worker wrote that over the last decade Communists have been "shrinking away from the association with great masses of workers * * * only very recently has there been stronger, and more consistent effort on the part of progressives (Communists and fellow travelers) to establish their rights and make their contributions within the conservatively led unions * * * it can be expected that following the convention of the Communist Party and revival of its influence and activity, the work of progressives in the labor movement will reach a still higher level."

VOW COMEBACK

From its position of unparalleled weakness the Communist Party is determined to make a comeback. It is moving its national headquarters to Chicago from New York City to be closer as the Communist Party said, to the industrial and agricultural heartland of America.

Years of declining membership and party purges have left the Communist Party with a powerful "hard-core" group of dedicated revolutionaries. Its national committee of 20 numbers 14 Communist leaders who have gone to jail or have been indicted and are awaiting trial.

The latest Communist Party convention disclosed what everybody knows—no matter how much its leaders may mumble unhappily about Khrushchev or Stalin or some single Soviet policy or other, when the chips are down, Communist Partyers here as in other countries of the free world, will toe the Kremlin mark or else.

Yet it should also be remembered that the Communist Party has emerged from this convention stronger than it entered. There will be differences and disputes within its ranks—but it will be over power, who is to be top dog—not whether the Soviet Union is right or wrong.

A stronger Communist Party, no matter how tiny numerically, represents a threat to American democracy, and, especially, to the American labor movement.

[Las Vegas Sun, February 16, 1957, p. 16]

VICTOR RIESEL—INSIDE LABOR

NEW YORK.—Though it met those past 4 days just around the corner from the Bowery, the Communist Party was far from hitting the skids. When its national leaders quietly slipped out of the city, their party was still a noticeable item in Moscow's cold war budget.

Couriers from the Kremlin had brought word that the Party's press would be heavily subsidized in America once again. The national headquarters would be refinanced. Funds for agitation-propaganda would be available once more. There would be stronger backing for the Party's labor friends—some of whom were in town from as far off as the west coast. There would be money for good lawyers and undercover organizers to help re-infiltrate the AFL-CIO.

The American Communist Party had agreed to behave itself and not to "Tito." Moscow was selling gold in London and Brussels. Some of the money would be funneled into the United States. Moscow had wanted to keep its American mouthpiece from fading out.

This was no convention; this was a conspiracy. And it would have been a mistake to cover the drones as we cover the national major party parleys. Among the chairmen, and dispersed through the 300 delegates and 110 visitors, were men awaiting jail on charges of teaching the violent overthrow of the Government. There were several Soviet secret police officials.

And, of course, the fellow who led the fight to free the electrocuted atomic spies.

The press was barred so that we, and perhaps some undercover men who might slip in with us, would not recognize the so-called delegates. But not because the delegates feared they'd lose their jobs—as the indicted Steve Nelson told several of us out on the sidewalk. The press was barred because the four-hundred-odd men inside were the top Communist functionaries in the United States—and among them were the men taking direct orders from Moscow via London.

These 400 were older people. They were the hard core. They made up—not a convention—but the first full gathering of the party's operatives throughout the United States. They were mostly from New York, California, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Illinois. They run the apparat in 34 States. They're tough. They are the ones the party can count on to walk through the street near the Chateau Gardens and scurry into the old hall—even after the blood bath of Budapest and the Soviet's ties with the Nazified Nasser.

There was talk of this as a convention. You know, three delegates representing every hundred members, caucuses, etc.

They took the pains to vote and count. But what did they count? The alleged "delegates," by the party's own total, would have spoken for slightly under 7,000 registered Communists. But this is like a wrestling referee's count. The party

has almost 20,000 registered members. That's positive. It has several thousand secret members who take orders from a tricky cell-like chain of command.

Furthermore, the party still operates on the 10 to 1 formula. Its leaders boast that they have 10 persons ready to work for them for every one of their official members.

That puts their count way up. So what you had at the Communist Party's 16th National Convention was a gathering of the top 300-man committee. These were not really delegates but regional chiefs being briefed by men who had taken their orders by courier from abroad.

Not all of them, however, were ready to take direction unquestioningly. So they were permitted to sound off about the new road to American socialism. Or about the yoke of "democratic centralism" which, translated, means "You have 5 minutes to talk Comrade, and then sit down, shut up or take orders." They had their hopes raised that they might be men again after the depurification of Stalin. But over the past weekend they were told that they must go along with the Kremlin, or their Moscow gold will be cut off.

The convention's press officer, Si Gerson, worked hard at giving us a fairly good facsimile of what a capitalist public relations man would be—with just one twist. Somebody asked for a drink and Gerson said, "Why don't you fellows send in a case of Scotch?"

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 25 AND 26, 1957

PART 54

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p. m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Roman L. Hruska presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine and William A. Rusher, associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator HRUSKA. The committee will come to order.

There was recently held in New York City a convention of the Communist Party of the United States of America. I believe the last day of the session was February 12, 1957.

This committee has had several witnesses appear before it in connection with reporting some of the things which transpired at that convention. Carl Rachlin was here. He was an unofficial observer at the sessions of the convention, as I understand it.

And Arnold Beichman was a reporter who covered as best he could the proceedings of that convention.

This committee, in connection with the inquiries in this general field of the activities of the Communist Party here in this country, would like to continue its inquiry into this situation.

And we have, therefore, invited Mr. Eugene Dennis to appear before this committee.¹

¹ See the following letter:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
New York, N. Y., February 18, 1957.

Re Eugene Dennis.

ROBERT MORRIS, Esq.,

Chief Counsel,

Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BOB: Enclosed herewith is copy of letter to attorney for the above-named subject which is self-explanatory.

Sincerely,

TOM BOLAN.

FEBRUARY 18, 1957.

Re United States versus Eugene Dennis.

JOHN J. ART, Esq.,

320 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

DEAR SIR: Confirming telephone conversation with my assistant, Thomas A. Bolan, this afternoon, please be advised that the United States attorney's office has no objection to the above-named defendant's traveling to Washington, D. C., on February 25, 1957, to answer a subpoena issued by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, or on any day to which his appearance may be adjourned by said subcommittee.

Very truly yours,

PAUL W. WILLIAMS,
United States Attorney.
By THOMAS A. BOLAN,
Assistant United States Attorney.

I presume at this time it would be well to swear the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. Will you please rise?

You solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the testimony which you are about to give?

Mr. DENNIS. I do.

Senator HRUSKA. So help you God?

Mr. DENNIS. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. I might say by way of preliminary that the Daily Worker, a well-known newspaper in this field, in commenting on the subpoena issued to the witness here, Mr. Dennis, made a statement which included this language:

Far from being a cellar conspiracy, our convention was held in the glare of white-hot publicity.

And it was our thought that perhaps, inasmuch as it was that, maybe you would share with us some of the things that transpired there, and also some of the parts which you assumed in that connection.

Judge Morris, would you like to proceed at this time to interrogate the witness, or do you want to do otherwise?

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE DENNIS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, ATTORNEY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. I will proceed.

What is your name and address, please?

Mr. DENNIS. My name is Eugene Dennis. I reside at 628 West 151st Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born, Mr. Dennis?

Mr. DENNIS. At this point, counsel and Senator, I would like to read a very brief statement. It is extremely short but it sets forth my legal and political position on these hearings.

Senator HRUSKA. Suppose we dispose of the preliminary questions first, Mr. Dennis, and then you may at a later time read that statement. (Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I am going to decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, first, invoking my rights under the first amendment, which precludes the Congress or any of its committees prying into my opinions, political beliefs, or associations.

Secondly, on the grounds of my conscience, because I consider this a lawless committee, headed by a chairman who is a notorious racist and—

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Dennis, you may make a short statement, but this committee will not tolerate any aspersions of that kind upon a member of this committee. They are not necessary for any statement which you have in this connection, and we would respectfully request that you desist from any further remarks of that kind.

Mr. DENNIS. May I complete the grounds on which I am declining?

Senator HRUSKA. Not if they include any further reference to any member of this committee, a fact which is not necessary in order to make your position clear in respect to your legal rights, Mr. Dennis.

Mr. DENNIS. And the further grounds on which I decline to answer this and other questions that I may so refuse to answer, is that I claim

my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself.

Senator HRUSKA. The Chair will overrule all of those objections, all of those grounds except that of the fifth amendment at this time.

Mr. DENNIS. May the record show that I am still standing on the grounds which I have stated?

Senator HRUSKA. The record so shows.

Judge MORRIS, will you proceed?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennis, to reframe the question, you were born in Seattle, Wash., were you not?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you born in Seattle, Wash., under the name of Frank Waldron?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the grounds as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I assume we have the same ruling?

Senator HRUSKA. The record will show that the same ruling will apply to all of the same assertions of refusal to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennis, you had your training, did you not, in the Lenin Institute in Moscow; that is, your Communist Party training?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer that question under the grounds as previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been to the Lenin Institute in Moscow?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer the question on these same grounds—

Mr. FORER. Pardon me.

Mr. DENNIS. As stated previously.

Mr. FORER. Have you gotten beyond the preliminary question, so the witness' request to read his statement may again be renewed?

Senator HRUSKA. Yes, I think so; subject, however, to that limitation which I placed on it, if that statement contains any reference which casts those kind of aspersions as were made a little bit ago upon the chairman of this subcommittee, we respectfully ask that they be withheld and not given.

Mr. MORRIS. Might I also add that there is a subcommittee rule with which I think counsel is acquainted that before statements are going to be read or presented to the committee, that the committee rule requires that they be filed 24 hours in advance.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we had an executive session, as you know, just a short time ago and there was no reference whatever made at that time to the filing or the reading of any statement here in this open session.

Mr. FORER. It is only a procedural rule which I am sure you can bypass.

Senator HRUSKA. It will depend.

Mr. DENNIS. May I state, Mr. Senator—

Senator HRUSKA. The Chair at this time requests that a copy of that statement be submitted in advance so we may consider whether or not we want to waive the committee rules to which reference has just been made.

Mr. DENNIS. I might say at this point, Senator, that contrary to—being the remark that you must have made inadvertently—I was not invited here. I was subpoenaed. And, therefore, I think after being

brought here that I should be entitled to read a very brief statement which is pertinent.

Senator HRUSKA. The record will stand corrected, insofar as it was a subpoena which brought you here as opposed to an invitation.

However, the committee rules have not yet been waived and I do not know that they will. Your ability to make that statement will be governed by the decision of the Chair, which will be made in just a little bit.

In the meantime, may we proceed to other questions while that statement is being analyzed by the staff?

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Dennis, you have been the general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States of America, have you not?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer the question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, did you attend the recent Communist Party convention in New York City?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer the question for reasons stated previously.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennis, as the chairman read just a short time ago at the time that you were served with a subpoena, the Communist Party, the national committee of the Communist Party issued the statement in connection with your very appearance here, that—far from this being a cellar conspiracy our convention was held in a glare of white-hot publicity.

Do you, even after that statement was issued, refuse now to tell us whether or not you were even present at the convention?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I repeat, I refuse to answer the question on the basis of the grounds as previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Irving Potash surreptitiously entered the United States in the closing days of 1956?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the basis of the grounds previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, to your knowledge did Irving Potash secretly meet with leaders of the American Communist Party at that time?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. That is absurd, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. What is absurd, that he met—that he met with leaders of the Communist Party?

Mr. DENNIS. My answer to your question is that is absurd. Beyond that I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, let me ask this, did you meet with Mr. Potash?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse, sir, on the basis of reasons as previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge did Potash meet with any leader of the Communist Party known to you?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer for the reasons as previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say—when you give—when you gave your preceding answer, “it is absurd,” did you mean that it is absurd that I should ask you that, Mr. Dennis?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I meant by that the implications contained in the question were absurd, fantastic, preposterous.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did he meet with you?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer on the grounds as previously given.

Senator HRUSKA. Do you know Mr. Potash, Mr. Dennis?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer, sir, on the basis of the reasons as I have stated before.

Senator HRUSKA. Do you know who he is?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer for the reasons as given previously.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Mr. Dennis, the New York Herald Tribune of January 9, 1957, contained an article, which said that Irving Potash has illegally entered this country carrying secret orders from the Kremlin to leaders of the Communist Party in the United States.

Now, did you know that Potash was in the United States at any time that he was in the United States?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the basis of the grounds as previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge that he was secretly meeting with leaders of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the basis of the reasons as I have given them before.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he, to your knowledge, bear any instructions to members of the Communist Party in the United States?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. Would you kindly repeat the question?

Mr. MORRIS. Read it.

(Question read.)

Mr. DENNIS. I certainly did not receive anything or act upon anything that I regarded as a directive or an instruction.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, did he have any advice or instructions for any member at the top of the Communist Party—did he—to your knowledge, did you know that he was imparting instructions or orders to any leader of the Communist Party?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. That is preposterous, Mr. Morris. I am sure, to the best of my knowledge, nothing was received that anyone in his right mind could regard as directives.

Mr. MORRIS. How about advice?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons I stated previously.

Mr. MORRIS. You will not enter a denial with respect to the term “advice”?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer on the grounds I have just given.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you be willing to tell us the purpose of Mr. Potash’s trip to the United States?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the grounds as previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first learn that Potash was in the United States?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer for the reasons as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man named John Williamson who was previously one of the leaders of the American Communist Party?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer for the reasons as previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us, Mr. Dennis—would you tell us when you last had a communication from John Williamson?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer for reasons I have stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you received instructions from John Williamson?

Mr. FORER. Just a moment, do you have in mind any particular time?

Mr. MORRIS. Within the last 6 months, did you receive a letter or any communication of any kind—

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to—

Mr. MORRIS. With recommendations or advice from John Williamson?

Mr. FORER. Let us get it straight. Your first question was instructions. Now it has become a letter. Which question do you want him to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you received any letters from John Williamson?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer for grounds previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you be willing to turn over to the committee any letters that you have received from John Williamson in the last 6 months?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer for the reasons as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you received any written instructions from John Williamson in the last 6 months?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I repeat, Mr. Morris, that is preposterous, absurd. I am sure to the best of my knowledge nothing was received that anyone in his right mind could regard as directives.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you receive any letter—a letter or any other communication from Mr. Williamson which gave you any advice as to how the Communist Party of the United States should be run?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer for reasons as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Again, you will make the distinction between "instructions" and "advice"?

Mr. FORER. There is a distinction, you know.

Mr. MORRIS. Again you are making the distinction in your answer between "instructions" and "advice"?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer for the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know, Mr. Dennis, that John Williamson went from London, where, to my knowledge, he now is, to Moscow, during the fall of 1956?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer for the reasons I have stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't it so, Mr. Dennis, that after he returned from Moscow, he commenced to write you and to give you instructions and advice with respect to how the Communist Party of the United States should be run?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer on the grounds as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Dennis, did you receive, or did you or any other leader of the Communist Party receive any letters or instructions or bits of advice from a French Communist named Duclos?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Morris, that is a very compounded question. I would appreciate it if you would break it down into its particulars.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, Mr. Dennis, did Mr. Khrushchev in addressing the 20th party convention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on March 7, 1956, state:

There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeois and the aggravation of the class struggle connected with this are inevitable.

Is that so, to your knowledge?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the grounds as previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, to your knowledge was the declaration made by a leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that peaceful transition is possible only in countries where there is voting socialism, but that there must be a revolutionary transition where the particular country concerned has an entrenched capitalist society?

To your knowledge was that statement made?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons given before.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the decision made in connection with any policy decision of the Communist Party of the United States that the United States was such a country where there is an entrenched capitalist society?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer on the grounds as previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last hear from Mr. Duclos?

Mr. DENNIS. I decline to answer on the grounds as stated previously.

Mr. MORRIS. And will you not tell us about any instructions and/or advice that the Communist Party of the United States received from Mr. Duclos?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I would appreciate, Mr. Morris, if you would break that question up.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I mean that has come up several times before, Mr. Chairman. The witness has stated that he has entered a denial with respect to any instructions that have been imparted to the Communist Party of the United States but has claimed privilege on the same question when the noun used is "advice."

Now, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that the witness is drawing a distinction here that we should take cognizance of. On the basis of his denials of having received any instructions, I think, Mr. Chairman, that we can pursue this further and make recommendations and expect answers with respect to any communication where instruction is involved.

Senator HRUSKA. The witness will answer.

Mr. FORER. We don't know the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you receive any communication from Mr. Duclos which contained an instruction to the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. FORER. Are you talking—as of what time are you talking about?

Mr. MORRIS. At any time within the last 6 months.

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I wish to repeat, as I have stated earlier to a similar question, Mr. Morris, that is preposterous. I am sure, to the best of my knowledge, that nothing was received by anyone in his right mind—which anybody in his right mind could regard as directives or instructions.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the end of the answer?

Mr. FORER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you deny that Duclos sent any instructions to the United States?

Mr. FORER. He could only answer to the best of his knowledge which he already did.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the best of his knowledge?

Mr. FORER. He just told you, he had no such knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. No knowledge of any communications from Mr. Duclos?

Mr. FORER. That was not the question. You asked if there had been any instructions, not if there had been any communications.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us, on the basis of that answer, what instructions that you know of that have been received by the American Communist Party from Mr. Duclos?

Mr. FORER. You are talking in the last 6 months?

Mr. MORRIS. In the last 6 months?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. FORER. He said he didn't know of any. How can you ask him what they were?

Mr. MORRIS. Did he know of any communication of any kind?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the grounds as previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire?

Senator HRUSKA. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe I quote you correctly, sir. You said:

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.

You stated that in response to questions about communications from Mr. Potash.

You stated it again in regard to communications from Mr. Williamson.

You stated it again in regard to communications from Mr. Duclos. On the latter occasion you added the words "or instructions."

It appeared to me that you were reading that statement and that is how you repeated it precisely.

I will ask you if that is true, were you reading that statement?

Mr. FORER. That is a pertinent question, Mr. Chairman. Isn't the witness entitled to use his notes?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I intend to inquire here for the purpose of testing the witness' credibility in connection with the positive statement he has made to the committee, and for the purpose of pursuing, so far as the committee has a right to pursue it, the implications of that question.

Senator HRUSKA. The Chair rules that the question is proper.

Mr. FORER. The question is whether he was reading his answer?

Senator HRUSKA. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. No implication that he does not have the right to read it.

Mr. FORER. Then I do not understand why you ask the question. All right, then.

Mr. DENNIS. What is your—

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is, When you stated on several occasions these words:

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives—

were you reading that phrasing?

Mr. DENNIS. I have various notes here which I refer to from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have in front of you a note which carries these words:

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. FORER. Give him time while he looks over his notes.

You are talking about those precise words?

Senator HRUSKA. The record will show that the witness has been given opportunity to scan the notes in front of him.

Mr. DENNIS. Not the notes—the notes are not in those precise words.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then let me ask you this question: When you said:

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.

were you saying precisely what you intended to say?

Mr. FORER. I don't get this.

Mr. DENNIS. I don't understand the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made an answer three times here. It seems quite obvious that is what you intended to answer, that you had made up your mind that that was what you were going to say to a particular kind of question. When that question came up you then did say it.

Is that what happened?

Mr. DENNIS. As you know, I was brought here under subpoena against my will and in violation of the first amendment. And I am offering testimony under oath and that testimony is mine.

And I don't want anybody to put any words into my mouth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Fine, fine.

Now, you have stated that you are sure—and I speak now with regard to your answer to the question which was asked as to Mr. Potash—you have stated that you are sure that nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.

I will now ask you, Do you have any knowledge whatsoever which will serve as a basis for your judgment as expressed in those words?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I rest on my previous answer to reply to that question just formulated, I decline to answer on the grounds as previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that the Chair direct that this question be answered. The witness has made a voluntary statement and we are not to put anything in his mouth. He made the statement. I ask that he be ordered and directed to answer that question.

The committee is entitled to find out the basis on which he gives the committee his opinion with regard to this matter.

Senator HRUSKA. The witness is directed by the Chair to answer the question.

Mr. FORER. I would like the record to show, Mr. Chairman, that I am here as Mr. Dennis' counsel and that I am the one advising him on his legal rights, not Mr. Sourwine, and that in my opinion it is perfectly clear that the witness was entitled to claim his privilege to that question.

And I am advising the witness now that he is entitled, if he so desires, to persist in his refusal to answer for the reasons he gave before.

Senator HRUSKA. The record will show what the counsel has just stated and the Chair further directs the witness at this time, notwithstanding that advice and the words of counsel, to answer the question.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I will abide by my refusal on the grounds and reason as previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Dennis, you have stated that you are sure that nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.

I will ask you: Unless you know everything which was received how can you make that statement?

(Consultation between witnesses and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I don't understand the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated that nothing was received which fell in a certain category—nothing was received from Mr. Potash which fell in a certain category. That is the category of things which anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.

Now, if you do not know what was received from Mr. Potash, how can you make that statement?

Mr. FORER. That is not a question—that is an argument. Really, Mr. Chairman, in terms of time, I am going to object to this line of questions because Mr. Sourwine is arguing with the witness. He is not asking him questions of information.

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't it apparent to you what Mr. Sourwine has just done was made very clear?

Mr. FORER. If he wants to make something clear he can do it—say whatever he has to say without asking the witness argumentative questions.

I mean if he wants to state what his position is, that is one thing. But that does not mean he has to do it in the form of questions to Mr. Dennis.

I think it is really just a waste of time.

Senator HRUSKA. It will be necessary for the committee to recess very shortly to resume this hearing in the morning. Before we do that, however, I should like to make a comment on the statement which was submitted by the witness, preceded by a couple of additional statements by Judge Morris here.

Mr. MORRIS. I have two questions that I would like to ask.

Senator HRUSKA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a son now in Moscow, Mr. Dennis?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer the question on the grounds as previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Your son, Timothy, is now in Moscow?

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer for the reasons just given.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here an article that appeared in the New Leader of February 25, 1957. This reads:

In fact, the main issues at the Communist convention were hammered out in a secret session which began 3 days before the convention, held on the 6th and 7th floors of the National Theater Building in a special room and nearby hall.

Is it true that there were secret sessions preceding the convention of the Communist Party held in the second week of February?

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS. I refuse to answer on the grounds as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.

Senator HRUSKA. Very well.

With reference to the statement which was submitted by you, Mr. Dennis, the Chair will rule that there will be a conditional acceptance of a part of it. You are free, if you choose, to read the first page thereof, but the Chair holds that it would be improper for you to read the second part thereof at this time.

So if you want to accept that and read the first page you may do so.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I shall read the first page of the statement according to the ruling of the Chair, and under protest, I shall not read the latter part, but I assume the statement in its entirety will be entered into the record.

Senator HRUSKA. Before you start, on the inquiry as to the inclusion of the entire statement into the record, we will let you read the first part, and the second part will not be read at this time nor will it be included in the record which is being made.

It will, however, constitute a part of the files of this committee.

(Consultation between witness and attorney.)

Mr. DENNIS (reading). I hold to the basic constitutional doctrine embodied in the first amendment of our Bill of Rights—Congress shall make no law denying the freedom of speech and assembly.

It follows that congressional committees may not investigate these areas, since they are not empowered to legislate in them.

I will, therefore, answer no questions involuntarily which relate directly or indirectly to my political beliefs or associations.

In so doing, I will invoke all constitutional guaranties available to all Americans—the first amendment, the fifth amendment, and all other guaranties of my rights.

Whatever political discussion I shall carry on, it will be in the market place of public opinion, and not under the gun of a congressional subpoena and witchhunt.

Let me make clear, however, that whatever the legalities, I place special emphasis on the first amendment. I hold firmly that neither this committee nor any other congressional body may constitutionally investigate peaceful assembly—whether exercised by conventions of Republicans, Democrats, Socialists, Communists, ADAers, or trade unionists.

I contend that this is so, even though this committee may endeavor to camouflage its unconstitutional invasion of the first-amendment

area under the pretext of investigating alleged "directives from abroad," or some other equally preposterous accusation.

Senator HRUSKA. The Chair would like to observe that such a statement as this witness has just read is a far cry from the words of Daily Worker of February 20, 1957, commenting upon that convention in New York, ending on February 12, which reads as follows:

Far from being a cellar conspiracy, our convention was held in the glare of white-hot publicity.

There are other observations and other questions which will be followed up a little later and we will recess until 10 tomorrow morning in a room to be determined, and notice of same will be given in due time.

We are recessed until that time.

Mr. FORER. You do not mean that you want Mr. Dennis back?

Senator HRUSKA. Yes; we want Mr. Dennis back.

(Whereupon, at 3 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene Tuesday, February 26, 1957.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p. m., in room 457, Senate Office Building. Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senators Jenner and Hruska.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher, associate counsel.

Senator JENNER. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Meyer, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give to this Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MEYER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the hearing today is a continuance of the present series of hearings being held by the Internal Security Subcommittee, by way of determining the nature of the purported or professed changes of the Communist party line. We have heard Carl Rachlin and Mr. Beichman. Yesterday we had Mr. Dennis, and now we have Mr. Frank Meyer.

We are going to do everything we can in order to get people who are competent to testify on Communist party policy, to testify in these hearings.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK S. MEYER, WOODSTOCK, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. MEYER. Frank S. Meyer, Woodstock, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. And what is your business or occupation, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. MEYER. I am a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. And what do you write, for instance?

Mr. MEYER. I am working on the finishing up of one book, and in the middle of another, and I have been doing a good deal of writing also, of a free-lance magazine character.

My first book, which is approaching the stage of production, publication, is a study of the molding of Communists, the training and making of Communists.

My second one is a study in American political theory. Most of my free-lance work recently has been for National Review, of which I am associate editor.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you do any other writings?

Mr. MEYER. I have done a good deal of free-lance writing here and there, but recently that is the main thing I have been working on, the two books, and the National Review work.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Meyer, where were you born?

Mr. MEYER. Newark, N. J.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what your education has been?

Mr. MEYER. I went to school at Newark Academy, Newark, N. J.; then to Princeton, N. J., where I spent a couple of years, and then I went abroad to England where, after studying privately for a year, I went to Oxford, Balliol College, Oxford.

Mr. MORRIS. How is that spelled?

Mr. MEYER. B-a-l-l-i-o-l.

I took a bachelor-of-arts degree there, which later was transformed to a master of arts from Oxford University, and later did graduate work, though I never took a degree, a couple of years at the London School of Economics, and several years at the University of Chicago.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Meyer, you joined the Communist Party as you went along the line, did you not?

Mr. MEYER. 1931.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you at that time?

Mr. MEYER. Oxford.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your first introduction to the Communist Party organization?

Mr. MEYER. I was rather active in the Labor Party organization, and a group of us became dissatisfied with what we thought was the slowness of affairs, reformism of the Labor Party.

We founded a small group at Oxford and made our own connections with the Communist Party. That is, we went up to London and saw the Communist Party and said we wanted to found a Communist Party group at Oxford University.

We then founded a public group called the October Club, which is a small group, Communist-controlled, and which became a small group in the University, along with the Labor Club and the Conservatives.

That actually was founded, I think, about December 31, just before the vacation.

Mr. MORRIS. And tell us, generally, the nature of your Communist activity while you were still in England.

Mr. MEYER. After I left Oxford in the spring of 1932, June 1932, I went as a graduate student to the London School of Economics, and at this point I became the secretary of the student bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain. That is, I was responsible for and the head of the students' activity.

Mr. MORRIS. You were secretary of what group?

Mr. MEYER. The Students' Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

Mr. MORRIS. Secretary of the Students' Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain. How extensive an organization was the Students' Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain?

Mr. MEYER. By the time I left England, about 1934, I would say that we had from 400 to 500 Communist Party members, disciplined Communist Party members, in the British universities, which is a more significant figure, perhaps, than in America, because there are only about 50,000 or 60,000 university students altogether.

Mr. MORRIS. So, of the 50,000 or 60,000 university students, there were 400 disciplined Communists?

Mr. MEYER. 400 to 500. At Oxford, I remember distinctly, there was a disciplined university group of 70, and at Cambridge of approximately 100.

Mr. MORRIS. How many at the London School of Economics?

Mr. MEYER. At the London School of Economics, I would say, the group ranged somewhere around 45 or 50, from memory.

Senator JENNER. Let the record show Senator Hruska is now in attendance.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Hruska, I will bring you up to date with what the witness has said today, thus far.

Mr. Frank Meyer is the witness. He has testified that he was born in New Jersey, attended Princeton University and Oxford. While he was in Oxford, he became a Communist; that he then rose to position of secretary of the student bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain, and, as such, was in charge of or head of a disciplined group of between 400 and 500 Communists, of which 70 were at Oxford and 100 at Cambridge. And how many—

Mr. MEYER. About 45 or 50 in the London School of Economics. Something like 150 or more at London University, as a whole, of which the London School of Economics is one school.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there any Communists from the other units of the British Empire in London at that time?

Mr. MEYER. The situation in that regard is rather an interesting one. I was in constant communication, through the British Central Committee, in a conspiratorial manner, with both the Chinese Communist Party unit and the unit of the Communist Party of India.

That is to say, I never met, as such, any member of either the Indian or the Chinese group, but we had constant communications through a third source; that is, through the central committee of the Communist Party. I was, as a matter of fact, at this point a member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain, and had specific contacts for this purpose, and my guess is—it has to be something of a guess—

Mr. MORRIS. A guess or an estimate?

Mr. MEYER. My estimate. But first—this is not an estimate—there was a powerful unit of the Indian group of the Communist Party in the London School of Economics, so far as I was informed by the party, and observing their result. That is to say, we coordinated our activities and one could see, when certain things were to be done, that the basic mass of the Indian student body could be swung by our Communist unit, when we wished to have them so swung.

I have no real estimate as to how many that group would be, but my general idea is that there must have been 25 to 30 members of the Communist Party of India in the school, in addition to our own group, judging by their results, and judging by my general memory of what sort of a group it was.

As a matter of fact, I was elected president of the student governing body of the London School of Economics, as a known Communist, on a United Front ticket. That is to say, we were supported by some elements of the left Labor Party, as well as our own following, and many scattered students, and, specifically, by an almost solid support of the organized Indian students.

Now, that organized Indian student group were nationalists. They were not Communists, as such, but it was very clear to me from the results we could achieve, that the decisive force within the Indian national group, the nationalist group, was the Communist Party unit. And they were our main allies in every campaign we carried on during that period.

It may be of interest that——

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the leader of that Indian group?

Mr. MEYER. The public leader of the Indian students and the Indian nationalists at the London School of Economics in the union debates was Mr. Krishna Menon.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Krishna Menon support you, for instance, when you were in these various activities you were carrying on?

Mr. MEYER. Very definitely; because in terms of any negotiations made with the Indian student grouping, where one met with 2 or 3 of them to decide on policy, he was the outstanding spokesman of the Indian students.

As a matter of fact, there is a rather odd story. I was a candidate for the president of the London School of Economics Student Union. It was a very hard-fought election.

Mr. MORRIS. Running as a known Communist?

Mr. MEYER. United Front candidate, but as a known Communist, and I was defeated by, I think, 8 or 10 votes, whereupon Krishna Menon discovered there had been fraud in the election. It did turn out that the fraud was somebody on our side, but at least it was fraud, and the election was canceled at his demand and after constitutional discussions in the union the election was held again, and this time I was elected by 35 votes. So that, in this case, the Indian students and their leader played a rather big part in my election, in the election of the Communist candidate.

Mr. MORRIS. And you knew there was a hard core operating there, but you did not know precisely which was a Communist?

Mr. MEYER. Precisely. I knew there was a hard core operating within the Indian national group. I knew some of the leaders were Communists, but I did not know which were which.

Mr. MORRIS. What are some of the other Communist assignments you had while you were in England? You left in 1934, did you not?

Mr. MEYER. Yes.

I joined the party, as it were, in 1931 to 1932. I have to make it general because this group attached itself and it was sort of informally associated with the party until we consolidated ourselves in early 1932.

Then, after I left Oxford, my main assignment was secretary of the student bureau of the Party. I was a member of the central committee of the party, and of the Young Communist League. I was——

Mr. MORRIS. Member of the national committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain?

Mr. MEYER. That is right.

And I was, at a couple of specific times, occupied in the leadership of youth and student delegations, both, to international antiwar and anti-Fascist congresses, which were held in Paris and in Amsterdam during those years.

The first of these, the Amsterdam one, was the international congress from which the American League Against War and Fascism proceeded. The others were secondary followup congresses of the same kind.

I was at the European Workers—I think it was called—the European Workers Anti-Fascist Congress, which was often referred to as the Pleyel Congress, and also at an international youth congress in Paris a few months later.

Now, these congresses, in addition to being publicly what they were, were also utilized for international student fraction meetings under the aegis of the Communist International, where international student policy was worked out, international youth fraction meetings, and so on.

Furthermore, during the time I was in England, I had other scattered assignments. I worked at one point for the central committee with the leading fraction of the London Busmen, and at another point with an important rail unit. But basically, my work was student work and, in general, united front work of the antiwar and anti-Fascist kind.

Mr. MORRIS. Generally, Mr. Meyer, as a general point of interest, would some of these students who are subordinates of yours in the Communist program work at Cambridge, Oxford, and the London School of Economics, have they gone on to be well-known personalities in some cases in Great Britain?

Mr. MEYER. I think so; in many cases. I have noticed names from time to time—writers, editors, political people in the Labor Party, scientists; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, when you came to the United States, did you recognize there was any link, organizational link, between the Communist Party of Great Britain and the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. MEYER. My movement, as it were, from the Communist Party of Great Britain to the Communist Party of the United States was a transfer between one section of the Communist International and another section of the same world party, the Communist International. And it was so handled officially. That is, I was transferred, as I might have been transferred from Chicago to New York, I was transferred from England to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any effort to maintain a fiction that the Communist Party of Great Britain was wholly independent and something separate from the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. MEYER. In those years there wasn't even an effort at that fiction. In those years it was openly accepted that each section of it, each national party was a section of the Communist International, with the same relationships to the executive committee of the Communist International that, say, the Chicago district of the American party would have to the national committee of the American party.

And far from being concealed at that point, it was taught, boasted of.

For example, in France, in ordinary newspaper talk they very often—the newspapers did not say “Communist Party of France.” They said the “S. F. I. C.,” Section Francaise Internationale Communiste—French section of the Communist International, and very often in England or America during those years the party was simply referred to as the American section of the Communist International or the British section.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, what was your assignment in the Communist Party in the United States, your first assignment in 1934?

Mr. MEYER. When I arrived in the United States in 1934, the student work in England had been Communist Party work. In the United States it was directly under the control of the Young Communist League, which at that period was simply a youth section of the Communist Party, and I was transferred, so far as my effective work was concerned, from the party to the Young Communist League, and some weeks, perhaps some months, passed before it was decided exactly what I would do.

During that time I participated in the preliminary discussions which led to the capture of the American Youth Congress by the Communists.

I did other odds and ends of work around New York. I went up to Canada to attend the founding congress of the Canadian Students League and Antiwar Congress there, and attended a convention of the Young Communist League of Canada at the same time.

And finally, it was agreed that I would go to Chicago, continue as a graduate student at the University of Chicago, and work with the district bureau of the Young Communist League in Chicago, and with the American League Against War and Fascism, as the party force in the youth section of the American League Against War and Fascism in Chicago.

And my student and YCL work in Chicago lasted about a year and a half, as my main assignment, after which I transferred over to party work, though I still had connections with the university, some responsibilities for it.

Shall I continue with that?

Mr. MORRIS. When you attended this meeting in Canada, what was the nature of the Communist Party of Canada that you observed at that time?

Mr. MEYER. Well, at that point the Communist Party of Canada was more or less underground. It was—it considered itself an underground party. There was an anti-Communist law. The Young Communist League did not fully come under that statute, so it met half conspiratorially, half open, and half closed, as it were.

Mr. MORRIS. And again, the relationship that existed between the Canadian Communist Party and the American Communist Party was the same as you have described as existing between the American Communist Party and the English party?

Mr. MEYER. Very definitely.

There was a delegation from New York, consisting of Gil Green, who was then national secretary of the YCL, I believe, and Max Weiss, who was then educational director of the Young Communist League, and a man named Max. I cannot give him a last name because I never heard one. He was a representative of the Young Communist International from Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he Russian?

Mr. MEYER. I have no idea what he was. He was obviously, by his accent, of some Slavic language originally. And I would gather from the authority he showed in Canada, that he was not only the representative to the Young Communist League of the United States, which I knew, but that Canada was, so to speak, secondary and under the leadership of him and the American Young Communist League. At least, both he and Gil Green spoke with great authority in the Canadian Young Communist League inner meetings.

As a matter of fact, the Canadians suggested that perhaps I should work in Canada for a period, but that was vetoed.

Mr. MORRIS. In describing the general nature of your work, Mr. Meyer, how far have you gone by way of point of time, from 1934 until—

Mr. MEYER. I got to Chicago in the fall of 1934, and I would say about a year and a half or so in the student movement, and some time in late 1935, early 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. And now, what did you do after 1936?

Mr. MEYER. My first serious party assignment after I left the student movement was in the South Side section in Chicago, which is the Negro area of Chicago, like Harlem in New York, also including the university area of Hyde Park. And I was the educational director of that section, which was considered a pretty important section by the party, since the section organizer was a member of the political bureau, actually still a member of the political bureau assigned to work there.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mr. MEYER. Harry Haywood.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you carry on work there?

Mr. MEYER. I would say about, again, roughly a year and half. I can date the time I went into full-time district work, which was 1938, but during this period I was still attempting to do some graduate student work at the university, as well as being pretty active on the South Side section committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what positions did you subsequently attain in the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. MEYER. Beginning in 1938, I became a full-time functionary in charge of the education work in the Illinois-Indiana district, whose center was Chicago, which included the whole of the State of Illinois and the State of Indiana. And at one point or another bits of Missouri and bits of Wisconsin, but most of this period it was Illinois and Indiana.

And I was, simultaneously, the director of the Chicago Workers School, which was an open party school, similar to and part of the same chain as the New York Workers School.

But as educational director of the party, I was responsible for all inner education, agitation, and propaganda, public meetings, printed matter, shop papers, everything that used to be called by the Communists agit-prop, but more politely in America called educational director at that point. And also as a district leader, I had from time to time all sorts of other general responsibilities.

I would be responsible for this section for a period of time, then for that one, for special campaigns, and so on. But my main work was educational director.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was there any—did the direction of all this Communist Party activity come from above—from a Communist organization above—or was it democratically decided among the various functionaries carrying on this work?

Mr. MEYER. I would like to put it this way:

At every level—in this case we will take the district level—a great many problems of execution were decided on the spot, but basic line came from above.

For example, in the position I held in charge of a department, it came in from two directions. One, from the district bureau and the district organizer himself of Illinois-Indiana who, in turn, had his directives from New York, from the central committee, and also directly to me from the educational apparatus in New York itself.

I would say that at each level in my experience the basic policies are laid down from on top, even to the degree of important personnel decisions being made from on top. But the execution of policies is your responsibility at the level you are at, and the same thing applies in your relations with the lower level.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how long did you remain a Communist Party functionary, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. MEYER. I became—incidentally, I did not finish the actual posts I held. The last year or so of my activity, that is, beginning in the spring of 1941, I went from educational work into organizational work, so that I was involved in the organizational commission for about a year, until the summer of 1942, at which time I entered the Army as a volunteer officer candidate.

I would say that my active work continued until about a month or two before I was accepted as a volunteer officer candidate in, I imagine, August or so. I was actually inducted in the Army in October of 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened when you were inducted into the Army, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. MEYER. Well, as a functionary, and since as I was not immediately draftable, there was considerable opposition from the party leadership to my volunteering, and it took several months of argument to get the O. K. to do so.

When I was actually inducted into the Army, as was the case generally, a formal breaking of formal membership in the party was the normal case. That is to say, as of that moment you were not a party member until you came out again, and became a party member again.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, if you were asked under oath, were you, during the period you were in service, a member of the Communist Party, could you, without fear of incriminating yourself, honestly deny that you were a party member?

Mr. MEYER. If you are a good casuist and a good Communist, you could.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no doubt about the fact, even though you were in that reserve status, you were a dedicated Communist?

Mr. MEYER. Of course; of course.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you serve in the Army?

Mr. MEYER. I went in as a volunteer officer candidate in 1942, in October, and went through basic training, and so on, and was washed

out for lack of sufficient physical agility at Fort Benning in late February.

Mr. MORRIS. A few months later?

Mr. MEYER. Seven months later, six months. I don't know—five months, actually; late February, early March—I am not sure of the date.

Whereupon, under the VOC situation, you were discharged honorably and reverted to draft status. But my feet had broken down completely in the Army, and I had to follow that up with a couple of operations, which kept me immobilized for about a year and a half.

Mr. MORRIS. Then, after you left the service, you did some work in Washington, did you not?

Mr. MEYER. No. I had in mind the possibility of getting a job in Washington, in order to be able to do something, and also I was a Communist, and thinking in terms of where I could be most effective in that period.

The point of the matter is this: that having been in the Army and still being draftable, and having these medical problems, the party felt that it was not worthwhile my going back into an organizational job that I might either, for medical or draft reasons, have to leave in a few months, and I was a member at large, living in and near New York, and at 2 points in 1943, and again in 1945, before and after the operations, I thought in terms of getting a job of some sort where my attitudes would be useful, and so on, in Washington. And I made some efforts in 1943.

Then it became absolutely necessary to have the operations, and then in 1945 I made efforts again.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Jenner, while you were chairman of this subcommittee, the subcommittee made an extensive inquiry into how Communists were able to get into Government and move around in Government. I wonder if we might ask Mr. Meyer how he, as a member at large at that time, went about his efforts to get Government employment.

Senator JENNER. Proceed.

Mr. MEYER. Actually, the person with whom I made contact, and it was done as so many things in the party are done in these circumstances, without specifically saying "he is a party member, you are a party member, you ought to work together," but by a series of recommendations, the details of which I don't even remember, I was introduced to a man named David Wahl, who seemed to me to be functioning as a sort of informal employment bureau for the party in Washington, because I know of one or two other cases where he was helping people in this way.

Mr. MORRIS. I might say David Wahl has been a witness before the subcommittee, at least in executive session here, connected with this particular aspect of his experiences.

Proceed, Mr. Meyer.

Mr. MEYER. Various possibilities arose. I unfortunately do not remember at this point exactly whom I saw. I was introduced to a number of people in Washington, where nothing happened to work out or come through.

The one I remember most distinctly, because it appealed to me very strongly at the time, was a proposal made by a friend of Mr. Wahl's

who was then Mr. Seller. I think it is Dick Seller. He had been, I believe, in a newspaper strike in Chicago, and was then secretary to Congressman Hugh De Lacy of Washington or Oregon. Washington, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was Seller a Communist, to your knowledge?

Mr. MEYER. To the same degree that I would say I talked and acted with Dave Wahl, as though he was a Communist, I talked and acted with Seller as though he were a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony that Congressman Hugh De Lacy was a Communist during this period.

Will you proceed, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. MEYER. The scheme or the proposal that Dave Wahl and Seller worked up was to get me a job as secretary to Congressman Helen Gahagan Douglas, who, so far as I know, was not aware of the circumstances by which this thing was being done. She apparently relied on Mr. Seller to a considerable degree for advice and general knowing the way around, and he was working to find her a person as a speech writer. I don't know which specific assistant to a Congressman or secretaryship it was but, as the job was discussed, it would have consisted of speech writing, general activity, and so on. I think this was before the period of the Congressional Reorganization Act anyway, was it not, and I don't know exactly what the specific post was.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. MEYER. This was 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, our records show, Mr. Chairman, that from January 3, 1945, to January 2, 1947, a person named H. Richard Seller was on the House Disbursing Office rolls, employed by Congressman Hugh De Lacy, at a salary of \$6,219. This is the House disbursing record, Senator.¹

The fact of the matter is you did not get the job, did you?

Mr. MEYER. No. The fact of the matter is I didn't. I don't even remember who did, except I knew he said there were other people he had in mind, and it did not work out.

I perhaps should go back a year or so to explain what I was, in general, doing at that point, and finish up this biography.

I was, as I say, a member-at-large. I had been very much out of activity because of the two operations and the recovery that occupied a lot of time, and I was in a wheelchair. I was in the country doing a certain amount of writing, and when I was in New York, in communication, personal conversations, with a number of national committee members—about the same time as I considered and looked into the Washington thing again for a few weeks, I was also discussing with the national committee what they had in mind for me to do from a party point of view.

¹ A study of the payroll records in the House disbursing office showed employment in DeLacy's office of the following individuals, their highest salary per annum, and their duration of tenure in his office.

Name	Tenure	Salary
H. Richard Seller.....	Jan. 3, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947.....	\$6,219.84
Isabella Savery.....	Jan. 3, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947.....	3,461.04
Barbara Z. Richardson.....	Jan. 13, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947.....	3,461.04
Gladys Castle.....	Jan. 3, 1945, to Oct. 31, 1945.....	488.40
Suzanne S. Blumenkranz.....	Nov. 1, 1945, to Aug. 31, 1946, and Nov. 1, 1946, to Jan. 2, 1947.....	1,145.00

• Blumenkranz is not listed on the rolls for the months of September and October 1946.

I should say that I think that, at that time, my mind was moving a little in the direction it later took. That is, I was critical of the party position. I was thinking in terms of very much what became the Browder position. I had drafted a memorandum to Browder just before he opened up the broad, so-called Teheran position of the Communist Party.

I was a little unsettled already, let us say, and perhaps might have moved still further away from the party during that long exile, had it not been that the Browder position seemed to me to be just what I wanted, and I remained in for a couple of more years, and became rather enthusiastic about it, moving in the direction of making it more that way.

Mr. MORRIS. And some time within a year after Browder's expulsion from the Communist Party you, too, lost your interest in the Communist Party?

Mr. MEYER. What actually happened is this:

During this period of 1945 or so, I finally, after discussions with John Williamson and Gil Green, it was agreed that I should write and teach for a year or so before taking on further organizational responsibilities, and I taught at the Jefferson School, wrote for the New Masses, and I had previously, incidentally, written a number of articles for the theoretical journal of the party, the Communist, later Political Affairs.

I don't believe my articles appeared when it was Political Affairs. I think they appeared in the earlier prints. And I actually broke with all or most inner party connections, or was broken with most inner party connections, almost identically at the time of the Duclos article and the big Browder removal from the position of power.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Browder well?

Mr. MEYER. I knew Browder extremely well right at that time, and somewhat later, during those first few months after he was removed from power. I knew him somewhat before.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you acquainted with a woman who was closely associated with Mr. Browder, Josephine Truslow Adams?

Mr. MEYER. Yes.

As a matter of fact, it was through her that I first personally met Browder; otherwise, in a very informal official capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Josephine Truslow Adams?

Mr. MEYER. Miss Adams is a woman, formerly a teacher at Swarthmore, who became involved in the United Front and Communist Party activities, in the first place, on campaigns on questions of so-called civil liberties, Spanish Civil War, and so on and, at the time I knew her, was teaching at the Jefferson School in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a teacher, or she was a teacher?

Mr. MEYER. Both of us were teaching, as a matter of fact. I met her when we were both teaching there.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you both were in the general Communist framework?

Mr. MEYER. That is right.

I was introduced to her by Howard Selsam, as a matter of fact, who was the director of the Jefferson School.

Mr. MORRIS. And a Communist?

Mr. MEYER. And a Communist.

At the time I met her, we got to know each other quite well through a series of accidental circumstances, and she was a very close friend of Browder's and had become a very close friend of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, of the President.

During the year or so I knew her, she was in constant communication with both of them, and insofar as my discussions with her were concerned, we acted, talked, and generally acted and talked as Communists together, in the perfectly normal way that Communists would act together.

In the circumstances in which I knew her, she talked to me at very great length through those years, had many long conversations, and from it I got a very detailed idea of what was going on in the course of her visits between New York and Washington, or between New York and Hyde Park.

So far as I can deduce from it, deduce from—I won't say deduce. My memory of what she told me from day to day and week to week was that these were not simply the carrying of messages, as it were, but a continuing political conversation devoted toward attempting to show Franklin Roosevelt the similiarity of aims of the Communists and of his, and persuading him, or attempting to persuade him, with much receptivity on his part, that the United States and the American Communist Party, the United States and the Soviet Union were and should be moving in the same direction, toward a democratic socialism, as it was put.

That is to say, Franklin Roosevelt was, I believe, from the conversations I had with Miss Adams, convinced that the Soviet Union would move from its lack of civil liberties toward civil liberties while the United States moved from its constitutional and free enterprise situation to socialism, and both would end at the same point, and that, as it were, he and Browder were very close political friends, though they never met personally, working toward the same goal from somewhat different positions.

This was the general framework of the conversations I had with Miss Adams.

Many detailed points could be raised in connection with it. I don't know to what degree you want me to go into the problem. Many questions were discussed concretely from time to time.

MR. MORRIS. Well, now Mr. Meyer, is it so, then, that Miss Adams was seeing both the President and Earl Browder, who was at that time the head of the Communist Party?

MR. MEYER. Right.

MR. MORRIS. Now, did you learn from what she told you about these conversations, as she would meet these two people involved—she would come back and tell you about it; is that the situation?

MR. MEYER. Yes.

She would talk to me—it so happened during that period I was teaching once a week at the Jefferson School in New York, and spent 1 day a week in New York, living out in the country, and the people with whom I stayed at the time, Miss Adams also lived with. Both she and I were people who liked to stay up late at night and talk and talk, and she would tell me a very great deal of what occurred the day before, the week before, what occurred a week before.

MR. MORRIS. Browder trying to influence Mr. Roosevelt, or Roosevelt trying to influence Mr. Browder?

Mr. MEYER. Mr. Browder was trying to influence Mr. Roosevelt specifically, and Miss Adams was acting as an influence from Mr. Browder on Mr. Roosevelt.

Senator JENNER. Did she tell you how she got into that position?

Mr. MEYER. Yes. It is quite a long, complicated story.

It began when, after leaving Swarthmore, I believe, she had some difficulties because of her political activities. After leaving Swarthmore and being active in Philadelphia in this kind of general activity, she became involved with—I don't know if she was an official member of it, but she became involved with the Free Browder Committee. Earl Browder had been sent to jail on a passport charge, and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and others were running a committee to bring pressure to bear to free him.

She was working with that, and she had previously had personal relationships through old friends of hers with Mrs. Roosevelt.

It was suggested to her that she should do what she could to utilize that relationship to help the work of the Free Browder Committee. She wrote many letters about the matter through Mrs. Roosevelt to the President, to Mrs. Roosevelt, and finally she was invited to Hyde Park to an art exhibit of some kind.

Miss Adams is a painter, incidentally, and some art exhibit was going on, of some WPA painter, or something of the kind, and she was invited there, along with a lot of other painters, and was quietly ushered into the President's office, study, whatnot.

He said a word or two about the exhibit to her, and then, as I remember her story, he turned to her and said, "What would happen if I freed Earl Browder tomorrow? What do you think would happen? How would the country react?" And she gave him the pitch of what the Free Browder Committee would want, argued with him a bit, and said things would be good, it would help national unity, that sort of thing. And they talked about it.

Now, I am not clear, I cannot remember distinctly one interview she had with Roosevelt from another.

Either at that one or at one fairly shortly thereafter, Roosevelt, in talking to her about her claim that there were a large number of people who—there was sufficient mass pressure to support him if he freed Browder, sort of half jokingly and half seriously said, "There is a meeting going on in Philadelphia at which, I believe, Wheeler and Nye and Lindbergh were speaking, and—well, if you know people and have people that can get mass pressure, it might be a good idea; maybe you might be able to do something about that meeting."

It was half jokingly done, half seriously done, rather sparringly done.

Miss Adams went down to Philadelphia, had all her connections through her friends around the party and near the party and, presumably, in the party. I don't know exactly what she did, and a rather spectacular countermeeting was held, which stole the headlines, or at least equaled the headlines of the Wheeler-Nye meeting. They got big caricatures of Wheeler and Nye.

I believe Mr. Cudahy was chairman of the meeting, and connected with the meeting, and he made some remark about Roosevelt which

was regarded as odd. It was misinterpreted. I don't know exactly the circumstances. They got big slogans.

To make a long story short, they got enough counterpublicity so that the anti-Wheeler-Nye-Lindbergh meeting got as much publicity as the original meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point may I break in to say in connection with the story now being told us by this witness, we have made some kind of an inquiry. For instance, on January 17 of this year Miss Josephine Adams did testify in executive session before the subcommittee.

She, in substance, tells very much the same story about that and about her own role as the person who would see Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Browder, and bear messages from one to the other. She has estimated that she acted in this capacity from 38 to 40 times and, Senator, as you know, we circulated this resolution yesterday, which reads:

Resolved by the Internal Security Committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, That the executive testimony of Josephine Truslow Adams, taken before the committee on January 16, 1957, be hereby released from the injunction of secrecy and made public; be it further

Resolved, That certain parts of said testimony may be used in public hearings from time to time.

Five Senators signed that yesterday, Senator.

I ask at this time, and in support of the testimony just being given here by this particular witness, that the excerpts selected by the subcommittee from this testimony of Miss Adams go into the public record.

Senator JENNER. It may go into the record and become a part of the official records of this committee.

(The material referred to was marked exhibit No. 438 and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 438

EXCERPT FROM JOSEPHINE TRUSLOW ADAMS' TESTIMONY, JANUARY 16, 1957

Mr. MORRIS. Why don't you tell us how the arrangement first had its origin.

Miss ADAMS. It started this way, in a very informal way. He saw me on other things. Then he asked me what I thought of the situation, what people in general—what was the impression from different sorts of groups. He knew I knew a good many different kinds of people—about the Browder situation. I mean, how the labor people felt, how the clergy felt, how the conservative people felt, what would happen if he should pardon him, and so forth, what would be the reaction in the papers. He knew I was one individual, but he evidently was saying this to a lot of people. I don't consider I am so important. But I think he thought—what he was practically saying to me is how many signatures can the Communists get in every city of people that are not just Communists, you know—what I did, practically, because I knew enough people to do it. And the person extremely uncooperative was Darcy of Philadelphia. He was difficult, because apparently his enmity to Browder had apparently been seething. I got details from Boston and New York and so on about that, and also about the clergymen, and so on.

Then there was—the first definite appointment that had anything to do with talking to him about Browder that was really on that point was when some of the people in New York told me that it would be a wonderful thing if I could get to Hyde Park to see him on that subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people in New York?

Miss ADAMS. Now, those were the people on the committee to free Browder—I mean like Elizabeth Flynn and Weinstock.

Mr. MORRIS. Louis Weinstock?

Miss ADAMS. Yes. I think what they did was invite me down someplace or other, Hotel Alba—it was mostly—it was really run by Louis Weinstock.

* * * Miss ADAMS. * * * And as soon as he [the President] had given me directions on that, he turned around suddenly and began talking about the Browder case and asked me—he said suddenly, “What do you think would happen if I should pardon Earl Browder tomorrow?” Just like that. “How would the newspapers take it?” And I told him to the best of my ability what I thought would happen at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was that, Miss Adams?

Miss ADAMS. Well, I felt that there would be a considerable protest from certain papers, but a general feeling of support and sympathy, because of the war situation—I think there was a strong support from labor and liberal groups, and even from the upper middle-class groups—on the point that he was there on a technicality, and that the war situation warranted it. And he pretty much agreed with me as to the basis of his being in prison. I think he was a little ashamed of the way he had been put in. He didn’t like Browder at that particular point. He thought there had been a technical frameup himself. He had been convinced of that. But he was embarrassed as to how to do it and what would happen, what kind of a reaction there might be, particularly because of the war situation. He didn’t want to cause any confusion. And it was a long time after that interview he did pardon Browder. But I saw him several times in between—because it was at that point he hinted also about wanting to find out what people thought about it as much as possible.

And after that I wrote to him a good many times, on other points, things that came up, anything that I thought might be useful. I think I have a list of some of those letters somewhere. And I always got some kind of an acknowledgment, very often from Mrs. Roosevelt instead of him, that the letter had been received. If it was important, he would send for me, and I would see him—if it was something of real importance to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, on how many occasions did you see the President?

Miss ADAMS. Altogether?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss ADAMS. I couldn’t say that under oath, because I might be wrong.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, just approximately.

Miss ADAMS. Oh, I should say approximately 38 or 40 times, in the whole time this existed. It was at Hyde Park as often as in the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what was your relationship to Earl Browder at this time, at the time of your visits to the President?

Miss ADAMS. Well, I didn’t know him at all at the time when he came out of prison, and did not see him for some time after. But the first time that I ever had occasion to see him was the time when I heard the story that Roosevelt—I heard from him, in other words—when I was ill in the hospital, St. Lukes, I had an operation, flowers were sent to me by Bill and by Mr. and Mrs. Browder, because people told him I had worked on his release, but I didn’t see him. And then I finally did go to one meeting that was held as a sort of celebration of his coming out, in which a number of people, Communists and non-Communists working on his release—of course, there were really lots of Communists—were supposed to be. I think that was on the Fourth of July in the year he came out in May. The first time I ever looked at him or saw him in person was on the Fourth of July, and I was introduced to him by Sam Darcy, who was sitting on the platform in front of me. And he shook hands with me, and that was all, said a word or two, and I think was scarcely aware at that point of who I was or of what I had done in the case. I think Carol King, his wife, told him.

And then I heard from Roosevelt and people that knew Roosevelt approached me on the subject that they would like to get word around that they did not want a third party in the 1944 election, outside of New York State, except for the ALP. And I gathered that he would like this word to get to Earl Browder. And I didn’t even know at the time where Earl Browder was, where he lived. But someone that I knew knew where his brother lived. So I went to see his brother. And his brother told me he was up at Monroe, in New York State.

So I took a bus to Monroe and went to see him, and told him the story of the no third party beyond New York State, and was interested to see that in those days he had a good deal of influence, because within a few days there were things in the papers all over the country about the fact that there would be no third party outside of the ALP in New York State—not just in the Communist papers, but all over. And Benson of the former labor group was approached and had an interview with Earl in New York, and of course Gil Greene, of later fame, wrote an article in the Daily Worker itself on that subject, and the Times came out with an article that there would be—understood there would be no third party beyond New York State in the 1944 election.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was New York excepted from that?

Miss ADAMS. Because the ALP was valuable to the election. In the other place it might cause splits, but there the support would be unanimous and they were sure of it. That was obvious. But that was the most amazing piece of political engineering, of course—the first I had witnessed of how fast things could go if they were well organized. In other words, that it really worked. And at that time he was at his peak of influence. Browder had a great deal of influence outside of the party at that time, although he was so shortly out of prison, because there was a very widespread and immediate reaction that I sensed. To me it was almost frightening, although I was completely in support of Roosevelt.

Mr. MORRIS. Almost what, you say?

Miss ADAMS. Frightening.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean the speed with which an order—

Miss ADAMS. Yes; I was surprised. I was in sympathy with the project and completely aware of the fact that it would probably be a good thing from my point of view. But I was a little amazed, overwhelmed, to see something work.

But during that interview, he asked me for the first time—of course it was the first time I really had any personal conversation with him—he told me that he was worried about Irene's status—this went on for years afterward, conversations about Irene's status—that was his wife. But he was worried and followed me down the steps in Monroe to speak about it—told me also to warn Roosevelt that the Puerto Ricans who were then in Atlanta were a dangerous setup as long as they were in this country. And he had a suggestion what should be done with Campos. He had gotten to know them in Atlanta. He thought they were pitiable, but unreliable figures. And he suggested that some relative of Campos in Peru would, you know, take him, because he had this bad heart and he was on parole in the Columbia Hospital down here in New York. And, of course, as soon as he was out of Atlanta and was in that hospital, all the Puerto Ricans in New York came to see him, and they were plotting all the time. And I went down a couple of times myself. I got to know him through Earl. And every time I went down to the hospital, I gathered more and more that this was going on. I wrote to Roosevelt continually on that point. But, of course, the thing was he could not, as I found out afterwards, just order a thing like that, because being a Puerto Rican, Campos was a citizen in a way, you know. I mean it wasn't a matter of deporting him where you wanted to. It was a difficult thing to arrange. But Earl realized the danger in Campos. That was not a party affair—it was just a personal thing to Roosevelt. Because Campos—you couldn't say what Campos was. He was with the Jesuits one day, the Communists the next. He would take anybody's help to help Puerto Rico to be free, as he thought, because he was a completely fanatical revolutionary.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Adams, you say that Earl mentioned to you, on the steps, of his wife's deportation, Irene's deportation case.

Miss ADAMS. Yes. At that time it was not a question of deporting her. It was not as definite as that. He was not sure of the status. It had not yet been brought up in that sense. They had not mentioned deporting her. The last developments had not happened at that point. But he was afraid that something of the sort would happen because of her uncertain status. And he wanted me to talk to Roosevelt if I could possibly get his ear on what could be done about Irene. And he assured me, as I found to be probably true through knowing other alien Communists, or alien members of Communist parties and so on, that she was not a member of the party officially, because they did not permit aliens to hold party cards. They considered it too dangerous. In the early days of the party I think most of them were aliens it was made up of. But at that point it was considered unwise, and I know she was not.

Mr. MORRIS. But that was a mere technicality.

MISS ADAMS. Of course, it was a technicality. But I think she was so wrapped up in her children—in all the period I knew her she was not involved with party people, she didn't get along with party people—Elizabeth Gurley Flynn couldn't stand her.

MR. MORRIS. And then did you relate that message suggested by Earl Browder back to the President?

MISS ADAMS. I didn't tell him that in person. I went home and wrote a letter about it. I wrote a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt that was sent to him. I often, in those days, wrote to her things that I wanted to reach him. And sometimes letters that I addressed to him I put inside of an envelope to her, because they got there faster. He had a bigger mail than she had even. If the things were earmarked for him they went very quickly from her office to him, I discovered. Her secretary knew enough to get them to him fast. Whereas if I sent it directly to him sometimes it took quite a while.

MR. MORRIS. Now, did Mr. Browder initiate any of these meetings? Did he suggest to you to go down and see the President and tell him this or take him that?

MISS ADAMS. I don't remember that it was ever said that way. If he thought there was something very important that had come up, that he wanted him to know about, he would say, "You had better get word to him such and such." And if I had a chance to see him, I did. If I didn't, I wrote letters. I wrote endless letters all the time. In fact, people that knew me then—Bella was surprised to find out I was a mural painter, because my political activities were so strong, they never even knew I was an artist.

MR. MORRIS. For instance, may I just take this one document.

MISS ADAMS. That is later; yes.

MR. MORRIS. This is a paper that I had photostated, which I have taken from your file. Do you recognize this paper?

MISS ADAMS. Yes, I do.

MR. MORRIS. What is it?

MISS ADAMS. It was a paper that Earl Browder gave me in relation to the activities of the Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek toward the Chinese in the north, using materials and troops that were supposed to be used in fighting the Japanese, but were used in fighting the civil war instead. And it was a summary of the exact statistics, as much as they could get on that, to bring home to Roosevelt, which he probably may have known from other quarters, what the situation was in China.

MR. MORRIS. Where did Mr. Browder get this; do you know?

MISS ADAMS. I am not positive where he got that. He handed it to me. I think that it came along with that other slip about the sabotage of the—no, it didn't—the sabotage of the airfield in Kweilin was a little later. I think he gave me that one separately, and it came from a suitcase that had come in from Burma, some place in the East. Because I saw him take some papers out of the lining of a suitcase somebody had brought him. It had come by plane. Somebody that had some connection with the East.

Browder was on very good terms at that time with Mao Tse-tung. He had been interested in China in the past. And, of course, I may say for Browder the first rebellion against Stalin started with him. Tito came later. It was really instigated by Browder and went around the world. That I know, because I watched it happen. He was way ahead of the others. He had insight enough to know. I am bringing this in—it is extraneous, but I believe it has a connection here. Because he thought Mao Tse-tung was going to be the kind of Communist that Tito became, and he was very interested in him. In other words, he thought he would work out some kind of national movement in China that was not as much associated with the Soviet Union. And he was watching him with great interest for that reason. He seemed to have been on good terms with him. And I imagine some of the material he had came through people that he knew through Mao Tse-tung.

MR. MORRIS. It came from the Far East?

MISS ADAMS. Undoubtedly. But the actual person that brought it I could not tell.

MR. MORRIS. Browder gave it to you?

MISS ADAMS. Browder gave it to me because he thought I could reach Roosevelt, either by mail or if I happened to be going down.

MR. MORRIS. In other words, he wanted you to give this to the President?

MISS ADAMS. Yes, as quickly as possible.

MR. MORRIS. Did he convey any message with it?

Miss ADAMS. No, simply he thought it would be of great interest to him, and it would be a good idea to let somebody go out there and see what was really going on. Of course, such statements were reinforced by people like Stilwell and so on. There were other people out there.

Mr. MORRIS. This reads that "as of February 20, 1944, Chungking troops entirely engaged in blockading Eighth Route Army under Gen. Hu Shung Nan, 23d Army Corps of three divisions each." This will appear in the record.

"As of February 20, 1944, Chungking troops entirely engaged in blockading Eighth Route Army, under Gen. Hu Chung-nan, 23d Army Corps of 3 divisions each; 30 divisions of central troops; 39 divisions of local troops. Under Gen. Kao Hsang-chen, south of Suyuan: Armies Nos. 1, 3, 16, 36, 8, 9, 91, 57, 22; and third cavalry army. Under Ten Pao-hsan, new 26th division, in Yu Ling-fu up north. Under the Ma brothers (moslems); Ninghsia 11th Army, 81st Army; and mechanized regiment of 70 tanks.

"Between October 1943 and February 1944, 4,000 tons of munitions sent from Chengtu and Chungking to area of Paochi and Sian, where can only be used against 8th Route Army. This was not directly lend-lease material, but was diverted from Kunming stores when replaced by lend-lease. Also vast stores of foodstuffs accompanied.

"On January 14, 1944, a military conference at Sian formed an anti-Communist training class, at same time sealed the radios operating at Sian and Chungking offices of 8th Route Army; also sent 2 squadrons of planes with Chinese pilots (from 18 to 24 units) for participation in attack on border region. Exposure and protests in foreign press caused withdrawal of marching orders. Economic situation becoming worse."

Miss ADAMS. I remember I did take it to the lens plant. I had seen Browder in the evening. I remember that I took it down instead of mailing it, because it was one of the times when I went from the factory where I was working, the lens plant, on 56th Street. I carried it to the factory, and, you know, had it on my desk there while I was working there.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, then, you did physically turn that over to the President?

Miss ADAMS. Yes, I had two copies. The reason I have that—they were on onionskin. And I think I kept one and sent the other to him or gave the other to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he return it to you later on?

Miss ADAMS. No. The copy I have is a second copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what happened after you showed this to the President?

Miss ADAMS. I believe he sent Wallace out there following that. Yes, he sent Wallace out. And Earl himself had some memory of that, because when I made the Ford recording, he came in at that point and mentioned things that happened that seemed to be a direct result partly of this and, of course, other material that the President had on the same subject. But he did send Wallace out there.

Mr. MORRIS. That was as a result, you think, of this—Browder having sent that letter down?

Miss ADAMS. Partly.

Mr. MORRIS. And was there anything that Browder said to you on this other occasion that you just referred to, at the time of the recording, that would be of interest in connection with this episode, Miss Adams?

Miss ADAMS. I think he said several things that would be of interest, but I could not be sure. No—I could add to this record—he promised me a copy of the record, you know, for myself. I could listen to it and then pick that up, send it in to you.

Mr. MORRIS. And you can supplement the record.

Miss ADAMS. Supplement it, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did the President say anything to you?

Miss ADAMS. My bringing this thing up, in other words, reminded Earl of things he said that he had almost forgotten and started him off. And several times he intervened with his voice on the record, adding things on this subject that came back to him as we talked. Anything the President said on that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss ADAMS. Yes. He was very interested in the Far East situation, and very bewildered by it, because he did not want a Communist China, if I may say plainly. He did not want that at all. But he realized, as I think a great many people had, that the leadership was very poor—that the south—that the eventual collapse might come for that reason, because they were not powerful or enough trusted—but that the Chinese would fall very fast for the Communists there—

because his contacts with Chiang and Madam Chiang were not too happy. He didn't like them or trust them particularly. He told me the story about some—Chiang appealing for gold, because he was short, and that he had sent things out that could be turned into gold, and then he sent it off, and he used it in some way himself, instead of fighting the Japanese war, he had thought. And that it was the best thing he could deal with, in other words, but he worried about him as a leader of a caliber—that he didn't feel that they had anything like, say, England and France had, as allies.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you think the President—

Miss ADAMS. I think he was not at all—I think it would be going to great extremes and very unfair to think that Roosevelt ever wanted China to become Communist. It was far from that idea.

* * * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I think you mentioned to me an episode about a Polish Government-in-exile agent.

Miss ADAMS. Oh, yes. I think I have that piece of paper in another folder. It isn't in there. I was given a cable to get to Roosevelt that was sent by a Polish Government in exile, in London, an agent of same—was sent by him in London as a sort of survey of the situation here of elements that he considered were fast falling to the bottom—that was the word—he was sorry to say that these were the elements that were supporting him, the only elements. And he listed a great many different types of things—organizations in Detroit, Polish organizations, church organizations, different political groups and individuals, among them Whittaker Chambers, incidentally. And none of these groups were identified too much. They were just described in a very vague way. And Browder went over them with me, and to the best of my ability, we marked in red ink on the side what we thought they were. For instance, Whittaker Chambers was mentioned as the editor of a popular magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Time.

Miss ADAMS. Yes; Time. But they did not say Time. So then we figured out it was Whittaker Chambers and it was Time. At that time I never heard of Whittaker Chambers, but Earl told me. So I labeled the different things and said those were his guesses as to what they were.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me see if I understand this. This was a letter—

Miss ADAMS. It was really a cable.

Mr. MORRIS. Written by—

Miss ADAMS. Roosevelt could have had access to it. In other words, it was brought to his attention this way. Roosevelt had the right to read that cable if he wanted to, but he didn't know it existed.

Mr. MORRIS. How did Browder know?

Miss ADAMS. Because somebody who must have worked in the office where this went through or something brought it to Browder. That is the only way I can figure. And so he thought the material might interest Roosevelt. It was simply a survey of what even the Polish people themselves thought were the groups that were supporting them. And he mentioned at the end that these were fast sinking to the bottom. In other words, in the political atmosphere of that day, they were very unpopular groups.

Mr. MORRIS. Let's see if I can understand this. This was a cable that Earl Browder showed to you.

Miss ADAMS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not know where he got it.

Miss ADAMS. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Obviously, however, it did not come from the sender—

Miss ADAMS. No—somebody who had access to it gave it to him.

Mr. MORRIS. What did Browder say? Did he ask you to call it to the President's attention?

Miss ADAMS. He never put it that way. He said he thought that was very interesting material. He knew I would be likely to send it if it was. And he thought it would be interesting to the President to see it. This was when the Polish border question was beginning to loom large, the whole question of Poland. It was just before Roosevelt's death.

I have a briefcase somewhere that incidentally was given to me by Roosevelt, it was something, some mineworkers in Mexico or something, some fancy thing they had given to him as a present, that he gave to me because I carried so many papers back and forth. In it was the Polish cable. That is in my home in Suffern, but I can send it to you.

Mr. MORRIS. The effect of that would be to cause the President to lose confidence in the Polish Government-in-exile, wouldn't it?

Miss ADAMS. Well, I don't think one cable would be powerful enough for that. But of course that was the object of it, I think—to make him realize that it was not a much-respected force, like a good many of the governments-in-exile.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you take that to the President?

Miss ADAMS. Yes. That I believe I mailed him. I mailed him that.

Mr. MORRIS. And you do not remember any conversation on his part, any reaction to his reception of that.

Miss ADAMS. Yes—because when I did go to see him, he went over with some interest—he went over what these different things meant. And I can remember then that was the first time that [the name of] Whittaker Chambers ever crossed my lips, I didn't know anything about him. Earl had given me a slight history of him at that moment.

Mr. MORRIS. What did Browder say of Chambers?

Miss ADAMS. Well, he said he had been a party member at one time and now was an editor of Time. And he sort of shook his head over him at that moment. And then—no mention of the later story. But he never went in for that kind of thing about people. But he did think that—he was apparently very anxious for Roosevelt to see it, and I gave it to him. And I do remember that Roosevelt went over the meaning of these different little red-ink marks. That is the document he later wrote "Dr. Johnson" on and was later found by Truman after Roosevelt died, and he was bewildered. It was in a dossier on Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the cable that Browder had acquired and you had sent it to the President.

Miss ADAMS. Yes. And that was the only way that my name ever came up.

Mr. MORRIS. It was marked "Dr. Johnson," you say?

Miss ADAMS. I think all this Madam X story must have come out of that.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the reference to Dr. Johnson?

Miss ADAMS. He had just written on the top "Dr. Johnson," meaning me.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did he call you that?

Miss ADAMS. Because I had to talk to him so much. I was a conversationalist rather than anything else. In other words, you know, Sam Johnson had to talk—I mean he was better known as a conversationalist than a writer. And there were many things that were the kind of things—they were not conspiratorial or anything like that, but you didn't want to go through the hands of a million secretaries and so on, that I tried to get to him by taking them down. And he was amused by my tearing down from the factory with a white shawl over my head, and coming back. So he used to call me Dr. Johnson to tease me.

Mr. MORRIS. There was no Boswell involved.

Miss ADAMS. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what specifically did he say about this cable later on, when you did speak to him?

Miss ADAMS. Well, he told me that he thought that the Government, the Polish Government-in-exile, was at pretty low ebb himself. He had gotten that report from many quarters—much like the experience he had had with the Finnish Ambassador and so on. He had had that feeling, that you had to deal with them because—he wasn't in sympathy with the things particularly that were going on in the country, but he felt, I think that that was not a completely representative thing, the government-in-exile. I suppose he would have labeled it Fascist, much as Earl would; at that time—probably it was, partly, according to the definitions in those days. I don't know. I couldn't say, in fairness.

* * * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how often did you see him, say, in Hyde Park and how often in Washington?

Miss ADAMS. Well, I would really hesitate to give a number, because it became a routine almost. And I was so interested in what was going on, and I never thought this was something to be made a record of, and I just could not say. Certain occasions stand out very vividly in my mind, but I could not give an exact count. I can just figure the space of time and the number of times that I—how far apart the visits were spaced. If it was over 2 years that I saw him once a month, you have 24 months there, you see. And it was really 3 years. I think, of this kind of thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you ever stay overnight in the White House?

Miss ADAMS. No; not in the White House. I stayed overnight in Hyde Park, a couple of times—more than once—several times. I went to the White House at night, but I usually went back, because I had the job. It was usually not on

a weekend. I took sleepers back and walked into the factory. I had to be there at 8 in the morning. And one of the things that I was looking up for him at that time was sabotage in the lens plant, which was reported in New York.

* * * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss the Teheran Conference with the President and with Mr. Browder?

Miss ADAMS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could develop that for us.

Miss ADAMS. Well, of course, I did not—Roosevelt didn't tell anybody before he went.

Mr. MORRIS. He didn't go to Teheran, did he? That was Hull. He went to Yalta.

Miss ADAMS. Wait a minute. He went to both—oh, yes. There were pictures of him at both. Yes, he did—because it was after the Teheran Conference. I remember, that was the first time that all of them got together. There had been some of them in North Africa, but without Stalin. There had been the DeGaulle meetings. There was a lot of amusing stuff—you know all that stuff—between Churchill and Roosevelt on the subject of DeGaulle, the way they used to speak of DeGaulle as the bride, his cable name. They had so much trouble with him as being a prima donna, that they always spoke of him as the bride.

But it seems to me that it was after the Teheran meeting that Browder said to me, "Well, my work is done." He seemed to think that—and that is when he wrote the book that of course got him out of the party. He seemed to have an instinct the way that things would march forward then, from that time on, in the party here, would broaden out into such a thing that he would no longer function as he had been functioning. He seemed to realize it very early. He didn't know just what pattern it would take.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Browder try to influence the President during this period with his ideas about Teheran? Did he make any recommendations to the President, in other words?

Miss ADAMS. I don't think he ever assumed that he would consider that too much—he never put it to me that way. In other words, he would have the hope that if he heard something from me, as he heard it from other people, that he would listen. But he had never been told that the President valued—only by action could he tell how much he did. The only time that he ever gave him a word, it was just once in a great while, sometimes indirectly, by thanking me, saying the thing I had done was important. Or the time that he did send word to Browder that he had put his country before the Daily Worker. And I remember there was one occasion on which he said, Roosevelt said to me, "If this is really put over, in a strange way you will have done as much as some of your ancestors for the country." I have that in some kind of notation. It completely overwhelmed me, and of course I didn't believe it. But it had something to do with Browder, because I went back to Browder with it. It may have been when the party was turned into the political association. But I don't think it was that. There was something else. And I have some note on that, too. I would hesitate to give it to you as a fact until I look it up again, but I have. And you see, I think that Browder—I felt that where there had been any shrewd contribution, that it was not a matter—I did not take credit to myself, that it was my brain—where there had been a shrewd analysis that might help him in the war situation, it was very often Browder's. So that I felt, in a way, when he said something to me that it was a tribute to Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. And was there any discussion between Browder and you on that, and then a resultant discussion between yourself and the President about Teheran?

Miss ADAMS. Yes, there were.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about those?

Miss ADAMS. It is very hard for me to look back at the moment and sift out Teheran and Yalta, although they were quite different. But I do remember that when the decisions at Teheran came out, they were in line with many discussions that I had with the President that were the outcome of things I had said to Browder. Not that I take credit for myself or Browder for being big enough to have influenced him. There must have been many, many things that influenced him. But I think that he had come to know by that time that Browder knew, or as representative of a certain group, that he was giving him what he thought, as far as he could. He was certainly not in contact with the Soviet Union at that time, but he had been in the past. I suppose he was giving him to the best of his ability a picture of what he thought would go on as a result of certain things.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was not in contact with the Soviet Union at that time.

Miss ADAMS. No; not during the war. He had very, very little contact. I know this by the fact that they were always puzzling and fighting on what was really going on there and what they really wanted. I heard that enough inside to know there were very few contacts during the war period, that it was guesswork from over here, if they were trying to follow out the policy of the Soviet Union from reading things—they were able to get hold of certain things. They saw certain publications, certain action, and were able to interpret them according to what they had known before. But you see, whatever representatives they had here were here and stranded. In other words, they did not have contact with home too much, either.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say now that—

Miss ADAMS. And I think that is what made such a prolonged quarrel over Browder's dismissal. They had no direct contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Miss Adams, can you tell us now specifically, give us a couple of concrete instances of a conversation on Teheran that you would have had with Browder and a subsequent one with the President?

Miss ADAMS. I remember that he believed that the opportunity for him to get together and talk things over would make a longtime program for possible peace in the world; that it would be of great benefit; and he thought it was the beginning of a possible wartime program of peaceful coexistence between the Socialist and the capitalist nations; that it would be of great advantage in the working out of the war itself, the winning of the war. And he laid great stress on the fact that if they had some common meeting ground, that something would be worked out. Of terms or advantages to the Soviet Union or the United States, specific terms, I didn't hear anything beforehand, because Browder did not know beforehand that the meeting was going to be. We didn't know that, had no way of knowing that. I could sense sometimes—I mean I have a sixth sense about these things. I had the feeling, say, that it was coming. I very often had, you know, on these trips. But nothing specific was told me about it. With Yalta, there was a more specific talk beforehand—if there were such a meeting—about terms, not on the part of Roosevelt, but on the part of Browder. I remember his saying that he hoped this or that would happen if they got together. For instance, this business of the Japanese, that if they did go to war with the Japanese, what could be done about waterways with the Soviet Union and so on. But nothing specific that was handed to Roosevelt, say a request. I do remember that other people tried to pump me as to whether or not Roosevelt had—I don't know how they ever got word of it; it wasn't through Browder; it wasn't through me; but I think it was at that time through Mary Jane Keeney. By the way, she came down on the train with me. She was standing behind me on the train. She must have been sort of watching to see whether I was testifying, because she knows I would have traveled coach ordinarily. She said, "I see you are going parlor car." She said, "I'm going in the smoker, so I don't suppose I'll see you again, but I'm glad to have seen you." She was right behind me at the gate. But I hadn't seen her in years. But I think Mary Jane must have been the person. I have a reason for knowing she knew I was down here.

One time when I did come down to stay overnight in Washington, but not at the White House, and saw the President, I stayed several days and saw him 2 or 3 times, and Mary Jane knew I was around, because she saw me at that time. And she did some rather foolish boasting, which I warned them about, boasting that she knew the people in the Embassy, and she got material—

Mr. MORRIS. The Soviet Embassy?

Miss ADAMS. Well, everybody went to embassy receptions. But as though she were rather important. She boasted.

Mr. MORRIS. About having gotten material.

Miss ADAMS. Yes. And I knew Kouvnikoff, just because he wandered around New York with his boxer dog and turned up everywhere.

Mr. MORRIS. Serge Kouvnikoff?

Miss ADAMS. Yes. She seemed to have direct relationships with Serge, seen him every so often and let him know what was going on. And I got the feeling, strangely enough, although she is a twitty little thing, of all the people I met around, aside from Ted Baer, that she had more direct connections with Embassy things, with Russian people, than other people that I knew. Most of the party people didn't. They were just guessing.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Kouvnikoff; was he a Russian national?

Miss ADAMS. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He wrote for the Daily Worker, did he not?

Miss ADAMS. He wrote for the Daily Worker. He had been a White Russian, and then he turned revolutionary. He was a fine horseman.

Mr. MORRIS. He wrote a column called The Veteran Commander.

Miss ADAMS. Yes. Ted Baer used to invite me down there. And I wrote to Roosevelt on this score, and I told Browder. Browder said: "Just always know nothing or give him something wrong." And I got the same word from Roosevelt. Because they began pumping me as to points about what Roosevelt thought. I mean, in the first place, it was a very daring assumption that Roosevelt would ever have told me anything of a military nature, or terms in any specific way before they came out, because that would be too dangerous a thing to do. But they thought I might have sensed something like that, or felt something was going on. So that, every once in a while, Ted Baer would try to snare me into his house, and the minute I got there, Kouvnikoff would walk in with the dog, as though this were just a little exercise. And then he antagonized me by always attacking our military as being so stupid, the campaigns in Italy—

Mr. MORRIS. Where was this?

Miss ADAMS. Ted Baer's house. He would attack the military, our own, as being stupid, because he was so conceited about his knowledge of military affairs—particularly on the Italian campaign. What he would do, he would come in with a riding crop in his hand, or the dog, sit there, and in a very arrogant fashion, just as though it were offhand and he could trap me—but I was wise to this thing—he would say, "What do you think they will do, the Russians, if they do go into the Japanese war?" It was very obvious. And I think if Roosevelt wanted anybody like that to know it, he had his own way of letting him know. In other words, I wrote to Roosevelt and told him exactly what had taken place, but I never said anything there.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell me this. Did Kouvnikoff have access to the Soviet Embassy?

Miss ADAMS. Oh, yes. I think without a doubt. I think there was a link—in fact, Keeney practically told me that once—between Keeney, Kouvnikoff, and the Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, there was a link that we were talking about, that the Communist Party would have a link to the Soviet Union.

Miss ADAMS. Well, it would be only such—because they always felt, and I know, with the discussions that came over, whether the Soviet Union approved or did not approve of Earl's dismissal business, that there were terrific rows about what the Soviet Union thought. So if they had anything—of course, finally—what is the name of that old fellow that was in charge of the International Publishing House?

Mr. MORRIS. Trachtenberg.

Miss ADAMS. Trachtenberg finally laid down the law—where he got it from—that he knew what was right and what they wanted. That is the way he got Gurley Flynn into line. He professed to speak for the Soviet Union; that he knew. In fact he came to the Jefferson School. They had all voted the other way. He said the vote had to be made over—"You just have to change it." Which is what made Frank Meyer fall downstairs. That was the end of Frank. Frank got up and fought on that occasion. I didn't have any right to speak, but I was terribly knocked down by Stachel. I started to say something. Stachel said, "Oh, comrades, this is a very sad occasion. I am afraid Earl Browder is not going to see the light. He doesn't want to. We will never straighten this thing out." He wanted it to be this way, you know. He was looking for power.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Senator, in addition, in trying to be sure that a story like this is accurate, I went to New York 2 weeks ago to see Earl Browder, and I asked Mr. Browder about this story. He said, yes, he knew about it. I told him the nature, the general nature, of Josephine Adams' testimony, and he corroborated it. He said: "Yes, it is true. She did act as an intermediary between me and the President."

I said that she had estimated between 38 and 40 times. He said, "Yes, that would be about right," and I asked him if he would testify, and he now is, I believe, Senator, under indictment, and he said that he would not like to testify in public, in public testimony before a

congressional committee on this subject, but authorized me, in the presence of his attorney, to state for our public record——

Senator JENNER. Who was his attorney?

Mr. MORRIS. O. John Rogge. He authorized me to say that the information, as I related it to him about the testimony of Miss Adams, was an accurate story, and he would generally corroborate it, and he said I may say so for the public.

Senator JENNER. Had he previously denied this story, or had he not been asked about it?

Mr. MORRIS. This had come up before. Mr. Meyer, you did testify to this once before, before the Subversive Activities Control Board?

Mr. MEYER. Very briefly, and simply, as to the existence of the relationship. It came up in the Jefferson School case before the Subversive Activities Control Board, and Miss Adams and Mr. Browder entered denials before the press, not under oath at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not denied; the substance of the thing. They took some particular aspects.

Mr. MEYER. They twisted around the matter; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, this testimony, which is now in the public record, is an acknowledgment on the part of Miss Adams that she so testified under oath, that these things did in fact occur, much the same as Mr. Meyer's testimony.

Senator JENNER. And Mr. Browder has substantiated this story, in the presence of his attorney, with you in New York as recently as——

Mr. MORRIS. Two weeks ago, but not under oath.

Senator JENNER. Not under oath. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything else now about your qualifications to testify here in connection with the meeting of the recent Communist Party Convention and that you think we should have in the record, by way of qualifying you as an expert in these particular hearings?

Mr. MEYER. Only, I suppose, that in the intervening years I have kept myself acquainted with Communist developments, Communist literature. I have worked for a year or two on a book which required that I make a rather special study of some aspects of it, and have followed the press, both American and world press. I think I remain acquainted from month to month with the developments in the Communist world.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, you never formally resigned from the Communist Party, did you, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. MEYER. I drifted out of it, as it were, after the Browder break, but the drift, so far as the Communist Party was concerned, was very quick, in the sense that, while I continued to teach at the Jefferson School a few months longer, I had no official connections with the party, as such. And I did not make an issue at the Jefferson School, and they did not. They waited until my last scheduled class was out of the way, and then we just let it go.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the year of that?

Mr. MEYER. The break, as it were, with the party officially was at the point of the Duclos letter, and a few weeks after, which is May to June 1945. The last course I taught at the Jefferson School ended in December 1945, so, let us say 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. December 1945?

Mr. MEYER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, how long after that—what was the transitional period which was necessary to set in, in your own case, before you, for instance, would say you would testify before a congressional committee about the details, about your own experiences in the Communist Party? Was there a transitional period in your case, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that that is very important for us, because, as you know, the Communist Control Act of 1954 indicates that, before action can be taken against a Communist-controlled union, you have to show Communist membership within a period of 2 or 3 years.

Now, we have been laboring at great length to establish that that is a very unreal provision in the law, Senator, because we find that it takes, ordinarily, many years before a witness, after he has disassociated himself from the Communist Party, sees the world issues clearly enough that he will come forward and testify against them.

That is why, Senator, in each case where we have somebody who did break away from the Communist Party and testifies here, we advert to this one particular aspect of his testimony.

Senator JENNER. Proceed, Mr. Meyer.

Mr. MEYER. In my case, it might be recognized that for 2 years there had been a certain process going on inside of me, even before I left the Communist Party. But starting with 1945 as a year, it was, I believe, 1947 or 1948—I am not quite sure—before I talked to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and it was 1949 before I testified in the Smith Act case, the Dennis case.

Now, it so happened that I have not testified before a committee before, and I would say it probably would have been much more difficult to convince me to testify before a committee in 1949, on a subpoena, in a judicial case. I would estimate that had there been any reason and had I been asked to testify before a committee, I might have done so as early as 1951, somewhere along there. Five or six years' minimum.

Mr. MORRIS. And the reason for that; I wonder if you could just generally tell us the reason for that, Mr. Meyer.

Mr. MEYER. The problem involved is this:

When one first breaks with only the abuses, one feels either the Soviet Union or Stalinism is bad, or this or that aspect is bad.

As my wife and I used to put it, we are not anti-Communist, we are just non-Communist, and then, even after you get from the non-Communist phase to becoming rather an anti-Communist, large remnants of prejudices that have been instilled all your life against investigating agencies remain.

One feels that, well, this is not the way to fight them, and one thinks it can be fought only in the labor movement, or only by intellectual methods. It is necessary to break first from a rejection of Stalinism, then of Leninism, then of Marxism.

It is a long process of philosophical breaking, and in many cases that I know of it never completes itself, but I feel that somewhere along that line—and it differs from person to person—when certain problems are really finally satisfied in one's mind and one realizes this is totally evil—the Communist movement—then one is prepared to testify, and it might take anywhere from a year or so, to 7 and 8 years.

I personally know cases of ex-Communists who are perfectly sound people today, but who still have years to go before I think they will be willing to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. Meanwhile, the secrets that they have remain locked up and inaccessible to the various agencies of the United States Government?

Mr. MEYER. And they get rather stale in the course of that time, too.

Meanwhile, new things have developed which will take another 7 years to get hold of.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Meyer, you have been following the Communist Party activities on the international level and national level, have you not, with great care?

Mr. MEYER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read thoroughly the 20th congress reports, the 20th congress of the Communist Party reports, from Moscow?

Mr. MEYER. I have seen a good deal of the material, and I have particularly studied both Khrushchev speeches, not merely the sensational secret speech, which was finally released by our Department of State, on Stalin, but the main report made to that convention which laid down the line of that convention, that congress, and was adopted as the line of that congress.

The main address of Khrushchev to the 20th party convention, which I believe is the central document for Communist Party ideology, policy, during this period—

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did that represent a retreat on the part of the Communists from their heretofore aggressive position?

Mr. MEYER. It is my opinion that the line of the 20th congress, far from being strategically a retreat or far from being a strategic admission of weakness in the need of retreating, is the most forward and aggressive strategic statement that has ever been made by the Communist international movement in all of the years of its existence.

Senator JENNER. Why do you say that, Mr. Meyer?

Mr. MEYER. For this reason. Previously, through all the years since the revolution, and up until—for a century up until this statement, or just before it, one doctrine of the Communist movement has been that we live, speaking for them, as it were, that we live in a world of capitalist encirclement. We have a Socialist island here, and the capitalist world could constantly encircle it. We are, as it were, on the strategic defensive. The main thing to do is hold on, to gradually strengthen ourselves, to wait for the day when new possibilities exist outside of the Socialist island.

With the 20th congress, for the first time—let's put it this way:

With the 20th congress, and with certain documents that appeared a few months or a year or so before it, for the first time in all the years of the existence of the Communist movement, the basic strategic point was reversed, and the constant talk was about 900 million people, the general tone was that of a period in which not socialism is encircled but capitalism is encircled, the free world is encircled.

And the conclusions drawn from that are extremely positive, hopeful, and just because, if I may be a little complicated about this, just because it is a strategically offensive situation when, from the Soviet point of view, time is on their side, everything is moving their way, it is possible to think much more than before in terms of tactics that are comparatively gentle, because at this point, with everything moving

in their direction, the only thing that would possibly stop them would be a really hard, desperate understanding of the situation and resistance. Soft tactics are far and away the best way to present such a resistance.

Hence, while the Geneva Congress line, and the Geneva agreement, Summit meeting line, and the 20th Congress line, which are the same—I am sorry.

Hence, while they are tactically soft, they are based on a hard strategy which is, as it were, thinking of itself as entering the last lap, of having passed over to the last big struggle and moving forward on that, with considerable hopefulness.

I have, as a matter of fact, Khrushchev's report, photostated here, and I think that there are a couple of aspects, a paragraph or two, if you would like that, that might be worthwhile reading in this respect, because this has to do—let me say one word more before I read, because these paragraphs affect several points relative to the recent convention.

It is clear from Communist strategy and Communist principles that the stronger you are in a given area or situation, the less need there is for violent revolution. The weaker the enemy is, the less need—I won't say for violent—yes, for violent revolution in the immediate sense of uprising. The stronger you are, the more the country concerned is surrounded with Red tanks, terrorized with Red rocket fleets, infiltrated from the inside with a strong Communist Party, with a leadership that is weak and vacillating and doesn't know where it is coming, the easier it is to pull a victory for communism, like Czechoslovakia where, without any actual civil war, the whole structure of the constitution was overthrown.

The passages I am interested in here connect both with the problem of their strategical concept and with the true meaning of all the talk that has come out, both internationally and in the United States, about how violent overthrow isn't necessary; world war is no longer necessary; which I think these few paragraphs may enlighten a bit.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Meyer, will you state for the record the document from which you are reading?

Mr. MEYER. This is the Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to its 20th Party Congress, delivered by N. S. Khrushchev.

Senator HRUSKA. What date?

Mr. MEYER. This comes from the organ, the organ of the Cominform, "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy," that is the name of the journal, dated February 17, 1956. And it is the full text of the report delivered by Khrushchev there.

Mr. MORRIS. There was some portion you wanted to read?

Mr. MEYER. Yes, which I think may be of interest on these two points:

Our enemies like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence, always and everywhere. True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a Socialist society.

That is to say, the recognition of a need for a revolutionary transformation.

It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists—which in this language means Communists—from the reformists, the opportunists.

There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries, the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie—

that is to say, of constitutional government of a non-Communist kind—

There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class struggle connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary. It is not true—

says he—

that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society.

Then, and this is relevant to the first question that was asked here :

Leninism teaches us that the ruling classes will not surrender their power voluntarily. And the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or the nonuse of violence in the transition to socialism, depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiting class itself resorts to violence, rather than on the proletariat.

In other words, "if you will hand over your money without being shot, we won't shoot you," or "if you will hand over your freedom without being shot, we won't shoot you." It is a question of the robber saying, "Your money or your life"; in this case, "your freedom, your Constitution, your way of living, or your life," and "if you won't fight, we won't fight, either."

Later in this passage he says, and this is relevant to the problem of their greater strength from their own point of view at this time, their feeling of Socialist encirclement :

The historical situation has undergone radical changes which make possible a new approach to the question. The forces of socialism and democracy—

that is, of the Soviet Union and its satellites—

have grown immeasurably throughout the world, and capitalism has become much weaker. The mighty camp of socialism, with its population of over 900 million, is growing and gaining in strength.

And so on. He develops this at considerable length.

Therefore, under these circumstances—

skipping a bit—

in these circumstances the working class is in a position to defeat the reactionary forces opposed to the popular interest—

that is, the Communist Party to gain power—

to capture a stable majority in Parliament, and transform the latter from an organ of bourgeoisie democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will.

That is to say, a transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The point—and it is a little complexly placed here—but the essential point, the conclusions I draw from this are :

First, and this is absolutely unchanged Leninistic doctrine in all the years that I have been a Communist, studied communism : 1. Our goal is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of a Communist society.

2. We will do this in any manner and by any means which is useful, efficient, and successful.

3. That includes violence where necessary.

4. Under the circumstances of the past period where the Communist camp has become stronger, where, rather than being an encircled island, we can almost begin to think in terms of encircling the free

world, there will be many more places in which we won't have to carry through an armed civil war, but can simply penetrate parliaments, penetrate the government offices, stir up threats abroad and at home, and carry through a victory, as we did in Czechoslovakia.

However, and I think this is vitally necessary in the present situation and considering the kind of headlines we have had about communism a great deal later, the one sentence here which is absolutely guiding and still remains is the section which says:

There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class struggle connected with this are inevitable.

Now, he did not name any names as to the number of countries, but clearly he means the ones where communism is weakest at this point, which are strongest in their economy and in their free system, and I think the initials of the one he really means are U. S. A.

I think that is about all the quotes from this.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, Mr. Meyer, the Communist Party had a convention here on February 12, and, as you know, the committee has been holding hearings on this one particular series of hearings.

Now, the first news headlines that came out from this convention, and I will mention them, are: "Reds in U. S. Vote To Cast Off Moscow." "U. S. Reds Vote End to Control by Soviet." "U. S. Reds Quit Foster, Kremlin." And it goes on.

We have been hearing quite a bit of testimony to the effect that that is just not the case, that the opposite is so. There was a tactical change, and a tactical representation is made that there was a break from Moscow, but witnesses have indicated that their lines are still holding fast.

I have been wondering if you have made a study of the reports of the recent Communist Party convention, the resolutions as such. In fact, you have studied every part of the convention, have you not?

Mr. MEYER. I have seen a large mass of material, read everything that I could find in the papers, both the Daily Worker and several other papers, and I think I have a pretty good idea. I have also read some of the testimony of witnesses you have had already here, in the press, and summaries of their testimony, who were actually at the convention.

I think I have as good an idea of what went on as anybody who wasn't there could have, in terms of the material issued, and I think I can make an interpretation that is fairly valid, on the basis of that material.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what your own interpretation of this Communist convention was based on, your studies and your own experience as a Communist, as you have described it?

Mr. MEYER. I would like to actually pick up for a moment on the international Communist situation, because I don't think it is possible to understand even the details of any Communist Party in a given country without seeing it against the background of the movement, of which it is an integral part.

And I have already stated my belief as to what the character of the main line of the 20th party congress was, in the Soviet Union which is a line for the whole Communist movement, the line of strategic offensive.

I want to make one more point about the 20th Congress and the period since.

I think it is undoubtedly true that, in the whole international Communist movement, and first of all in the Soviet Union itself, a factional struggle has been going on since Stalin's death. But I also want to emphasize that that factional struggle is not a new idea or new possibility in Communist ranks, that there have been a number before, and that this factional struggle, whether in Russia, internationally, or in the United States, is far and away less violent an inner struggle than others, and in particular than the struggle that went on hardly without cessation from 1925 or so to 1929 or 1930, at which time also our papers were hourly predicting the end of communism as a serious threat or saying that Stalin was fighting with Zinovieff and Trotsky, Russia is going to mind its own business, or this, that or the other.

That is to say, I think that there are many examples of more severe factional struggles in the past than this.

Secondly, I do not find in all the reading I have been able to do, and despite certain new aspects of this struggle that I will mention in a moment, any very profound difference between the factions and serious theoretical factors, not as severe as between Stalin and Trotsky, or Stalin and Bukharin in the struggle between 1925 and 1930.

They were arguing and disagreeing and fighting for power, with considerable differences of opinion. It was basically a power struggle, but it was also a theoretical struggle.

So far as I can see at this point, in the general terms of Communist theory, there is not anything like the severity in that difference in the three major groupings that seem to me to turn up again and again in international communism in the last year or so. And those three groupings I would characterize as unreconstructed Stalinists on the one hand, a rather smaller group which seems to think in terms, for tactical reasons, of a certain liberalization, for example, of more emphasis in Russia on consumer goods to pacify the population, internally a little gentler hand with the satellites.

Let us call it, for the moment, a liberalizing on the other hand; and, the third faction, and apparently at this point the dominant one, which I believe Khrushchev represents, a center faction which is essentially holding them all together in a little bit, a considerable amount of internecine squabbling, but in which the line moves pretty much along, first, making a little concession to this group, and then making a concession to that group.

I raise this only because I do not think that it is possible to understand what went on at the convention of the Communist Party of the United States without this background.

One other thing: The 20th Congress and the general Soviet attitude since, have allowed, have encouraged, have, one might say, directed that such differences should be allowed to occur openly to a certain degree instead of being concealed as they were in the past in committees and bureaus.

Hence, as I hope to show in a moment, the United States—the Communist Party of the United States convention will not merely reflect in content the same kind of divisions as occurred in the 20th Congress and have since occurred in the Communist International, but actually the very fact that these things are being fought out in the open to a certain degree, being argued out in the open, com-

promises arrived at in the open, the very fact that they are doing it in the open, the very fact they are talking about how independent they are of Moscow in the open, is precisely a carrying out of the directive of the 20th Congress to say in the open, "We are independent of Moscow"—in the open.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you see any sign that there is any independence of Moscow?

Mr. MEYER. To make this point, I think it would be necessary to analyze, it would be necessary to put it this way. Let me just go a bit further on the three groupings, as far as I am concerned.

The Stalinists are unreconstructed Stalin groups that seem to be headed by Foster.

The liberal group by Gates, and the center seems to have been most of the old solid leaders of the party, not the best ones, but the good solid leadership of years' duration.

So far as I can see, on the question of relationship to Moscow and the relationship to international communism, the resolutions as adopted to the degree that we know them, and the draft resolutions where they have not yet published them, are all fundamental defeats for any effort whatever to take a substantially non-Moscow-dominated stand.

Basically, on the Hungarian situation where one small group, rather to the liberal side, wanted the adoption of a resolution being quite critical of the use of Soviet troops in Hungary—this was smashed, and a double-talking resolution on the surface passed on the motion of the Illinois State committee, which essentially accepts the Foster position, with a little window dressing, criticizes by implication the Gates position, and ends with this sentence:

While international working-class solidarity includes the right to friendly criticism of the party or of the actions of Socialist governments, at the same time—

And this is the key sentence—

at the same time it requires that such criticism shall be within the framework of recognition that the fundamental conflict is with the forces of imperialism.

And as a directive to the party, this is a statement on the Hungarian situation, that the Soviet Union acted correctly. It is against the forces of the rebels in Hungary, who are categorized as Fascists and imperialist agents, that we must direct ourselves. We must hold our criticism, to the degree we have any criticism at all, to a minor level and fundamentally support the Soviet Union in this situation.

As a matter of fact, somewhere in the material, someone's speech, in an appeal to be a little more liberalish, a little more surfacely critical, someone said—I cannot remember who it was offhand, but one of the speakers said:

Look, I agree perfectly. We must not overdo the criticism of Stalin, overdo the criticism of the Soviet Union but, after all, it is all right for the Chinese party, who already have power, to say "Let's take a balanced view of this in our public statements," but recognizing, as we do, of course, that Stalin only made surface errors, certainly in a country with civil liberties, can't we be allowed a little more criticism of the Soviet Union than, say, the Chinese party would be?

Practically in those words—not those exact words.

Generally speaking, to summarize the answer to your question, I feel, from the evidence of the material and the resolutions passed, that all basic questions that were argued rather vigorously in the party during the months beforehand were solved before the Congress opened.

The convention did three things. It made a show of unity, as the Daily Worker and all the last speakers said. Foster did not win, Gates did not win, Dennis did not win. The party won.

The first thing it did was that.

Secondly, it developed a working agreement between the factions by essentially splitting all committees that were so far elected just about equally between them, with the center on top.

Thirdly, it made a record for the courts, or attempted to make a record for the courts, in terms of verbiage but not of fundamentals on its relationship to the American free constitutional process.

And fourthly, on all important questions of program, with 1 or 2 exceptions, it passed on to the new national committee the task of making a program, only 1 or 2 questions on which I think this convention took concrete action in terms of its immediate program, in looking at it. Most were passed over to the new national committee.

There was a point on the agenda, party program, which was totally passed over.

But on one question the stand of the convention is extremely clear in all its resolutions, and that is that the main campaign of the Communist Party at this point must be, to use their verbiage, the extension of democratization in the South. That is to say, the main point made by the convention in terms of an immediate program fits in very well with an old line of Communist attitude toward constitutional processes in America.

It goes back, to my knowledge, 15 years or so when I was rather deeply involved in some theoretical work in connection with the so-called Negro question, and it is this: To the Communist Party efforts to utilize mass democratic mob criterion approaches rather than constitutional ones, to attempt to turn elections into plebiscites, and the main obstacle is the structure, the constitutional checks and balances structure.

And they have recognized for 15 years, and clearly now recognize, that that point in the country at which this structure of checks and balances has its greatest support is in the Senate of the United States, and specifically in the State rights structure of the Southern States, which bring it about that the Democratic Party cannot be looked at by them as a totally people's party in their terms, totally a laborish kind of party, but split it up.

Hence, the major drive in the sense of putting themselves at the head, or attempting to put themselves at the head, to penetrate the movement of the Negro people in the various forms it has been taking in recent years and previously, has nothing whatever to do with any interest in the aims and desires of the Negro people, but is a realization by the Communist Party that that movement can be used as the most important and strongest cutting edge against the constitutional structure of the United States, by trying to develop a removal of division of power guaranties in the South, and, secondarily, by the fact that they believe, as it is clear from the resolutions, that at this time in a prosperous country this is the only place in which

serious trouble can possibly be stirred up, in which there are serious possibilities of developing what they call mass struggles, of building up extra-constitutional and extra-legal actions, and so on.

I do want to emphasize, however, that this is not in any sense a humanitarian position. It has nothing whatever to do with any sympathy for the needs of the Negro peoples themselves. But it has to do with a feeling on their part that this is the point of breakthrough in the country at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Meyer, both Senators have advised me that they have 3:30 appointments. I wonder if we might break in at this time.

Senator, I don't know whether we will be able to work out finally complete testimony of Mr. Meyer, but if we can, we will do it, and I will so notify the subcommittee.

Senator JENNER. Well, on behalf of the committee, Mr. Meyer, I want to thank you. I think you have contributed a great deal to the work of this committee.

I am only sorry that every Member of the Congress couldn't have heard you. I am only sorry that every person in the United States couldn't have heard you.

We certainly want to thank you for your forthright, courageous presentation of this very important subject here today.

Senator HRUSKA. I just want to say, Mr. Meyer, I think in many respects so many of the points about which many of us have been thinking have been corroborated by your testimony here this afternoon.

That is specifically true of your observations concerning the convention held in New York City. Thank you for being here.

Mr. MEYER. Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

The following newspaper article was ordered into the record at a subsequent meeting of the subcommittee:

[From the New York Times, March 5, 1957]

SOVIET ATTACHÉ LEAVES—RUSSIAN OUSTED BY DENMARK ON ESPIONAGE CHARGE

COPENHAGEN, DENMARK, March 4.—Capt. Mikhail Roudichev, assistant naval attaché in the Soviet Embassy here, who was ordered to leave Denmark last week, left Copenhagen by plane today for Moscow.

Captain Roudichev was charged with having tried to obtain secret military information, particularly that concerning the new coastal defenses on Denmark's Baltic coast.

In January Lt. Col. Anatol Rogov, assistant military attaché at the Soviet Embassy here, was expelled on similar charges.

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